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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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Translation of the Russian-language journal **PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA** published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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SOME PROBLEMS IN BEIJING FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY

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[Round table discussion in editorial office of journal at the end of 1979]

[Text] The latest discussion of the peculiarities of the Beijing leadership's current foreign and domestic policy and the antisocialist, anti-Soviet, great-power chauvinistic line of the Maoists in the international arena and within the nation was held in the editorial office of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA at the end of 1979. During the course of the discussion, Sinologists and researchers from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences answered a number of questions of interest to our readers and pertaining to the present state of affairs in the PRC and the implications of certain political actions by the Beijing leadership.

Question: As we know, the Chinese leaders are guided by the official resolutions of the 11th CCP Congress and sessions of the NPC [National People's Congress], which still praise Mao and propagandize Maoism, although they are actually (particularly in certain publications) openly criticizing Mao and denying many of his basic tenets. What is the reason for this?

Answer: It is true that this contradictory phenomenon exists. Naturally, we must not judge CCP policy on the basis of isolated newspaper articles or speeches, but on the basis of fundamental official documents and the actions of the PRC leadership. When we evaluate the situation from these vantage points, we must say that the PRC leadership is still loyal to Mao Zedong and is carrying on his great-Han militaristic line. It is striving to keep national development within Maoist bounds. In this respect, we can definitely say that the "Thought of Mao" is still the basis of the current PRC leadership's strategy. At the same time, the present leaders of the CCP must recognize the fact that many of Mao's tenets have proved worthless, are obviously impeding national economic development and cannot guarantee the fulfillment of Maoist strategic

plans. They must manipulate and modify the "Thought of Mao" and search through Mao's past statements for remarks which can be adapted to present conditions.

On the other hand, it is true that the Chinese press and statements by some Chinese scholars, writers and public spokesmen contain anti-Maoist appeals, condemn Mao's fundamental directives, make demands for the democratization of all public life in the nation and so forth. There is no question that many of these statements reflect the Chinese people's opposition to the Maoist line and confirm that the Chinese people view Maoism as a bankrupt ideology. These remarks and attitudes are still of an isolated and unorganized nature and cannot be used as a basis for assumptions regarding radical changes in CCP policy. We must also remember, as Deng Xiaoping frankly admitted, that many of the "democratic" steps taken by the Chinese leadership, like the establishment of the "wall of democracy," have been calculated to win the sympathy of the capitalist West.

Therefore, the contradictory phenomenon we are now observing in the PRC reflects the continuing state of political instability and unrest in the nation. The mass purges, reprisals and other forms of terrorism that are being employed now, just as they were during the years of the "Cultural Revolution," testify that the military-bureaucratic government of the PRC still has means of coercion that are strong enough to preserve its dominant position.

Question: New youth and children's organizations are now being founded in China. We know that the Komsomol, the Pioneer organization, the All-China Federation of Youth and the All-China Student Congress once existed in the PRC. Why are these new youth organizations being founded?

Answer: The PRC once had 30 million Komsomol members and around 100 million Pioneers. In May 1949 the All-China Federation of Youth was founded--a mass organization of the united front of Chinese youth, guided by the CCP. It was made up of the Communist Youth League, the All-China Federation of Students and other youth organizations.

But Mao Zedong was not pleased with all of these youth organizations. In place of these, the hongweibing, zaofan and hongxiaobing ("little soldiers") organizations were founded in the years of the "Cultural Revolution" and were used by the Maoists to break up the CCP, the Komsomol and so forth. The separate hongweibing, zaofan and hongxiaobing factions could not get along with one another and even fought real battles. The army was used to restore "order" and many hongweibings were sent to rural and alpine regions for long periods of time. The youth organizations founded at the time of the "Cultural Revolution" discredited themselves and were extremely unpopular among the Chinese people.

New Komsomol organizations began to be formed in the 1970's, but a Congress was not convened until October 1978. The new youth organization called a Komsomol rests totally on a Maoist foundation, as set forth by the charter

of the Young Communist League of China. In 1979 the Beijing leadership attempted to extend its control over the younger generation by founding an All-China Federation of Youth, an All-China Federation of Students and a Pioneer Organization and by disbanding the hongweibing and hongxiaobing organizations. New charters were adopted at the congresses of the youth and student federations in May 1979, proclaiming the "Thought of Mao Zedong" to be the ideological basis of these organizations. The "Thought of Mao" also lies at the basis of the new Pioneer Charter.

An analysis of the youth movement in recent years and the attitudes of Chinese youth, however, indicates that Maoism's prestige is declining sharply among the younger generation. The recreated mass youth organizations have not had any significant influence on most of the young people in China as yet, they ignore their problems and they do not express the views of Chinese youth.

Question: The Beijing and foreign press have reported the rehabilitation of many representatives of the Chinese artistic intelligentsia. What are the actual scales and purpose of this action by the Beijing rulers?

Answer: There is no question that the rehabilitation of the artistic intelligentsia represents a "trump card" in the Chinese leadership's current domestic and foreign policy. It is necessary to the Beijing leaders as a means of encouraging the intelligentsia to take an active part in conducting and supporting the "modernization" policy. Besides this, rehabilitation of this type, which is inevitably connected with the exposure of crimes committed in the past in regard to workers in the cultural sphere, has served as a means of discrediting opponents in the struggle for power, while, on the level of foreign policy, it is being employed to give the regime an air of respectability and to alleviate contacts in the international arena.

The rehabilitation of the "Cultural Revolution's" victims began in 1977. This was accompanied by the "theoretical" substantiation of rehabilitation. Quoting statements made by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, the press has repeatedly stressed that the intelligentsia is part of the working population, that it should not be considered bourgeois and, consequently, that it should not be the target of a policy of suppression and restriction. The theory concerning the triumph of the "black line" in literature and art in the 17 years prior to the "Cultural Revolution" has been branded erroneous and criminal. At the end of 1978 a CCP Central Committee decision was adopted on the total eradication of the "rightist element" label, and the "unfair and erroneous" categorization of a multitude of cultural figures as "rightist elements" in 1957 and 1958 began to be revised.

It would seem that the matter has been settled. But it is still not known whether many of those who remained alive but were seriously injured by the ordeals lasting so many years will be able to resume their artistic work.

On the other hand, in spite of the seemingly positive nature of the processes described above, it is still too early to speak of a radical change in the status of the intelligentsia in the PRC.

Finally, the general policies of the Beijing leadership and its militaristic, chauvinistic goals naturally alarm cultural figures in the PRC, the majority of whom have always been distinguished by their progressive and realistic views. Will they support this essentially antisocialist course? And if they do not, is it not likely that this "offer of a cookie" will again be succeeded by new ordeals for the Chinese intelligentsia, particularly representatives of the liberal arts?

Question: A congress of PRC cultural figures was recently held in Beijing. Why did the Beijing leadership convene this congress after a hiatus of almost 20 years? What were its results?

Answer: The fourth congress of PRC cultural figures was held in Beijing from 21 October through 16 November 1979. Union congresses were also held for writers, artists and people working in the theater and cinema who belong to the All-China Association of Workers in Literature and Art.

The desire to enlist the support of cultural figures for the course of "modernization" was clearly reflected in Deng Xiaoping's welcoming speech and in the keynote speech by Zhou Yang. In congress materials, which have now been published, there is an underlying appeal to the artistic intelligentsia to forget the bitterness of the past. Naturally, the blame for all that happened was assigned to Lin Biao and the "gang of four," who supposedly distorted Mao Zedong's "correct" teachings and directed the "Cultural Revolution" into "false channels" for their own selfish purposes. Zhou Yang stressed at the congress that the "Thought of Mao Zedong, including his ideas about literature and art, always was, is and will be the compass by which we are guided in our literary and artistic work."

It is not surprising, therefore, that the generous promises made at the congress and prior to it, "to develop democracy in literature and art," did not arouse anticipation in all congress participants. Chinese writers and artists, poet Bai Hua said, are naturally disturbed by the fact that the people who took revenge against them have not been punished by law and have not even been demoted in rank. In response to the official appeals to "write the truth" and "speak frankly," Bai Hua said: "Many frank people have lost their jobs, their freedom, the elementary necessities of life and even their heads. At the same time, many liars have easily won glory and privilege and have become dignitaries. The primitive mentality has been firmly established: The liar is safe, but the man who speaks the truth is taking a risk."

There is no question that the Beijing leadership will have to make a tremendous effort to dispel the doubts of cultural workers and stimulate their artistic activity. The promotion of Zhou Yang--a man whose name is

associated with the persecution of many honorable writers and artists in the late 1950's--to the position of this association's chairman is hardly likely to help.

The need to develop "cultural exchange and friendly contacts with writers and artists in various countries," which is supposed to contribute to the "fight against imperialism and hegemonism," is only mentioned in general terms in the published congress materials. This means that the PRC rulers will continue using literature and art in their fight against the Soviet Union, Vietnam and other socialist countries--that is, they will use them for purposes totally unrelated to the real interests of the Chinese people and Chinese culture.

Question: What were the results, and what is our opinion of the results, of the visit made by Chairman Hua Guofeng of the CCP Central Committee, premier of the PRC State Council, to Western Europe (15 October-6 November 1979)?

Answer: It is true that the Chinese leadership widely publicized its satisfaction with the results of the first Western European visit by a Chinese head of state in the nation's history. An analysis of the results of Hua Guofeng's meetings with Western European leaders (French, West German, English and Italian) and articles in the Western press, however, indicates the opposite. The Chinese premier was unable to attain his chief political goal--a change in the approach of the leading four Western European countries to the Soviet Union and the policy of detente. The guest was informed that Western Europe had no wish to worsen relations with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese leader's talk about the danger of "hegemonism" was only given a positive reception in London and Munich, where M. Thatcher and F. J. Strauss demonstrated a certain similarity of opinions in regard to counter-acting the "Soviet threat." On the whole, however, as even the British press reported, the ultimate goals of the West and Beijing turned out to be different. Beijing's belligerent instigating stand on military detente in Europe was particularly unattractive in comparison to the new peaceful initiative set forth in a speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979 in Berlin. Hua Guofeng openly took the side of the United States and the particular forces in Western Europe that have given in to the pressure of the Pentagon and military-industrial NATO circles in the issue of the deployment of new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

One of the main objectives of the Chinese mission was to win more support from the Western European countries for the continued escalation of tension in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. But the instability in Southeast Asia is viewed in a different way in Paris, Bonn and other Western European capitals.

His visit to Western Europe did not produce any tangible economic results either. During the course of this visit, some agreements were signed on the development of economic, cultural and scientific relations and the possibility of credit for China was discussed. But no major agreement was signed, however. The "Chinese explosion" was explained by the strict predictions of Western economic experts about the "endless" development of trade with China due to internal disorders in this nation and the limited nature of its export and import economies.

Another reason for the visit of the premier of the PRC State Council was the hope of determining the possible scope of assistance to China's military-industrial development. His visit was indisputably planned by the committee of some political leaders of the Western European countries about their interest in a stronger China. Margaret Thatcher officially declared the British Government's willingness to sell China Soviet fighter planes and other military equipment. It is true that the "Iron Lady" made the sale of weapons to Beijing conditional upon the cessation of other NATO members, since the Chinese aggression against Vietnam has not only entrenching Western politicians aware of the risk of ending Beijing's role in the Western European countries must also take the potential position of the Soviet Union in this matter into account. This objective of Hua Guofang's election also remained unstained.

Question: What is the nature of the terrorist regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in Kampuchea, overthrown more than a year ago by the people of this country?

Answer: When we analyze the nature of the murderous Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime, we must first consider the following facts. This regime was not the result of internal Kampuchean processes, but of U.S. armed intervention in the beginning of the 1970's and, after the April 1975 victory in the war of resistance, the intervention of Soviet China, which aimed to establish a bridgehead in Kampuchea for the accomplishment of its great-power hegemonistic plans in Southeast Asia. Chinese social-chauvinism was the necessary condition for American imperialism here. This is why Comrade L. I. Brezhnev correctly stated that a pro-Beijing regime had taken shape in Kampuchea by 1975, a "Chinese-style" political structure, and that the mass executions of people in Kampuchea were nothing other than the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" in action on foreign territory.¹

Immediately after the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime took power in Kampuchea in 1975, this country was inundated with more than 20,000 Chinese "advisers." Pol Pot, the Chinese chauvinists' assistant, said at that time: "Out of 8 million inhabitants, we need only 1." This extremely infamous belief was then implemented on the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime murdered more than 3 million Khmers in 3 years and devastated the country, especially in the Kampuchean cities. The brutality to the goals of the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" is quite evident: the political extermination of the working class, the annihilation of the intelligentsia and, what is more, the transformation of the country into one big "strategic village"—not, more precisely, a "death camp" for the Khmer people.

1. Pravda, 10 January 1979.

The Declaration of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea contains the following definition of Pol Pot's brutal regime: "The regime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique is a regime offering a new type of slavery and has nothing in common with socialism." In essence, this was not a political regime in the strict sense of the term, but a machine for the total physical and moral annihilation of the Khmer nationality, a machine which made "living space" available to migrants from China and Russia from the Southeast Asian countries, a machine which was installed and put in operation in Beijing to its own chauvinistic, hegemonistic interests.

The Pol Pot regime had no objective conditions or social base. It remained in power exclusively by means of terrorism and outside intervention and was a type of "bureaucratic communism." Naturally, this terrorism caused repression to the population and among cadres. The united resistance forces opposed and this regime of genocide and slavery. The crimes of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique were revealed to the entire world. International reaction and the Hanoi rulers are futilely trying to whitewash and "exonerate" this bloody regime and to depict the remnants of Pol Pot's gangs as "fighters resisting foreign aggression." But the progression of Kampuchean slavery toward democracy and socialism is irreversible.

Question: What stand has Beijing taken in negotiations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam?

Answer: The most striking feature of the Chinese side's position in the Vietnamese-Chinese talks is Beijing's persistent utilization of these talks to exert the most flagrant pressure on Vietnam in order to achieve what it could not carry by means of armed aggression. In place of equalization and mutually beneficial agreements, the Chinese side is trying to dictate its own terms to Vietnam, namely GDR recognition that it is part of Beijing's sphere of special interests (that is, hegemonistic great-power interests) in Asia and, in accordance with these interests, the implementation of a Beijing-approved policy toward Kampuchea, Laos and the entire socialist community as a whole, the renunciation of its sovereign rights in the Pescadore and Spratly Islands and the reinstatement of the residence rights of all Hmong who fled from the GDR to the VDR and sought by Beijing.

Beijing is also using the talks as an occasion to demonstrate the "peaceful" foreign policy of Soviet China, particularly in Southeast Asia, and, so far, to prolong the conflict and use these talks as a cover for the continuation of its aggressive expansionist policy in Indochina. The Chinese militarists have not ceased their armed provocations against the GDR and their invasion of its lands, territorial waters and skies.

Therefore, there is reason to believe that Beijing is using the talks to prepare world public opinion for a possible repudiation of China's armed invasion of Vietnam. China is building up its armed forces and weapons on the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Lao border and is openly demonstrating its willingness to embark on a new military adventure.

It is clear that the Beijing rulers have not abandoned their policy of resorting to pressure on Vietnam. Under these conditions, it is difficult to expect real advances in the resolution of urgent problems in the international relations between the two countries. Positive results can only be obtained if the Chinese side takes a constructive and realistic stand and renounces the policy of flagrant arbitrariness, expansionism and hegemonism.

Question: What is the essence of Beijing's tactic regarding the ASEAN countries and what do the Chinese leaders expect to achieve here?

Answer: In its increased hostility toward the Indonesian countries and its ostentatious show of "friendship" for ASEAN, Beijing is essentially adhering to its traditional tactic of setting some Southeast Asian states against others. Mao Zedong's tactic was aimed to create conflict not between individual countries, but between entire groups of Southeast Asian states with differing social structures. In its pursuit of this objective, Beijing is acting in concert with imperialism and is coordinating its own policy of setting the ASEAN states against the socialist states of Indochina with imperialist policy.

Beijing is making every effort to conceal the main purpose of its policy toward ASEAN—to draw the association into the sphere of anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese politics by declaring the need for a "united front" against the USSR and DRV. This is the purpose of virtually all foreign policy activity by the PRC in relations with ASEAN, which has recently taken on the dimensions of a diplomatic theme. Beijing is not limiting itself to general assurances of "friendship" and appeals to "ward off" the imaginary expansionism of the Indonesian countries and the USSR, but has even expressed a provocative willingness to "assist" ASEAN by military means.

The Chinese "patronage" of ASEAN is hypocritical. The Moslems are still supporting pro-Beijing groups and elements in the ASEAN countries and are doing their utmost to stimulate political and financial contacts between the Moslems and Beijing. The Chinese rulers are simultaneously increasing their positive balance in trade with the ASEAN countries (between 1970 and 1975 alone, the total deficit in commodity turnover between the ASEAN countries and the PRC was around 2.5 billion dollars, and by the end of this century Beijing plans to increase the annual flow of currency resources out of these countries to 1 billion dollars). Beijing's actions are taken with consideration for the presence of influential rightist bourgeois and reactionary forces in the ASEAN countries, which are not averse to using China to counteract socialist forces in Southeast Asia. The supporters of a "tough" line in ASEAN are pushing the association into a trap set by Beijing, which hopes, as is well known, to rule all of Southeast Asia.

Question: What was the result of Japanese Prime Minister N. Ohira's talks in Beijing on 3-9 December 1979?

The meeting in Beijing demonstrated that, in spite of the numerous assurances of "friendship and cooperation" by both sides, there are serious differences in the Chinese and Japanese approaches to the resolution of problems in international and bilateral relations.

The PRC leadership is striving to use these talks primarily for the purpose of drawing Japan into the orbit of its own hegemonistic great-power policy and to win support for some of its actions in the international arena. But the Japanese delegation definitely refused, for example, to support Beijing's policy toward Vietnam. It appealed to the PRC to "display restraint in interrelations with Vietnam, settle the conflict through negotiations and not resort to the use of weapons." The Japanese representatives announced that their country would "keep its promise to give Vietnam economic assistance in 1980." The positions of the two sides also diverged considerably in the assessment of Soviet policy and in other matters.

Questions connected with the further development of trade and economic ties were given a great deal of attention at the talks. In spite of China's requests for 5.5 billion dollars in credit, Japan agreed in principle to negotiate only the sum of 1.5 billion, and specifically promised to extend only 700 million dollars in the 1979 fiscal year for work on six projects--the construction and remodeling of hydroelectric power stations, railroads and seaports. As for credit in subsequent years, its extension, it was announced, will depend on "concrete financial conditions" in Japan and "progress in the completion of these projects."

The press made much of the Japanese prime minister's statement that Japan will extend China all of the customs privileges set up for the developing countries from 1 April 1980 on. Nonetheless, both sides made an effort to ignore the decision to restrict imports of Chinese products to Japan.

While the Japanese delegation was in Beijing, an agreement was signed on cooperation in the investigation and exploitation of oil deposits in Bohai Gulf over a territory with a total area of 25,000 square kilometers. If this enterprise should be successful, China will sell Japan 42.5 percent of the petroleum yield for 15 years. Foreign correspondents noted, however, that the project is not likely to be completed by 1984, as the two sides have planned.

During this visit, an agreement was signed on cultural exchange. The Japanese side promised to allocate around 4 million dollars in nonrefundable aid for the organization of Japanese language studies in China. It was also announced that an agreement had been reached regarding a trip to Japan by Premier Hua Guofeng of the PRC State Council in May 1980.

During their stay in Beijing and upon their return to Japan, the leaders of the Japanese Government took pains to assure the Southeast Asian countries, particularly the ASEAN, as well as the United States and the Soviet

Union, of their intention to take a discerning approach to the development of contacts and relations with the PRC,

The results of the Japanese prime minister's visit to the PRC proved that the PRC leadership's hope of winning unconditional Japanese support for Beijing's hegemonistic course has obviously suffered a defeat. Japan displayed a certain degree of caution in its replies to Beijing's political solicitations and tried to satisfy its own interests in these talks. The reappearance of acute conflicts between the two countries does not cancel, however, the potential danger Japanese-Chinese rapprochement would pose to the cause of peace in Asia if this rapprochement would be based on an unprincipled foundation and move in directions meeting the requirements of reactionary forces.

Question: Why is it that Japanese businessmen, despite all of their caution, attach great significance to economic relations with the PRC and are financing Japanese-Chinese trade "out of their own pocket"?

Answer: China is an extremely unreliable trade partner for Japan. It has repeatedly set up unexpected barriers to the completion of transactions eagerly sought by itself by demanding the revision of terms and thereby putting Japanese companies into a difficult position. This was the case with all of the contracts signed in 1978 for a total of 2.3 billion dollars. The main reasons for this not very conscientious behavior can be found in the adventurist nature of the current Chinese leadership's policy, the unrealistic plans for the "four modernizations" and China's overestimation of its ability to repay loans.

These transactions were only resumed in May 1979, after Japan decided to extend China yen credit amounting to 8 billion dollars, with payment to be made in yen as well as dollars. These substantial concessions were made by the Japanese side for a number of reasons. The PRC's share of Japanese foreign trade does not exceed 3 percent. But the PRC represents a sales market for the particular Japanese goods that are most difficult to sell. The PRC is quickly becoming one of the largest importers of complete sets of Japanese equipment. This impresses business and official circles in Japan. This is also the reason that Japanese companies seem to have forgotten the shock they suffered in the spring of 1979 and have increased their shipments of goods to China while simultaneously increasing imports from China, as a result of which commodity turnover in Japanese-Chinese trade in 1979 reached an impressive figure--6.5 billion dollars.

In their intensification of trade with China, Japanese ruling circles are also pursuing political goals--they hope to consolidate their own position in Asia, to "exert pressure" on the USSR, to enhance the prestige of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, to weaken opposition forces and to muffle pressing internal problems with the aid of the "China boom." But they are not deluded as to the feasibility of these goals.

The growth of Japanese-Chinese commodity turnover in 1979 was the result of temporary factors in the market and has not eradicated the major conflicts between the PRC and Japan in this field.

Question: The PRC leadership is persistently striving to establish military ties with Japan in addition to economic and political contacts. What specific steps are being taken in this field? What effect could Sino-Japanese rapprochement in the area of military policy have on the international situation in Asia?

Answer: Ever since the "treaty on peace and friendship" with Japan was signed on 12 August 1978, the PRC leadership has repeatedly proposed the establishment of close contacts between the military establishments of both countries. A month after the treaty was signed, Zhang Caiqian, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, took a trip to Japan to discuss the establishment of regular contacts with the Japan Defense Agency.

In May 1979, Su Yu, PRC deputy minister of national defense, visited Japan. During the course of this visit, Su Yu made provocative statements about the "military threat" posed to Japan by the USSR and appealed to the Japanese Government to strengthen its military alliance with the United States, build up its military potential and develop contacts with Chinese military circles. Su Yu also declared that the PRC was prepared to purchase military technology, including equipment for the production of computerized fire direction devices.

The Japanese Government's official statements generally totally exclude the possibility of any kind of military contacts with China for the sale of weapons to China. In October 1979, however, a decision was made to send a delegation of officers from medical units to China as a kind of "trial run."

It should also be borne in mind that, along with purely military contacts, the extension of credit and loans to China for the purchase of various types of equipment, machinery and means of transport and for the financing of projects connected with the modernization and development of the infrastructure will also be of great significance in building up China's military potential. A member of the executive committee of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, I. Nakagawa, declared in this connection on 27 November 1979, for example, that the offer of economic assistance to China "could be tantamount to military cooperation."

The desire of both countries to develop contacts of this kind gives rise to the real danger of their considerable expansion in the near future, which would have an extremely negative effect on the international political situation in Asia, severely injure the development of Japan's ties with neighboring countries, complicate the spread of detente to Asia and the Pacific region and prevent the conclusion of collective agreements on guaranteed security in Asia.

Question: What stand has Beijing taken in regard to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan?

Answer: Ever since the April revolution of 1978, the PRC has made the focal point of its relations with Afghanistan various kinds of subversive activity against the revolutionary gains of the Afghan people. The Chinese leadership is actively supporting and assisting reactionary Afghan elements both within the country and beyond its borders. Numerous articles in the foreign press have reported shipments of weapons to the Afghan rebels by the PRC, along with the United States and other Western countries. Weapons of Chinese manufacture were used by participants in antigovernment demonstrations in a number of cities in Afghanistan. China has delivered large shipments of weapons to the enemies of the Afghan revolution both directly across its common border with Afghanistan and through Pakistan. An announcement by a representative of the security service of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan stressed that Beijing is training gangs of terrorists and raiders, made up of counterrevolutionary emigre elements, on Chinese territory. According to India's *LINE* magazine, more than 8,000 Afghan rebels were trained in 12 camps located in Pakistan and China in just the year following the April revolution. The December issue of *COUNTERSPY* prints convincing data concerning the presence of Chinese Army officers and instructors in Pakistan, who are training and equipping armed formations operating against Afghanistan.

Subversive antigovernmental activity against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is also being conducted by Afghan Maoists, who look to Beijing for guidance and support. An illegal "congress" of Afghan Maoists was held in Herat in January 1979, where a decision was made to unite the efforts of separate groups and coordinate their actions for an all-out fight against revolutionary Afghanistan.

As we know, acting on the Afghan Government's persistent requests for immediate assistance in the fight against foreign aggression, the Soviet Union sent a limited military group to Afghanistan, which is being used exclusively to aid in warding off armed intervention by external forces. Beijing, however, is making every effort to denigrate the Soviet Union's friendly support and assistance of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to discredit the purposes and objectives of the Afghan revolution.

Beijing is taking its subversive actions against the Afghan revolution in close conjunction with the forces of international imperialism and reaction, especially the United States. This was conclusively reaffirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown's trip to China. One of the central topics of discussion in his meeting with the Chinese leaders was the question of broader support for military groups invading Afghan territory from bases in Pakistan.

AN ACTION CONFLICTING WITH THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM (AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ABRIGATION OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE TREATY)

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[Article by Professor M. S. Ukraintsev]

[Text] On 3 April 1979, the PRC Government announced that the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress had decided not to renew the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, concluded on 14 February 1950, signifying that the treaty will expire in April 1980.

The Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance represents an entire era in Soviet-Chinese relations; it has also left its mark on international life as a whole.

The treaty was concluded soon after the declaration of the People's Republic of China, and the very formation of the PRC was indissolubly connected with the role played by the Soviet Union in world affairs and with its consistent support of the Chinese revolutionary cause. Mao Zedong said in 1949 that if there had been no Soviet Union, if there had been no victory in the antifascist Second World War, if--and this is of particular importance with respect to the Chinese revolution--Japanese imperialism had not suffered a defeat, and if there had been no support from the socialist states and revolutionary forces in other countries, the victory of the Chinese revolution would have been impossible.¹ The Soviet Union heartily welcomed the victory of this revolution. It was the first to recognize the People's Republic of China and establish diplomatic relations with it.

In December 1949, talks initiated by the Chinese side began in Moscow. During the course of these talks, between December 1949 and February 1950, many questions connected with the international situation and Soviet-Chinese relations were discussed, several documents were drafted and plans were made to develop cooperation by the two states and safeguard the security of the PRC.

On 14 February 1950 the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (for a period of 30 years), agreements on the Chinese-Changchun Railroad, Port Arthur and Dal'niy and on the extension of long-term economic credit to the PRC and other documents were signed.

The Soviet-Chinese treaty embodied the noble goals of peace and security and the lofty principles of international friendship and cooperation and represented a model of the new type of intergovernmental relations characteristic of the fraternal socialist countries. It was signed at a complex, difficult and crucial moment in the life of the People's Republic of China, when the Chinese people had just embarked on the path of socialism and were experiencing a particularly acute need for assistance and support in the accomplishment of the difficult tasks of economic and cultural construction and the defense of the young socialist state against imperialist aggression. The treaty became one of the most important conditions for the attainment of these goals. The Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation strengthened by the treaty, and the PRC's entry into the family of socialist countries and into the ranks of energetic fighters for peace were factors of primary importance in the Chinese people's successful struggle to peacefully build a new and independent socialist China and in the enhancement of its international prestige.

The PRC and USSR undertook joint measures to prevent the repetition of aggression and violation of the peace by Japan or any other state which joined Japan, either directly or indirectly, in its aggressive actions. In the event of invasion of one side by Japan or its allies, the other side would immediately render all military or other assistance to its utmost capability. Both sides undertook to participate in the spirit of sincere cooperation in all international events aimed at the consolidation of peace and security. They agreed to consult with one another on important foreign policy issues affecting their common interests. The treaty also envisaged the maximum expansion of economic and cultural contacts between the USSR and China. Their cooperation was to be based on the principles of equality, mutual interests and respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, just as nonintervention in one another's affairs.

In a separate document, both governments guaranteed the complete independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The results of the treaty came immediately. Implementing the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the USSR sent several aviation divisions to China in accordance with an agreement concluded at the time of the Moscow talks. Soviet pilots stopped Chiang Kai-shek's air raids on Shanghai and other locations and safeguarded the security of the entire eastern coastline of the PRC. Later, during the war in Korea, Soviet air divisions located in China protected Northeast China and the entire eastern coastline against American air attacks.²

Close contacts were established between the CPSU and CCP, between the two governments and between various departments in the two countries, and the regular exchange of opinions and experience was instituted. The USSR and PRC coordinated their foreign policy actions and fought shoulder to shoulder with other fraternal countries in the struggle against imperialism and for peace and international security. Economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation acquired broad dimensions.

The existence of the Soviet-Chinese alliance was the most important factor keeping the militaristic American circles responsible for the aggression in Korea from firing the flames of war into the PRC. Harry Truman, who was then the President of the United States, later wrote the following about this. "If we had tried to extend the war to China, we could have expected retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, both ideologically and in accordance with their treaty. If we had attacked communist China, we could have expected Russian intervention."³

The firm stand of the USSR kept U.S. imperialism from dropping a nuclear bomb at the time of the so-called crisis in the Taiwan Strait in the fall of 1958, which was being insisted on, as later reports indicated, by the American military establishment. In a letter sent to the CPSU Central Committee on 15 October 1958, Mao Zedong commented: "We are deeply touched by your boundless fidelity to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and internationalism. On behalf of all my comrades who are members of the Chinese Communist Party, I sincerely thank you.... In our fight against the Americans, we have already acquired the strong support of the Soviet Union."⁴

In turn, the PRC took part in actions initiated by the USSR and other fraternal countries for the purpose of safeguarding security and peace. The PRC welcomed the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact as the necessary basis for preserving the safety of all peaceful people. Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai, who attended the conference of the socialist countries in Warsaw as an observer representing China, said the following: "If the peace in Europe is violated, if imperialist aggressors launch a war against the European peace-loving countries, our government and our heroic population of 600 million will join the governments and populations of our fraternal countries in the fight against aggression until the final victory."⁵

The USSR and the other fraternal countries belonging to the United Nations resolutely defended, and still defend, the rights of people's China in the international arena. As early as 1950, the USSR announced that it did not recognize the authority of Chiang Kai-shek's delegation in the United Nations and demanded that representatives of the PRC be invited into this international organization. At each session of the General Assembly, the Soviet representatives insisted on the dismissal of Chiang Kai-shek's representatives and the restoration of China's rights in the United Nations.

In accordance with the agreement of 14 February 1950, the Soviet Union granted the PRC the full ownership of the Soviet section of the CCRR [Chinese-Changchun Railroad] in 1952. Many Chinese railroad workers were trained on the CCRR. In connection with the war in Korea, the PRC Government requested an extension of the Soviet presence in Port Arthur. On the initiative of the USSR, Soviet Army and Navy units were recalled from the base in May 1955, and all of the equipment in this region was transferred to China free of charge.

Commodity exchange between the two countries developed rapidly: The total in 1950 was 519 million rubles, but in 1959 it was already 1.849 billion.

Machinery, equipment, spare parts, ferrous and nonferrous metals, chemical products, petroleum and petroleum products and many other commodities essential to the development of the Chinese economy were shipped from the Soviet Union to China in large quantities. In turn, China supplied the Soviet Union with ores and concentrates of nonferrous metals, chemical products, textile raw materials and semimanufactured goods, raw materials of vegetable and animal origin, foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods.

Soviet economic assistance took the form of shipments to the PRC, on beneficial credit terms, of complete sets of equipment and materials for enterprises being built and remodeled in the PRC with the technical assistance of the USSR, the training of Chinese specialists in the USSR and the dispatch of Soviet specialists to the PRC. In all, the Soviet Union extended long-term credit to China for a sum exceeding 1,818,000,000 rubles, of which the Chinese side used around 1,816,000,000. In accordance with an agreement of 1 February 1951, offering the Chinese side a discount of 209.5 million rubles, the total credit subject to repayment was 1,737,700,000 rubles including interest. The highest interest rate charged was 1-2 percent per annum, although in world practice of that time credit was extended at much higher rates. The preferential terms of Soviet credit also included the possibility of repayment by means of shipments of traditional Chinese export goods.

Over a period of 10 years (1954-1963) the Soviet Union sent China more than 24,000 complete sets of technological documents, including the plans for 1,400 large modern enterprises and licenses for the manufacture of many industrial items, materials and machines. The use of Soviet scientific and technical experience helped China to quickly, and on a high technical level, accomplish the growth of many economic branches and laid the foundations for socialist industrialization. In turn, the use of Chinese experience in some branches of the national economy was also helpful to the Soviet Union, although the volume of documentation transmitted was not great (between 1954 and 1963 the USSR received around 2,000 complete sets of technical documents from the PRC).

Between 1951 and 1962, around 11,000 Chinese engineers, technicians and skilled workers and around 1,000 students acquired an education, scientific training and practical experience in the USSR. More than 11,000

Chinese undergraduate and graduate students received degrees from Soviet higher academic institutions (moreover, the Soviet Government paid 50 percent of the cost of their education).

At the request of the Chinese Government, more than 10,000 Soviet specialists were sent to China between 1950 and 1960. The work performed by the Soviet specialists in the PRC is a vivid example of the fraternal feelings of the Soviet people and the CPSU for the people of China. This was not a commercial transaction, as in the nations of the capitalist world, but an unselfish offer of assistance to the Chinese people in the transmission of the rich Soviet experience in socialist construction.

Soviet economic assistance helped China to establish whole branches of industry--aviation, automotive, tractor, radioelectronic, heavy and precision machine building, instrument building and various branches of chemical production, as well as to modernize and develop power engineering, the coal, petroleum, petroleum refining and pulp and paper industries, light industry, the food industry and transportation. Just recently, the organ of the CCP Central Committee, HONGQI magazine, noted that 156 central industrial enterprises were built in the first five-year plan with Soviet assistance, that this "laid the initial foundation for socialist industrialization" and that "successes were tremendous."⁶

The first clear signs of a change in the Chinese leadership's policy were apparent in 1958 and 1959. Isolated problems sprang up in the relations between the two countries. There had been differences of opinion on some matters in the past, but the two sides had reached an agreement without difficulty. Now, however, Mao Zedong and his supporters began to behave more and more capriciously and made more stubborn attempts to impose their own wishes.

During the talks between Soviet and PRC leaders in Beijing on 31 July-3 August 1958, Mao Zedong displayed an extremely unhealthy reaction to the Soviet side's decision that it would be inexpedient to comply with the Chinese regime's request for several hundred atomic submarines. Soon after this meeting, China launched hostilities in the region of the coastal islands, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait became extremely tense, giving rise to the danger of a major armed conflict. The Chinese rulers could provide only a fairly unintelligible explanation for their actions when Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko arrived in Beijing at the beginning of September 1958, in the first days of the crisis. Mao Zedong asserted at that time that, all things considered, international tension would be more convenient to our countries and less convenient to the imperialists, particularly the tension connected with events around Taiwan.

The Chinese leaders ignored Moscow's friendly advice on the conflict between China and India in the Himalayas. Moreover, when a Soviet party and governmental delegation arrived in Beijing to attend festivities commemorating the tenth anniversary of the PRC, the Chinese rulers pointedly

expressed their displeasure with a TASS press release of 8 September 1959, in which the Soviet Government called upon both sides to settle their dispute in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the two states.⁷

The Chinese leaders maintained that it was not China's fault that relations between the PRC and the USSR deteriorated. They alleged that the USSR "tied the knot, and it is its job to untie it." But what actually happened?

When the Chinese leadership decided to foment a break with the Soviet Union and the socialist community at the end of the 1950's, it began to take more and more actions contrary to the Soviet-Chinese treaty. In violation of articles 1 and 4, the Chinese rulers stopped taking part in international actions aimed at the safeguarding of peace and security and began to provoke world war. Consultations between the partners on important international issues affecting the common interests of the USSR and PRC ceased to be held. Contrary to articles 1 and 2, they indulged the whims of Japanese imperialism and worked toward the creation of a Sino-Japanese alliance directed against the Soviet Union. They violated article 5, which obligated the two sides to build their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual interests, mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity and nonintervention in one another's internal affairs. They declared hostility toward the USSR to be the basis of state policy, made territorial claims on their neighbor and began to promote the creation of an international front for struggle against the Soviet Union. After commencing this process in 1960 with arguments over theoretical matters, the Chinese leadership later discarded this ideological pretext for its turnabout and openly agreed to an alliance with imperialism in the fight against world socialism.

The transformation of the Chinese leaders' attitude toward the treaty--from its high commendation and energetic implementation to its denunciation--was closely related to the evolution of their political course, in which the dominant position was gradually occupied by great-power hegemonistic ideas, hostility toward the real friends of the Chinese people, contempt for other countries and nationalities and a pathological hatred for anything contrary to the Maoist strategy of establishing world supremacy.

Mao Zedong said in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador in February 1963 that if the argument should continue, the "sky will not fall, grass and trees will still grow, fish will swim and women will give birth to children." Frank argument represented, in his words, a battle fought with pens, brushes and paper, and it could not kill anyone. Alas! Mao Zedong's policy led to the firing of shots on the island of Damanskiy in 1969 and the death of people on both sides. "In 10 or 15 years," Mao Zedong said in February 1965, "when the imperialists raise their hand against you or against us, we will join forces. War will immediately unite us. We are fighting because we are living in a time of peace."⁸

Now the Maoists are trying to ingratiate themselves with the imperialists as much as possible and have allied themselves with the imperialists in the fight against the socialist community and against the communist and national liberation movement.

In a talk with a group of Japanese socialists on 10 July 1964, Mao Zedong threatened to present the bill for sizable sections of Soviet territory. Since 1962, the situation on the border has become increasingly tense. The Chinese rulers have obviously been searching for a pretext for conflicts and have tried to provoke the Soviet side into firing shots, so that this could later be used to poison the mind of the Chinese people. After it became clear that Soviet border guards could not be provoked to armed conflict on the border, the Beijing ruling clique ordered Chinese border guards to open fire. This led to conflicts on Ussuri River on the island of Damanskiy in March and on the western section of the border in August 1969, ending in the utter defeat of the Chinese provocateurs. Soon after this, Mao Zedong told the president of one Asian country that all of this had been engineered expressly for the purpose of arousing hatred for the Soviet Union in several generations of Chinese.

As for the Soviet Union, its line in regard to the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the PRC was always clear and definite. We are still deeply convinced that history will give the necessary credit to this treaty, which helped the Chinese people defend the sovereignty and independence of the People's Republic of China in the most difficult years of its development and served as an important instrument for the preservation of peace and security in the Far East and the rest of the world.

Even during the years when the Chinese authorities were trying to denigrate and undermine the significance of the treaty, the Soviet Government invariably acted on the assumption that the treaty was still in force, that the obligations stipulated in the treaty for both sides were still binding and that they had to be respected by the Soviet Union. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Government, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. P. Il'ichev officially informed the Chinese side of this in April 1971.

After the Soviet Union had repulsed Chinese provocations on the border, it firmly and consistently pursued the normalization of relations with the PRC. Even during the period of greatest friction in this relationship, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not lose sight of the main perspective: The fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese people coincide, and the return of Soviet-Chinese relations to the channel of friendship and neighborliness would be of tremendous importance to both countries, to the entire socialist community and to the cause of peace throughout the world. The USSR proposed that the heads of the Soviet and Chinese governments meet to seek ways of normalizing intergovernmental relations.

When Chairman A. N. Kossygin of the USSR Council of Ministers went to Peking to attend the funeral of President Hu Shi Shih, he expressed his willingness to make a brief stop at the Beijing airport in his flight over China and to meet with Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council. The Chinese Government consented to this meeting and it took place on 11 September 1969.

During the course of this talk, which lasted three and a half hours, the restoration of normal conditions on the border, the exchange of ambassadors, the promotion of more active economic contacts and other matters were discussed. An agreement was concluded, in general terms, that the USSR and PRC would take steps to normalize intergovernmental relations.

The Soviet Union sent V. S. Izraelson to the PRC as its ambassador in October 1970, and he was replaced by I. S. Shcherbakov in September 1976. Chinese Ambassador Lin Jinqian arrived in Moscow in November 1970, and in August 1977 Wang Yizheng was appointed PRC Ambassador to the USSR.

Trade negotiations did not begin right away. It was not until June 1970 that the Chinese side responded to the USSR minister of foreign trade's thoughts concerning the commencement of negotiations and the possible volume of reciprocal shipments. In November 1970, a delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade L. V. Gritskin went to the PRC. A protocol was signed on commodity turnover for 1970-1971. The tripling of the volume was planned (in 1970 it totaled 62 million rubles). Between 1972 and 1977 the trade volume between the two countries amounted to 210-260 million rubles a year, and in 1978 it exceeded 300 million rubles due to the transfer to world prices. The Soviet Union supplies China with some metals, civilian aircraft, machine tools, and spare parts for tractors and motor vehicles. The PRC exports nonferrous metals, cotton fabric, tung-oil, bog bristles and fruit to our nation.

In order to create an atmosphere favorable for the normalization of relations, the Soviet press ceased to print criticizing remarks about the policy of the CCP leadership. The Soviet press and radio kept this silence for several months, but Beijing was intensifying its propaganda campaign against the USSR at that time.

In line with the agreement concluded at the meeting of the heads of government concerning the institution of measures to normalize the situation on the border, Soviet border guards were instructed to do the following in September 1969:

To continue the strict maintenance of normal relations with Chinese border troops and authorities and to preserve the status quo on the border;

To always observe the procedure according to which all border issues must be settled by means of consultations, conscientiously and correctly, so that good-neighbor relations will exist on the border and the possibility of the use of weapons and force will be excluded;

Acting in line with the traditional relations of friendship between the people of the USSR and China, to consistently and actively consider the interests of the population in border regions in both countries with respect to economic activity;

To refrain from propaganda against the other side on the border, including the use of loudspeakers.⁹

The Soviet side reported all of this to promote the improvement of relations between the two states and the establishment of normalcy on the border itself. The Soviet Government officially informed the Chinese side of all these measures immediately, assuming that China would take similar steps. The Chinese side even replied that it had also taken steps in this direction. It appeared, therefore, that the mutual understanding that had been reached and the consistent implementation of the measures instituted by both sides would create the necessary conditions for the eradication of tension on the border and for the commencement of negotiations.

Not long before the beginning of the talks on border issues, on 7 and 8 October, the PRC Government published documents which repeated the previous groundless assertions that the treaties defining the present border between the USSR and the PRC were supposedly unfair. An attempt was made to blame the Soviet Union for the friction on the border, our party and nation were slandered, and it was stressed that "there are irreconcilable and fundamental differences of opinion between China and the Soviet Union" and that "the struggle between them will continue for a long time."¹⁰

Border talks began on 20 October 1969 in Beijing. The Soviet delegation was headed by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. V. Kuznetsov, and then by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. P. Il'ichev; the Chinese delegation was headed by PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Qunhua, and later by Sun Wenzheng and Yu Shen. "As you know," L. I. Brezhnev said on 16 April 1970, "the normalization of conditions on the Soviet-Chinese border is now being negotiated with the PRC Government. The Soviet Union has taken a clear and unambiguous stand in these talks. We believe it is necessary to reach an agreement which will turn the Soviet-Chinese border into a line of friendship rather than enmity. Without departing from our legal principled positions, and always defending the interests of our Soviet motherland and the inviolability of its borders, we will do everything within our power to normalize intergovernmental relations with the People's Republic of China. Naturally, as everyone knows, this does not depend only on us."¹¹

The negotiations to clarify certain sections of the boundary line reached a deadlock, however, when the Chinese side, referring to some inconsistent "agreement by the heads of government," began to demand the recognition of "disputed regions" within Soviet territory and "the withdrawal of troops from areas adjacent to disputed regions."¹²

Neither at the time of the meeting of the heads of government nor in the subsequent exchange of letters between them was the achievement of positive results in the talks made dependent on the fulfillment of any kind of preliminary conditions. At any rate, the Soviet Union did not set forth any kind of preliminary conditions for the Chinese side, did not take on any commitments contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union and did not request the Chinese side to take on any commitments contrary to its interests.

What are these "disputed regions"? Why was it necessary for Beijing to invent them?

With the aid of the artificially manufactured concept of "disputed regions," the Chinese authorities are trying to camouflage the central element of their political line--great-power hegemonism and its innate territorial expansionism. The concept of "disputed regions" was engendered by Maoist dogmas along with territorial claims to parts of the Soviet Union and many other neighboring states.

The very term "disputed regions" is extremely useful to Beijing. It provides a phrase, commonly used in diplomatic speech and not indicative of any need for caution, to camouflage nothing other than territorial claims to Soviet land. The concept of "disputed regions," according to the plans of its creators, is mainly intended to shatter the existing boundary by creating huge gaps in it. Chinese representatives have frankly declared that "there is no boundary in the disputed regions," that the "Soviet-Chinese border is not a single, continuous line" and so forth. In other words, this is no longer simply a matter of clarifying the border in the "disputed regions," but of revising and changing the border as a whole.

Beijing's entire mode of behavior indicates that it is not pursuing the settlement of border issues, but the deliberate exaggeration of them for its own anti-Soviet, chauvinistic purposes.

There can be no other explanation for the loud provocative campaign to "substantiate" claims to Soviet land, which has been going on for many years in Beijing in the form of statements by Maoist leaders, numerous "studies" by orientists, dubious archaeological discoveries and the 1972 and 1979 respective editions of the "Atlas of the World" and an almanac. All propaganda tools have been put to work to lend the appearance of truth to the lies and fantasies invented in the depths of Beijing agencies.

In order to poison public opinion and to win imperialist friends, the Chinese authorities constantly scream that there is a "threat from the North," that the Soviet Union intends to "destroy" China and that this "threat" is making the successful outcome of the talks impossible.

As early as 14 March 1970, a TASS release was issued, in which attempts to cast suspicions on our nation's policy toward China were resolutely condemned. "Fabrications of this kind," the release said, "have absolutely

no basis. With the aid of these, anticommunist propaganda is trying to hamper the Soviet-Chinese talks now going on in Beijing and add to the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations. The Soviet armed forces are performing their daily duties and improving their combat skills within the framework of the usual plans and programs, strengthening the defense of the Soviet State throughout all of its territory."¹³ The TASS release stressed that the policy of the USSR and its government has invariably pursued the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, the development of cooperation and the revival and reinforcement of the friendship between the populations of the two countries.

Even after this, however, the Chinese leaders continued to misrepresent the foreign policy of the Soviet Union by depicting it as a force hostile to the PRC. The campaign of "preparations for war," the measures to instill the spirit of militarism in the nation, and anti-Soviet inflammatory propaganda were escalated as intensively as before. Later, the legend about the "threat from the North" would be supplemented with a fable about the "threat from the South."

The Soviet Union reacted calmly to Beijing's slanderous attacks, adhering firmly to the line worked out at the 24th CPSU Congress: "We will not forgo the national interests of the Soviet State. The CPSU will continue its tireless fight to unite the socialist countries and the world communist movement on a Marxist-Leninist basis. At the same time, our party and the Soviet Government are deeply convinced that the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be in the fundamental long-range interests of both our countries and the interests of socialism, the freedom of people and the consolidation of peace. We are therefore prepared to wholeheartedly promote not only the normalization of relations, but also the restoration of the good-neighbor relationship and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and we are certain that this will ultimately be achieved."¹⁴

The Beijing lies about the USSR, particularly the legend of the "threat of attack," look particularly ridiculous against the background of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union.

As early as September 1969, when preparations for the border talks were being made in accordance with the agreement concluded by the heads of the two governments, the question of a Soviet-Chinese non-aggression pact was raised. Although the USSR and China had signed the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950, the Soviet Union, with a view to the Chinese side's allegations that it was worried about the intentions of the Soviet side, proposed that the USSR and PRC conclude a non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government proposed that this important and serious commitment, which transcends the bounds of border settlement, be set forth not as one point of an agreement on temporary measures to preserve the status quo on the border, but in a special high-level inter-governmental act.¹⁵

But the Beijing leaders were interested least of all in removing their legend of the "threat" from the agenda. All of their actions were aimed only at preventing the conclusion of agreements in any form.

On 8 July 1970 the Soviet Government addressed the Chinese Government with a proposal that negotiations be conducted and an intergovernmental agreement be drafted on mutual non-aggression by armed forces, including nuclear, and on the prohibition of war propaganda and preparations for war against the other side. The Chinese Government essentially did not reply to this Soviet initiative, reiterating constantly that "talks would take place in an atmosphere of military threat" on the part of the USSR and alleging that "an atomic bomb would hang over the negotiation table."¹⁶

On 15 January 1971 the Soviet Government proposed the immediate conclusion of a Soviet-Chinese treaty on the non-use of force or threats of force in any form, including conventional, missile and nuclear weapons. A draft of this treaty was submitted to the Chinese Government. In particular, it said the following: "The sides undertake to avoid force and threats of force in any form whatsoever in their mutual relations during the settlement of disputes. They undertake to settle all disputes exclusively by peaceful means--by means of negotiations and consultations; the sides will not use armed forces against one another with any kind of weapon, including: a) conventional, b) missile, c) nuclear."¹⁷

The Chinese rulers rejected the draft, but agreed to the inclusion of a statement to this effect in the interim agreement on the preservation of the status quo on the border. The Soviet side conceded to its partners and the text of a corresponding article in the agreement on the status quo was drafted. It appeared that the matter had been settled. But the Chinese representatives erected another barrier, making their proposal conditional upon recognition of the concept of "disputed regions"--that is, they set forth a preliminary condition which would not have been acceptable to any sovereign state. In this way, both the conclusion of an agreement on the status quo and the enactment of the non-aggression commitment were left up in the air.

When official Chinese representatives realized it would be impossible to go any further and began to declare that relations between the USSR and China should be founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union, still motivated by good intentions, expressed its willingness to build these relations on this foundation. This was also clearly announced on the highest level--for example, in L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in March 1972.

Translating this willingness into the language of absolutely specific and constructive proposals, the Soviet Union took another step in the same direction on 14 June 1973: It proposed to the Chinese leadership that a non-aggression treaty be concluded by the USSR and China. In the text of this treaty, the two sides would promise not to attack one another with the use of any types of weapons on land, on sea and in the air, and not to threaten attacks.¹⁸

This proposal was also rejected by the Chinese regime.

In February 1972, the Soviet side proposed the conclusion of long-term contracts and the resumption of border trade between the USSR and PRC. In March 1973 the USSR Ministry of Health proposed the revival of cooperation with China in the field of public health care. Various Soviet organizations and officials have repeatedly proposed the resumption of contacts and cooperation between academies of sciences and friendship societies, the exchange of correspondents from central newspapers and so forth. In December 1977 the USSR proposed the renewal of scientific and technical contacts.

All of these proposals, however, were either rejected or ignored. Before any problem in Soviet-Chinese relations can be solved, progress must be made in the resolution of the "border issue"--that is, even before the talks the Soviet Union will have to recognize Chinese territorial claims and satisfy other conditions. Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council said at an NPC [National People's Congress] session on 13 January 1975 that the recognition of the "disputed regions" and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these regions was not much to ask.¹⁹ When the Soviet side definitely refuted all of the claims dreamed up by the Chinese leadership, Beijing refused to settle other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations.

After rejecting Soviet proposals, the Chinese authorities began to escalate their anti-Sovietism and forced the Chinese people to waste their energy, funds and resources on the construction of trenches and underground shelters. As time went on, the Chinese rulers made more insistent attempts to convince their people that the Soviet Union was their number-one enemy and to isolate the Chinese people from the USSR.

On 14 March 1974 the Chinese rulers detained a Soviet helicopter and its crew, three officers, who unintentionally flew over Chinese territory in Xinjian and made a forced landing due to bad weather. The Soviet officers were imprisoned for almost 2 years and accused of espionage, but they and the helicopter were finally returned to the Soviet side in December 1975,²⁰ and a memo from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the suspicions of espionage had not been corroborated. On 29 April 1976 someone committed a diversionary act against the Soviet Embassy in China by setting off a bomb at the embassy gates. Three Chinese were killed, including two militia-men on duty, and it was purely by accident that no Soviet people were injured. This action was obviously calculated to create acute conflict between the USSR and the PRC.

As for the USSR, the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, presented by L. I. Brezhnev, stressed that "in relations with China our party is adhering firmly to the line set forth at the 24th Congress. Experience has confirmed the accuracy of this line. We will continue to wage a struggle against Maoism, a principled and irreconcilable struggle." At the same time, it was reasserted that "in

relations with China, just as with any other country, we adhere firmly to the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonintervention in one another's internal affairs and non-aggression. In other words, we are prepared to normalize relations with China on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, we can confidently say that if Beijing returns to a policy that is truly based on Marxism-Leninism, abandons its present line of hostility toward the socialist countries and embarks on the path of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world, this will meet with the proper response from our side and will create opportunities for the development of good relations between the USSR and the PRC in line with the principles of socialist internationalism. It all depends on the Chinese side."²¹

In an attempt to aid in creating a peaceful atmosphere, in which it would be easier to seek ways of normalizing relations, the Soviet Union again stopped the publication of criticizing remarks and articles pertaining to the state of affairs in the PRC and the policy of this nation and set forth a number of new initiatives in September 1976, after Mao Zedong's death.

In a message to the Chinese leadership from the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers on the 27th anniversary of the PRC, the Soviet desire to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence was underscored.²² At the October (1976) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, L. I. Brezhnev declared that there were no problems in Soviet-Chinese relations that could not be resolved in a spirit of friendship.²³ On 28 November 1976, the head of the Soviet delegation at the border talks, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs L. F. Il'ichev, arrived in Beijing. During the course of the talks, he repeated the Soviet proposals aimed at the normalization of relations: the conclusion of a treaty on the avoidance of force and a non-aggression treaty, the establishment of regular contacts between ministries and departments and the resumption of cooperation in various fields. He underscored the Soviet Union's willingness to escalate the talks on the clarification of certain sections of the boundary line and to sign a new treaty so that this issue could be removed from Soviet-Chinese relations.

At that time, as later reports testify, a fierce battle was going on within the Chinese leadership, and the "gang of four" were arrested on 6 October 1976 after an attempted coup. During the campaign to expose the crimes of the "four," it was announced that they had destroyed and compromised experienced party, government and military cadres, subjected the artistic intelligentsia to brutal treatment, undermined the national economy, impeded China's scientific and technical development, objected to the study of useful foreign experience and obstructed China's international economic relations. Incidentally, during all the years that Soviet writers and the press had been pointing out what was happening in China, the Chinese side took offense and accused the Soviet Union of unfriendly attacks.

It was natural to assume that the dismissal of top-level officials promoted by Mao Zedong, their conviction for the tremendous injuries they had inflicted on China and the direct or indirect acknowledgment of the many errors of the "Great Helmsman" himself would result in adjustments in foreign policy, particularly policy toward the socialist countries.

The imperialist camp anxiously kept an eye on the new leadership to see if it would make a move toward detente in relations with the Soviet Union. The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR frankly stated: "The benefits the West derives from the hostility between China and the Soviet Union are so obvious and so apparent on the West that even the hint of a possible decline in this hostility is disturbing."

But detente in relations with the USSR did not come about. The new Chinese leadership did not respond to Soviet initiatives. A desire to set up new barriers to the normalization of relations was apparent at the next round of border talks in November 1976-February 1977. The Chinese side again declared that relations could not be developed in any area unless the presence of "disputed regions" was recognized--that is, unless its territorial claims to Soviet land were satisfied. Moreover, it demanded the fulfillment of preliminary conditions and unilateral steps from the Soviet Union, which clearly attested to a desire to bring relations to an impasse.

Propaganda organs and officials, including top-level leaders, continued to misrepresent Soviet foreign and domestic policy. All available means were utilized to denigrate the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the fraternal relations of the nations of the socialist community, the efforts of the USSR to consolidate friendship and cooperation between nations and its struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression.

On 19 May 1977 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a memo to the PRC Embassy, in which the Soviet Government protested the slanderous campaign being conducted in China against the Soviet Union and issued a severe warning that the Chinese leaders would bear the full responsibility for the consequences of this campaign.²⁴

At the same time, the Soviet Union consistently, just as could be expected of a nation convinced of the accuracy of its course, continued its efforts to put an end to the tension in Soviet-Chinese relations. In July 1977 the Soviet side consented to an agreement between the governments of the USSR and the PRC which would permit Chinese civilian ships to sail in Soviet internal waters past Khabarovsk when the border Kazakevich channel was too shallow,²⁵ and Chinese ships have been sailing past Khabarovsk since 1 September 1977. The Soviet Union simultaneously proposed that this channel be deepened and widened and expressed its willingness to supply the necessary equipment, but the PRC regime rejected this proposal.

The 11th CCP Congress (August 1977) marked the end of a crucial stage in the internal political struggle in China and took up the Maoist, adventurous and schismatic policies of China in international affairs, with

hostility toward the USSR lying at its basis. Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and State Council Premier Hua Guofeng said: "At the beginning of this year, Chairman Mao Zedong told us: 'The United States has certain interests in the world which it is striving to defend, but the Soviet Union has a thirst for expansion, and nothing can change this.... The Soviet Union and the United States are potential seats of a new world war, particularly Soviet social-imperialism, which represents a great danger.... Now that we are faced by aggression and threats on the part of imperialism, particularly social-imperialism, since the Soviet revisionists have not abandoned their hope of enslaving our nation, we must be prepared to fight.'"26

Beijing has persistently defended the hegemonistic theory of the "three worlds." It is adhering to the line of undermining the socialist community, the world communist movement and the national liberation movement and exploiting the conflicts between the socialist world and imperialism in the interests of Beijing's own great-power policy. In a September 1977 meeting with Manfred Werner (Christian Democratic Union), representative of the FRG Bundestag's defense committee, Deng Xiaoping called Sino-Soviet rapprochement unthinkable; he expressed the certainty that neither he nor Hua Guofeng would live to see this and added that he excluded the possibility of this "even for the future generation."27

Beijing has made increasingly frank statements signifying that it is imperialism's partner in the fight against the USSR, and imperialist propaganda has synchronized its campaign of hostility toward the USSR with these statements. In an article published in CHINA AKTUEL, Wolfgang Bartke wrote: "The Springer press, which was cited 8 times in 1977, is given preference, as a result of which political and propaganda schizophrenia is becoming obvious. On the one hand, China, which is pursuing confrontation with Moscow, is using the FRG press and, on the other, the Springer press and the BAYERN KURIER, which are aimed at anticommunist policy, are always the first to unconditionally join the Chinese press in its campaign against Moscow."28

This position was contrary to common sense and it was most damaging to the PRC. Renowned American Professor Allen Whiting said in his book "China's Future" that "both Beijing and Moscow realize that Washington is exploiting the confrontation between them, playing one side against the other."29 American scholar Stephen Levine, expert on Sino-Soviet relations, said in an article entitled "The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Relations," published in the book "Dragon and Eagle," that "the alleviation of tension between China and the Soviet Union will return some of the funds allocated for military needs to important areas of economic development. This will also," Levine went on, "exert more pressure on the United States, which will have to make concessions to China in the Taiwan matter to keep China from taking the side of the USSR."30 American scholar James Hsiung wrote in ASIAN SURVEY that the United States should not be in any hurry to sacrifice Taiwan, since China, which is bound by its hostile policy toward

the USSR, has nowhere else to turn and will not depart from good relations with the United States.³¹ In an article published in CURRENT HISTORY, D. W. Klein said: "Beijing's reconciliation with the Soviet Union would make it possible to solve the Taiwan problem: Nothing could compel the United States to abandon Taiwan more quickly than the probability of close relations between the PRC and USSR."³²

The Soviet Union has repeatedly taken steps to alleviate the tension between the two countries.

In a 24 February 1978 message to the NPC Standing Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium announced its willingness to put an end to the present abnormal situation in relations between the USSR and PRC and to stop the dangerous process of the continued exacerbation of relations, which could have seriously negative effects on our nations and people and on the fate of peace in the Far East, Asia and the rest of the world. For the purpose of giving concrete form to the expressed desire of both sides to base their relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and of embodying this desire in an authoritative international act, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium proposed that our nation issue a joint declaration of the principles of interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. A joint declaration of the way in which the two sides will build their relationship on the foundation of peaceful coexistence, adhering firmly to the principles of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonintervention in one another's internal affairs and nonaggression, could promote the normalization of our relations. The hope was expressed that, if the idea of issuing this kind of document would be acceptable to the Chinese side, a meeting of representatives of the two sides on a sufficiently high level could be held in Moscow or Beijing to draft a mutually acceptable statement as soon as possible. During the course of this meeting, Chinese proposals aimed at the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations could also be discussed.³³

The NPC session of February-March 1978 indicated that the Chinese leadership was not only avoiding any discussion of the essence of the need to normalize relations with the USSR, but was also displaying its intention to continue conducting its hostile policy toward the Soviet Union. On the level of a PRC State agency, the NPC session reaffirmed the anti-Soviet course of the Chinese leadership, as set forth at the 11th CCP Congress, and gave this course legal reinforcement in the basic law of the nation--the constitution. Now the struggle against the USSR and its allies is not only a party norm, stipulated in the CCP Charter, but also a constitutional norm. The constitution was amended to correspond to the documents of the 11th CCP Congress, according to which the Soviet Union was declared China's number-one enemy. At the NPC session Hua Guofeng repeated the accusation that the Soviet Union has supposedly not abandoned the hope of "enslaving our nation" and connected it directly with the need to accelerate all economic and military development in the nation.³⁴ In this way,

anti-Sovietism was associated with the so-called general objective of PRC domestic policy.

The Chinese Government responded to the Soviet message on 9 March 1978 in a note from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy.³⁵ It rejected the Soviet proposals. The note stipulated preliminary conditions for the improvement of intergovernmental relations, touching upon the defense of the USSR and the security of Mongolia. This signified that Beijing was still not ready for the kind of constructive dialog that would bring about positive changes in relations between the USSR and PRC and was already moving toward the culminating point of its policy of hostility toward the USSR--the denunciation of the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

Imperialist circles applauded the Chinese Government's rejection of the new Soviet initiative. The newspaper of the English Conservatives frankly stated that "the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty between Moscow and Beijing would be the most frightening event imaginable in the international arena, with the exception of world war."³⁶

Belligerent imperialist circles encouraged the Chinese rulers' provocative behavior. During his visit to Beijing in May 1978, Z. Brzezinski, the American President's national security adviser, wanted to learn whether Beijing was taking a firm enough anti-Soviet stand and was reassured by what he was told. The NEW YORK TIMES wrote: "In his speeches Brzezinski tried to underscore the common concern about the Soviet Union. Apparently, he was successful in his dealings with the Chinese leaders, who like his tough stand in relations with the USSR."³⁷ But some voices in the United States were heard appealing for caution. "President Carter and his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski are acting as if," an American newspaper said, "they should reward the PRC for steps taking largely in its own interest. It even appears that they regard the weak Chinese economy and the poorly equipped Chinese Army as a blessing that will somehow strengthen the strategic position of the United States in relation to the much more powerful USSR. The fact is, however, that increased hostility on the part of the Soviet Union could harm us--and the PRC--more than Beijing could help us. For example, any military incident connected with the Soviet Union on the Chinese border would quickly compel Hua Guofeng and Carter to come to their senses and realize the kind of risk they are taking."³⁸

Events in Southeast Asia also left a mark on the Soviet-PRC relationship for many years.

The U.S. aggression against Vietnam presented an excellent opportunity for the reconciliation of the USSR and PRC and the unification of their efforts for the purpose of rendering assistance to a socialist state that had become the victim of imperialist aggression. The Chinese leaders, however, rejected Soviet proposals regarding joint measures to assist Vietnam when it was resisting the American aggression. For several years, the Chinese

set up barriers to block the shipment of Soviet weapons and ammunition to Vietnam through Chinese territory and disrupted the operations of the Moscow-Hanoi air line.

The Vietnamese people's victory and the rapid unification of the nation into a single Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the conduct of an independent foreign policy by Vietnam and its line of stronger unity with the socialist states displeased Beijing. Beijing was also displeased by the development of fraternal relations between Vietnam and Laos, which had begun to build socialism. The Chinese leaders became increasingly certain that Vietnam did not wish to serve as an instrument of China's aggressive policy in Southeast Asia, but, to the contrary, was opposing Chinese expansion. Beijing then began to exert more pressure on Vietnam.

Once again, the Soviet Union vigorously supported the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The determination of the SRV and USSR to resist attacks or threats of attack was reflected in the 3 November 1978 treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries. "We can predict," L. I. Brezhnev said when the treaty and agreement were signed, "that it (the treaty--M. U.) will displease those who do not like the idea of friendship between the USSR and Vietnam, who take advantage of the escalation of tension and who hope to break up the socialist countries. But the treaty has already become a political reality. And whether they want to or not, they will have to take this reality into account."³⁹

After a period of threats and provocations, China launched armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 17 February 1979 for the purpose, as Deng Xiaoping said when he visited the United States, of "punishing" Vietnam. Chinese troops intruded on Vietnamese territory on almost the entire length of the border and seized a number of populated points in the border zone. Vietnam resolutely repulsed the aggressor. The adventure cost Beijing the lives of several tens of thousands of soldiers and large quantities of military equipment; China suffered incalculable damage in the eyes of the world public, who learned more about the habits of the Chinese rulers and condemned this disgusting aggression. Instead of "punishing" Vietnam, the Chinese militarists were soundly beaten, and on 5 March Beijing had to announce the withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam. Even during the retreat, however, Chinese troops continue to destroy cities and villages, blow up bridges, pillage and loot.

The Soviet Government issued a statement on 18 February 1979, announcing that China's attack on Vietnam testified once more to Beijing's exceedingly irresponsible attitude toward the fate of peace, and the criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership resorts to the use of weapons. The Soviet Union will perform all of the obligations it took on in line with the treaty on friendship and cooperation between the USSR and SRV. Policymakers in Beijing should stop before it is too late. The USSR has resolutely demanded the cessation of aggression and the immediate withdrawal ⁴⁰ of Chinese troops from the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The Soviet Union took an active part in the extensive international campaigns of the socialist countries, communist parties, many developing states, and progressive and peace-loving organizations in all countries against the criminal invasion of Vietnam by the Chinese militarists. Measures were taken to render additional assistance to Vietnam and supply it with everything needed for the repulsion of the aggressor. The Soviet Union carried out several other important measures, which were fully understood by the Chinese rulers and which cooled their ardor. All of these measures were carried out in constant contact with the SRV leadership.

In a statement issued on 2 March, the Soviet Government warned Beijing not to take aggressive actions against the Lao People Democratic Republic.⁴¹ The Soviet Union gave the LPDR additional assistance in strengthening its defense capability.

It was a logical consequence of China's decline to the position of imperialism's accomplice that the NPC Standing Committee announced on 3 April 1979 that it would not renew the 14 February 1950 Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the PRC and USSR. The treaty had supposedly played its historic role in safeguarding the security of China and the Soviet Union, in promoting friendship and cooperation between the two countries and in defending peace in the Far East and the rest of the world, but great changes had taken place in the international situation--for example, relations between the USSR and Japan, and later between China and Japan, had been normalized, the provisions in the treaty pertaining to Japan were outdated, the commitments stipulated in the treaty had been ignored, and not through the fault of the PRC, and the treaty had ceased to be nominally in effect long ago.

In a statement issued on 4 April, the Soviet Government described this hostile act as the logical result of the extreme rightward shift in the policy of the Chinese ruling clique, their adventurism and their desire for hegemony. China's shameful aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the statement said, demonstrated how adventuristic the policy of Beijing ruling circles had become and how low they had fallen in betraying the interests of socialism.⁴²

Informing the Soviet Government of its decision to cancel the treaty, the PRC Government proposed, in the same note of 3 April 1979, that talks be conducted to settle unresolved issues in the relations between China and the Soviet Union and to improve these relations. There was no rhyme or reason to Beijing's illogical position. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union, which has always advocated the normalization of relations with China by means of negotiation, agreed to enter into talks of this kind and, in a memo dated 17 April, suggested the following topics of discussion: the improvement of relations and the drafting of a document on the principles of interrelations between the USSR and the PRC as a point of departure. Later, in a memo dated 4 June, the Soviet side suggested that this document include a statement about the nonrecognition of any claims to special

rights or hegemony in Asia, even for peaceful purposes. Finally, in a memo dated 23 June, the Soviet side consented, with consideration for the wishes of the Chinese side, to add the question of the development of trade, scientific and technical contacts and cultural exchange in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit to the agenda of the negotiations. The two sides agreed to entrust the negotiations to governmental delegations headed by deputy ministers of foreign affairs--respectively. L. P. Il'ichev and Wang Youping.

At the suggestion of the Chinese delegation, the two sides agreed to hold the Soviet-Chinese talks alternatively in Moscow and Beijing (the Soviet delegation agreed to this after the Chinese side consented to its proposal that future negotiations to settle border disputes also be held by turns in Moscow and Beijing). It was also decided that the delegations would work without a formal agenda, with each delegation bringing up the topics it deemed necessary. The Moscow stage of the negotiations lasted from 27 September through 30 November 1979. The talks will be continued in Beijing soon.

At the first plenary session on 17 October 1979, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft declaration on the principles of interrelations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China to the Chinese delegation.

The Chinese delegation is making the drafting of the principles of interrelations conditional upon the settlement of "unresolved issues" and the "elimination of barriers." The talks were accompanied by feverish activity on the part of Beijing, visits and negotiations, during the course of which the Chinese leaders are arranging parallel actions with the imperialist powers and appealing for the creation of an international coalition for struggle against the USSR.

It is possible that great-power and hegemonistic aims have obscured some Chinese leaders' view of the state of affairs in the international arena, but they must understand that the cancellation of the treaty by the PRC Government was an extremely rash and nearsighted step to take, as well as an extremely dangerous one for the cause of peace. China will also lose a great deal as a result of this. Many errors committed in the past are now being criticized in China. The time will come when this act will also be appropriately judged.

FOOTNOTES

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3. H. S. Truman, "Memoirs," vol 11, New York, 1956, p 361.
4. H. S. Kapitan, Op. cit., p 170.
5. Ibid., p 79.
6. HURUQL, 1979, No 10.
7. PRAVDA, 9 September 1959.
8. Quoted in PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1974, No 2, p 72.
9. PRAVDA, 1 April 1978.
10. KENNIN KIRAO, 9 October 1969.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy kurs. Rechi i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 342.
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17. PRAVDA, 21 March 1971.
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39. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskiy kurs. Rech', privetaniya, stat'i, vzglady" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches, Addresses, Articles and Remarks], vol 2, Moscow, 1979, p. 503.
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THE PRC ECONOMY IN 1979

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 31-46

[Article by V. I. Akimov, doctor of economic sciences, and V. I. Potapov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] 'Regulation' in Place of the 'Four Modernizations'

We know that a long-range program for the development of China was drawn up in 1978 at the First Session of the Fifth NPC (National People's Congress), pursuing the goal of turning the country into a "great and mighty power" by the end of this century. The strategic objective of "approaching the top world level" in economic indicators, of reaching this level or surpassing it, was set. In other words, it was assumed that China would be one of the world leaders in economic development by the end of the 20th century. The program of the so-called "four modernizations" was set forth as a means of attaining this objective.

The program gave top priority to the development of heavy industry, military production and transportation. It envisaged accelerated agricultural development. As the decisions of the First NPC Session stipulated, the program of "four modernizations" was intended primarily to accelerate the militarization of the country and provide a material base for the establishment of strong military-industrial potential for the purpose of turning China into a strong military power. The Chinese leadership associated this national economic guideline with preparations for war. In foreign policy, the line adopted was one approved at the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in December 1978: the line of alliance with the developed capitalist countries and the "expansion of the international united front of struggle against hegemonism"--that is, against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The fulfillment of the ten-year plan for national economic development during 1976-1985, the basic premise of which had been discussed at the First NPC Session, was supposed to be the first major step in carrying out the "four modernizations" program. This plan was based on the idea of a modified "great leap forward." Many of the economic indicators specified

in the plan were inconsistent with the actual state of the national economy. Disparities between the rise in demand for material goods and the low level of their production, between consumption and accumulation, between levels of industrial and agricultural development, between separate branches of industry and so forth were ignored. The plan envisaged excessively high rates of agricultural mechanization, although neither the material nor the socialist conditions for this existed. In his report at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Chairman Yu Qiuli of the PRC State Planning Commission remarked that "serious disparities in the national economy have not been corrected as yet, chaos and confusion still exist in production, construction and the circulation and distribution sphere, and many consumer service problems are still unsolved."¹

In reference to capital construction in 1978 and the beginning of 1979, RENJIN RIBAO reported that the scales of ongoing capital construction far exceeded material and financial capabilities. It will take all of the resources allocated for capital construction in the next few years just to complete ongoing projects. Existing plans were compiled without a scientific approach, contain many "gaps" and violate the comprehensive balance of material and financial resources. It was also pointed out that certain problems still exist in capital construction, such as the excessively broad scales of this work, the dissipation of forces and means and administrative confusion.² As a result of this, 1978 plans for the construction and start-up of large and medium-sized facilities were only 70-percent fulfilled, and 82 percent in the case of isolated projects. Although capacities for the production of 39 basic types of industrial commodities were augmented, plans were unfulfilled for 26 (coal and iron ore, rolled steel products, chemical fibers and other commodities).³

After the First Session of the Fifth NPC, extensive debates broke out in China over the means and methods of carrying out the "four modernizations" program, which testify to differences of opinion within the Chinese leadership on matters of economic construction. One of these debates began at the all-China conference on the law of value, at which time serious differences of opinion were expressed by various groups of participants. A heated debate broke out at the all-China conference on capital construction, at which time plans for the construction of industrial and other facilities in 1979 and subsequent years were criticized and it was recommended that the number of construction projects, present as well as future, be reduced, and that the construction schedule be revised with a view to the economic importance of each individual project.

A national economic plan and state budget for 1979 were approved at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC (18 June-2 July 1979). For the first time since the end of the 1950's, detailed reports on the fulfillment of state plans and the state budget for the preceding year and the drafts of the plan and budget for the current year were published in China. A discerning approach must be taken to the numerical indicators in these reports on plan assignments and results, as they are often based only on approximate statistics and are largely the product of the Beijing leadership's propaganda.

The Chinese leadership had to make substantial adjustments in its ambitious plans for rapid industrial development in 1979 and the next few years. The PRC State Council had to revise the 1979 national economic plan that was drawn up in 1978. According to reports in the Chinese press, the revised plan "assigns top priority to the accelerated development of agriculture, light industry and the textile industry and increased production and construction in the coal, petroleum and electric energy industries, transportation and the construction materials industry."⁴ In the first place, the rates of industrial growth are much lower in the revised plan (according to official data, the rate dropped from 13.5 percent to 8 percent). The growth rate of light industry (8.3 percent) is supposed to exceed the growth rate of heavy industry (7.6 percent). Despite the advertised priority development of agriculture, the growth of the gross product in this branch in 1979 has been set at 4 percent (according to official data, the increment was 8.9 percent in 1978).

In the second place, the scales of capital construction were reduced for the more efficient use of capital investments. Total capital investments for 1979, including credit in foreign currency and the funds of local government bodies and agencies, have been set at 50 billion yuan, in comparison to 47.9 billion in 1978. The proportion accounted for by capital investments in heavy industry will be lower than in the preceding year (decreasing from 54.7 percent to 46.8 percent). Investments in the coal, petroleum, electric power and construction materials industries will be increased. There was a slight rise in proportional capital investments in light industry (5.8 percent as against 5.4 percent). Proportional capital investments in agriculture rose from 10.7 percent in 1978 to 14 percent in 1979.

The construction of 987 large and medium-sized facilities and the completion of the construction and start-up of 118 large and medium-sized facilities and 258 separate structures are planned. The start-up of these facilities and installations will make it possible, in particular, to increase cement production by 2.1 million tons, augment logging operations by almost 1.5 million cubic meters and increase the true capacity of ports by 11.6 million tons. In agriculture and commercial fishing, 65 large and medium-sized irrigation networks and 11 fisheries are to be built. The construction of several new railroads and auxiliary roads and the electrification of the most heavily used trunklines are planned.

In the third place, measures were envisaged to heighten the efficiency of production and ensure the stricter observance of conservation standards. In general, these were aimed at augmenting the role of economic methods of management, instituting elementary order at enterprises and in administrative and planning agencies and raising profits and profitability levels. As for specific economic problems, top priority is to be given to the alleviation of difficulties in supplying the national economy with fuel and electric power.

In the fourth place, the plan envisaged a considerable increase in exports--up to 19.2 billion yuan (14.7 percent higher than the 1978 figure), and an increase in imports of up to 24.8 billion yuan (32.4 percent higher). A sum of 4.73 billion yuan was allocated for the purchase of complete sets of equipment and new technology (3.2 times as great as the 1978 figure). All regions and departments were instructed to "make a massive effort to develop the export sector and increase foreign currency revenues."

State budget revenues and expenditures for 1979 were set at 112 billion yuan (in 1978 income was 112.1 billion and expenditures were 111.1 billion).⁵ No increase in revenues was planned for 1979 for several reasons, particularly the need to finance a rise in purchase prices in agriculture and auxiliary trades, the "regulation" of the wages of some workers and employees, the reduction or cancellation of taxes in some rural regions and the expansion of public employment. One of the chief distinctive features of the 1979 state budget is its much more militaristic nature, reflected in a significant rise in military expenditures. Military expenditures planned for 1979 amount to a huge sum--20.2 billion yuan (16.8 billion in 1978). There is reason to believe that the official data published in China on military spending are considerably understated. For example, the American magazine *BUSINESSWEEK*, believes that if expenditures on military research and the provision of servicemen with food and clothing are taken into account, the actual amount China spends on military needs would be equivalent to 25 percent of the state budget, and not 18 percent.⁶ It appears that these estimates are also understated. We can say that China is one of the world's leaders in terms of absolute volumes of military spending, while it is in 125th place among 150 yuan members in terms of per capita income (152 dollars a year).⁷

New committees and ministries were created to improve the management of the economy and individual economic branches--in particular, the Financial and Economic Committee of the PRC State Council, the State Committee for Agriculture, the Ministry of Building Materials and the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building. The ministries of agriculture and forestry and the ministries of water conservancy and the power industry were consolidated.

During the year, many national, sectorial and regional conferences were held to discuss ways of "regulating" the economy and solving current problems.

Despite all of these measures, however, the state of the economy is still fairly poor. Gross industrial production was only 5.7 percent higher in the first 8 months of 1979 than during the same period last year.⁸ The situation was somewhat better in September and October. In particular, gross industrial production was 9.4 percent greater in September 1979 than in August, including a rise of 10 percent in light industry and of 8.9 percent in heavy industry. Since July, measures have been taken to intensify the development of light industry and the textile industry with

a simultaneous deceleration of the growth rate in heavy industry. In the first 10 months of 1979, industrial production increased 7.4 percent, but this was still lower than the plan assignment. The Chinese press reported an increase of 9.6-22 percent in the outputs of cotton thread and fabric, synthetic detergents, chemical fertilizers, tractors, bicycles, sewing machines, wristwatches, radios, paper and cardboard. On 24 November 1979, RENMIN RIBAO reported that "little progress" had been made in "regulation." The instructions to reduce the front of capital construction have not been implemented. Many administrators have refused to reduce volumes, complaining that their sectors are "bottlenecks" limiting the development of the entire national economy. There has been a tendency toward expanded scales of capital construction.

During the second half of the year, the Chinese press repeatedly pointed out the need for a redistribution of capital investments in favor of agriculture, light industry and the textile industry. Apparently, changes in this branch are being made too slowly. The reorganization of the economic structure is also taking too long, and this structure is still dominated by heavy industry.

Problems in providing the economy with fuel, energy and raw material resources were just as pressing in the second half of the year. According to Vice Premier Kang Shien of the PRC State Council, conservation became a particularly acute issue in industry and transportation. He also announced that the output of coal, petroleum and electric power in the next 3 years "will just barely cover the needs of production development."

The anticipated improvement of food supplies did not come about. According to official data, the per capita harvest in 1979 was 300 kilograms, which "is insufficient in view of national requirements" and "there is no reason for optimism in this area."⁹ The retail prices of meat, fish, eggs and other food products were raised on 1 November 1979 in China. For example, the prices of meat, fish and other seafood rose by an average of 33 percent. Therefore, the state did not take on the entire cost involved in the elevation of agriculture wholesale prices. The wages of workers and employees were simultaneously increased approximately 40 percent to compensate for the rise in retail prices. Nonetheless, the price increase had a negative effect on the life of the people and will certainly reduce the consumption of animal husbandry products. The increase in wages will not compensate for the higher prices.

It has been extremely difficult to guarantee the accumulation of state budget income. The economic effectiveness of industry, transportation and agriculture is still low. Such important problems as the need for an effective system of economic planning and management have not been solved. Judging by the decisions of the Financial and Economic Committee of the PRC State Council to organize the nationwide "investigation and analysis of economic issues" and of the PRC State Council "to intensify statistical work and subsidize organizations engaged in this work," the Beijing leadership does not have complete information about the actual state of the national economy and its problems and contradictions.

The increased wages of some workers and employees widened the gap between public purchasing power and the market's ability to satisfy demand. It has been suggested that this gap will become even wider in the next 2 years, and this will certainly escalate inflationary tendencies.

One new feature of the economy in 1979 was the encouragement of private enterprise. An effort is being made to restore and stimulate the development of the private sector, represented by independent craftsmen, small-scale merchants and the owners of small service establishments. In the middle of September 1979, the central RENMIN RIBAO newspaper reported that independent craftsmen and small businessmen had been given a "green light" in trade and the service sphere. The newspaper criticized those who described the activity of individual craftsmen as a "capitalist deviation" and explained that these craftsmen do not hire labor, are not exploiters and do "observe" existing laws. By August 1979, for example, 3,300 licenses were issued in Liaoning Province for the opening of small private industrial and trade enterprises. In October 1979 it was reported that local authorities in Guangzhou had authorized the operation of 15,000 private enterprises, and 300 citizens in Beijing were permitted to open private restaurants.

The "former" Chinese capitalists have become more active in economic life. The bank accounts, personal real estate and other assets that were confiscated during the "Cultural Revolution" were returned to them at the beginning of 1979. Representatives of the national bourgeoisie have been encouraged to take management positions in industrial and other enterprises, are being employed as skilled engineering and administrative personnel and are receiving high wages and other benefits. An official statement was made at a "discussion of CCP policy regarding the bourgeoisie" organized by the United Front Section of the CCP Central Committee in January 1979: "We must make every effort to utilize national capital to stimulate national economic development."¹⁰ Private stock companies have come into being. The founding of a "patriotic construction company," the shareholders of which are former Shanghai industrialists and merchants, was announced at the end of September. Its immediate objective is to acquire foreign currency by constructing luxury buildings and selling them to rich overseas Chinese and their relatives. The stockholders will earn a fixed rate of interest on their capital.

The Beijing leaders are throwing open the doors of the nation to foreign capital. At the Second Session of the NPC (18 June-2 July 1979), the need for the "more vigorous use of foreign capital" was discussed. The "Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Enterprises Founded with Chinese and Foreign Capital Investments," adopted at the Second NPC Session, went into effect on 8 July 1979. This law permits foreign companies, enterprises and individuals to establish joint enterprises on PRC territory with Chinese companies, enterprises or other economic organizations. As a rule, foreign capital should represent at least 25 percent of the total investment. Foreign participants are authorized to transfer their share

of net profits and all their other assets out of the country. Other privileges have also been extended. A special committee on foreign capital investments in the PRC has been created in connection with the enactment of this law. Various methods are being used to attract foreign capital--compensatory transactions, contracts for the processing of raw materials, the acquisition of parts for the assembly of finished products, and technical cooperation.

Here are a few examples. The Chinese Foreign Credit and Investment Company in Shanghai, headed by Rong Yiren, one of the most prominent Chinese capitalists, signed an agreement with the American Eaton-Shen [?] Pacific Corporation at the beginning of October. The agreement covers the next 3 years and envisages the investment of 150 million dollars in the establishment of joint enterprises and in compensatory trade.¹¹ The Beijing General Economic Construction Company had signed several dozen agreements and contracts by the middle of September for compensatory transactions, the processing of raw materials, the assembly of machines and so forth.¹²

Foreign businessmen are attracted to China by the cheap labor and the substantial privileges extended by the Beijing leadership.

The State of the Economy in 1979

Industry: Economic development in 1979, as mentioned above, took place in difficult and largely unfavorable conditions. As a result, the industrial growth rate was lower than in 1978 and there was no significant increase in the economic effectiveness of production, although the output of many commodities did increase to one degree or another, some technical and economic indicators were higher in individual branches and the quality of some products improved.

Data on the production plan for several types of industrial commodities for 1979 are compared to corresponding official data for 1978 in Table 1.

There is reason to believe that the data on the production of fuel and electric power in 1978 were overstated. Besides this, the substandard products of technically poorly equipped small and medium-sized enterprises were included in the total output.

Considerable difficulties in industrial development became apparent in 1979. The biggest problem was the inadequate fuel and energy base, although China occupies third place in the world in terms of absolute fuel production scales. The growing severity of the fuel and energy crisis was one of the main reasons for the disruption of the "four modernizations" program. To a considerable extent, the shortage of fuel and energy is being compounded by their extremely wasteful use. For example, the use coefficient of the heating capacity of fuel in China is only 28 percent, which is almost only half as high as in developed countries. In comparison to existing standards, there are significant overexpenditures of fuel and

electric power. Annual overexpenditures amount to 40-50 million tons of coal, 3-4 million tons of oil and 20-30 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power. Up to 30 percent of the nation's production facilities (up to 50 percent in some provinces) are not being used due to the shortage of electric power. Conservation assignments for 1980 call for a savings of 10 percent in liquid fuel, 5 percent in coal and 3 percent in electric power. Despite the measures that have been taken, the fuel and energy problem will not be perceptibly alleviated in the near future, and this will certainly slow down the development of industry and the entire economy.

Table 1

Type of product	1978	1979 (plan)
Growth of gross product (%)	13.5	8
Coal (millions of tons)	618.0	620.0
Petroleum (millions of tons)	104.05	106.0
Electric power (billions of kilowatt-hours)	256.55	275.0
Steel (millions of tons)	31.78	32.0
Mineral fertilizers (millions of tons)	8.69	9.57
Tractors (thousands)	113.5	95.0

Sources: RENMIN RIBAO, 28 and 29 June 1979.

Chinese industry is experiencing increasing difficulties due to the shortage of skilled engineering and technical personnel, workers and administrators. A survey of 32 light industry enterprises in the city of Kaifeng (Henan Province) revealed that only seven enterprise directors met the necessary requirements.¹³ The inadequate skills and low general educational level of the capital's industrial workers (over 80 percent of them have less than a secondary school education) have been reported by BEIJING RIBAO.¹⁴ Labor productivity at large enterprises in China is only one-fifth as high as in developed countries. In a number of provinces, only 20 percent of the administrators in industry, transportation and finance are experienced in their field.¹⁵

In 1979 steps were taken to raise the professional level of workers in industry, especially administrators and engineering and technical personnel. In particular, they are now being sent to capitalist countries for training and work experience. The network of higher and secondary academic institutions for the training of specialists for industry is being expanded. It was reported in the middle of March 1979 that workers and employees would have to take professional technical examinations in 1979.¹⁶ The transfer of personnel and the promotion of better-trained workers to administrative positions are being practiced.

In 1979 the Chinese press had much more than usual to say about the problem of product quality. In its pursuit of better quality, China is borrowing from foreign experience. Besides this, experiments are being conducted

with quality control systems (for example, in machine building), "quality months" are organized, and the provision of economic and moral incentives has been instituted (the awarding of certificates of merit, medals, bonuses and so forth). The "reorganization" method is also being used, sometimes taking the extreme form of the closure of enterprises producing substandard goods. For example, in the first quarter of 1979 the Beijing Electronics Administration "reorganized" 20 plants, transferring part of their manpower and raw materials to enterprises producing goods of the required quality. In Shanghai 42 textile mills were "reorganized" (merged into 24 enterprises).

Measures were taken in 1979 to develop the cooperative (collective) sector in industry. This was done because the creation of new jobs at cooperative enterprises requires considerable less funds than at large and medium-sized enterprises. In addition, it was done in an attempt to improve consumer services. In Beijing, for example, several hundred cooperative tailoring salons, carpentry shops and other enterprises were founded in 1979. This provided work for part of the unemployed younger generation. The cooperative sector accounts for one-third of the Chinese industrial gross product.¹⁷

Let us take a look at conditions in the main branches of industry.

In the coal industry, limited coal production was planned, in essence, for 1979, which is totally inconsistent with the officially declared intention to "intensify production and construction" in the coal industry¹⁸ to alleviate the acute shortage of fuel in the nation. Apparently, this was planned because the practice in 1977 and 1978 was to sharply intensify coal mining at small mines, many of which produced fuel with a high rock content, while the increase in coal output from large and medium-sized mines was far ahead of the growth of facilities for the concentration of fuel. This caused the quality of the coal output to deteriorate perceptibly. Conditions in the branch were also affected by the obviously inadequate volumes of preparatory operations and the shortage of transport. We still believe¹⁹ that the coal output statistics published in China for 1978 (and 1977) were overstated.

In 1979 the fuller use of the potential capabilities of existing enterprises and the technical remodeling of all mines were given top priority. The Chinese press reported in May 1979 that many mining enterprises had still not matched the highest level of labor productivity in the past, although production equipment had been renovated and the level of mechanization in major mines was more than 20 percent higher than in 1966.²⁰ One "serious obstacle" in the development of the coal industry was the high number of accidents in the mines. According to the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, losses of working time due to accidents totaled 25,000 man-days in just the first 8 months of 1979. This deprived the nation of 6.1 million tons of coal.

Major capital construction projects in the coal industry last year were concentrated in eight coal basins with an annual yield of more than 10 million tons of coal each. The year's increment in new coal-mining facilities was set at 13.6 million tons. Attention was directed to the increased scales and accelerated speed of preparatory operations at existing mines.

In the petroleum industry the negligible increase in oil production stipulated in the state plan for 1979 was a result, according to the official explanation, of the need to "regulate the internal balance in oil fields" and "delays in prospecting work."²¹ On the whole, there was a noticeable tendency toward a constant decline in the growth rate of liquid fuel production in 1979, just as in previous years.

The objective of improvement in geological prospecting work for the purpose of finding new sources of liquid fuel was set in the petroleum industry. The output of natural gas grew more quickly in the past year than the output of petroleum, and petroleum refining increased. It was reported, for example, that the oil output was 3.6 percent greater in the first half of 1979 than in the first half of 1978, the output of natural gas was 7.4 percent greater, the oil refining volume was 6.3 percent greater and the output of the main petroleum products was 10.2 percent greater. There was a 17-percent increase in total capital construction during this period.

A conference of petroleum industry workers was held in March 1979 to stimulate the production activity of oilmen and put an end to some undesirable developments in production. The question of more intensive ideological work with the laborers in this branch was discussed at the conference. According to the official explanation, the conference was made necessary, in particular, by the fact that "there has been noticeable disregard for state and collective interests and for production development among workers recently...and there have been violations of public law and order and production procedures."²²

Oil production capacities were to be augmented by 8 million tons in the past year. The commencement of operations, after a year of experimental testing, in the new Nanyang oil fields in the southwestern section of Henan Province was reported (geological prospecting began here in 1970, and the construction of petroleum production facilities began in 1977). Hundreds of operational and injection wells were drilled, an 850-kilometer pipeline was laid, and a transformer substation and other facilities were erected. The construction of the first section of a new petroleum-production region in the Karamai oil fields in Xinjiang was completed in the middle of the year and 30 new wells began operating. CHINA NEWS AGENCY reported that a high-yield well had begun gushing on 13 August in the South China Sea, on the continental shelf near the mouth of Zhujiang River. The well is more than 3 kilometers deep and it produces light oil with a low sulphur content.

Electrical power engineering: In spite of the drought, which had a negative effect on the functioning of several hydrostations, the total output of electric energy in the first half of the year was 11.4 percent greater than in the first 6 months of 1978. There was an increase of 10-30 percent in electric energy production in 8 of the nation's 12 largest power systems.

Considerable attention was given to the improvement of the technical state of equipment and the enhancement of operational efficiency. In 1979 the plan called for a reduction of 6-7 grams in the proportional expenditures of coal on the production of each kilowatt-hour of electric energy (in 1978 average coal expenditures were 434 grams per kilowatt-hour). Losses of electric energy in power supply systems and in personal consumption are to be reduced from 16-17 percent of the total output of electric energy to less than 15 percent between 1979 and 1981. The need for the gradual conversion of thermal electric power stations from petroleum back to coal, in order to reduce expenditures of liquid fuel, was announced.

The intention to institute a single system for the distribution of electric power by the state was reported.²³ All power systems, both interprovincial and provincial, should be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Power Industry. All departments and regions without exception must strictly limit production and capital construction in line with established energy expenditure standards.

According to data published in the beginning of September 1979, the total capacity of electric power stations in the nation exceeded 50 million kilowatts. Several dozen thermal and hydraulic power stations have a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts or more (the capacity of the largest Chinese electric power station--the Liujiaxia GES--is 1.2 million kilowatts). In 1979 there were more than 88,000 small GES's in the nation with a total capacity of over 5.3 million kilowatts. It was reported that one-fourth of China's 2,100 districts could satisfy their own energy needs primarily through their own GES's; in 113 districts, the GES capacity exceeds 10,000 kilowatts.

The construction of 40 large and medium-sized thermal and hydraulic power stations continued. The capacity of each exceeds 1 million kilowatts. Small GES's were also built. The capacities of the equipment used in the production of electric power will increase by 4.7 million kilowatts, according to the plan for the year.

Ferrous metallurgy: The steel production figure in the 1979 plan was virtually the same as in the preceding year. This was due to the shortage of fuel and energy resources and the need to emphasize "the improvement of product quality and the increased production of items in short supply."

In the first 6 months of 1979, 17 million tons of steel were smelted and 12.2 million tons of rolled steel products were manufactured. These indicators were 7.9 percent and 15.4 percent higher, respectively, than

in the first half of 1978. It was reported that the annual plan had been fulfilled by 14 December 1979. Total production figures were 32.9 million tons of steel, 23.8 million tons of rolled products and 35 million tons of cast iron.

Metallurgical enterprises attempted to improve product quality and reduce expenditures of fuel and raw materials. It was treated as a grand achievement that the quality of 109 of 123 types of steel and rolled products at the Anshan Combine surpassed the highest indicators in the combine's history in the middle of 1979. Savings in the first half of the year consisted of 360,000 tons of coking coal, 150,000 tons of lubricants and 240,000 tons of cast iron and scrap steel. The average use coefficient of blast furnaces at the Shoudu Metallurgical Combine reached 2.086 (lower than 0.5, according to the methodology used in the USSR), and expenditures of coking coal per ton of cast iron decreased from 455 kilograms in 1978 to 428 kilograms in the middle of 1979. These indicators are regarded as outstanding in China.

According to the data of the Chinese press, the nation had more than 40 large and medium-sized metallurgical enterprises with an annual capacity of over 100,000 tons each, and more than 10 of these were large enterprises. There were more than ten specialized metallurgical enterprises. In addition, there were many small enterprises, poorly equipped from the technical standpoint and, as a rule, with low technical and economic indicators (for example, expenditures of electric energy per ton of steel at medium-sized and small metallurgical enterprises are 3-4 times as high as the indicators for world ferrous metallurgy and 2-3 times as high as the indicators of leading enterprises in the PRC).

China is still importing rolled metal products in large quantities. In the first half of 1979, 2.5 million tons of rolled metal products were purchased just from Japan, and plans for the second half of the year envisaged the purchase of around 2 million additional tons.

Machine building: The only machine-building product mentioned in the report on the draft national economic plan for 1979 was the tractor, with the 1979 output figure set at 95,000 which is lower than the 1978 figure (113,500). The report also mentioned the rate of increase in the output of some consumer goods. In particular, the following increases were planned for 1979 in comparison to 1978: 10.8 percent more bicycles, 8.6 percent more sewing machines, 12.7 percent more wristwatches, 23 percent more cameras and more than twice as many television sets. In the field of agricultural machine building, priority was assigned to the improvement of product quality, the production of complete sets of agricultural implements and the production and delivery of spare parts. On the whole, the development of individual branches and production units in machine building was quite uneven in 1979: Some types of production were accelerated while others were slowed down or curtailed. In the first 6 months of 1979, for example, the gross product of machine building was

9 percent greater than in the first 6 months of 1978, but the output of machine tools decreased (this process began in 1978) while the output of motor vehicles, transformers, heating gear and refrigeration equipment increased more than 20 percent. The output of power engineering equipment almost doubled (3.33 million kilowatts in absolute figures). Despite the general decrease in the output of conventional machine tools, the output of extremely scarce large and precision tools grew (16 percent and 8 percent respectively). In the first 6 months of 1979, 501,000 television sets were manufactured (690,000 in all 12 months of 1978).

A process which began in the second half of 1978 continued in machine building: This was the extremely complex and painful process of reorganization, aimed at elevating the technical standards of production, introducing production specialization and cooperation on a broad scale, removing the product assortment, improving product quality and re-equipping enterprises.

According to the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, an all-China conference of workers in agricultural machine building was held in Beijing from 25 October through 12 November 1979. A decision was made here to increase the number of plants for the manufacture of machines and mechanisms for animal husbandry from 12 to 27, and the number of harvesting machinery plants from 15 to 17. A decision was also made to reduce the number of enterprises manufacturing the same products—for example, to reduce the number of tractor plants from 65 to 35 by eliminating the plants producing goods of poor quality.

Chemical industry: The plan for 1979 envisaged the production of 9.5 million tons of mineral fertilizers, calculated in terms of active substance—that is, 880,000 tons more than in 1978. Plans were also made to increase the output of chemical fibers by 5.3 percent and of synthetic detergents by 8 percent. By 9 December 1979, 6.6 million tons of mineral fertilizers had been produced (an increase of 21.4 percent in comparison to the same period of 1978). The output of synthetic and viscose fibers amounted to 300,000 tons.

One fundamental problem in the chemical industry is the need to reduce proportional expenditures of fuel and energy at small enterprises, which began to be built at the time of the "Cultural Revolution." In the first quarter of 1979, at 49 small nitrogen fertilizer enterprises in Zhejiang Province, expenditures of coal per ton of synthetic ammonia were reduced to 1,924 kilograms, and expenditures of electric power were reduced to 1,796 kilowatt-hours. These indicators are considered to be good because there are many small plants of this type in China which use more than 4 tons of coal and 2,000 kilowatt-hours of electric power to produce a ton of synthetic ammonia.²⁴

New construction projects in the chemical industry include the Tianjin Petrochemical Fiber Plant and factories for the production of vanillin in Sichuan, Gansu, Guangxi and Yunnan. Several large enterprises have begun

operating: the Anqing Petrochemical Combine in Anhui Province (annual oil refining capacity of 2.5 million tons and fertilizer production capacity of 1.34 million tons), the Chishui Natural Gas and Chemical Fertilizer Plant in Guizhou Province (1 million tons of fertilizer a year), the Dongting Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant in Hunan Province (240,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and 304,000 tons of carbamide), the Hubei Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant (240,000 tons of synthetic ammonia and 380,000 tons of carbamide) and a terylene fiber factory in Heilongjiang Province (16,000 tons).

Light industry and the textile industry were ranked second in terms of importance, after agriculture, in the national economic plan for 1970. The plan stipulated production growth figures only for certain types of products manufactured in the chemical and machine-building industries.

The 1970 plan underlines the need to give light industry and the textile industry priority supplies of fuel, energy, crude resources and other materials.

Imports of crude resources and other materials needed for light industry and the textile industry are to be 17 percent greater than in 1970. The Ministry of Light Industry has been instructed to improve the quality of its products. Branches of light industry and the textile industry have been authorized to independently organize the sale of products not purchased by domestic and foreign trade organizations. Heavy industry enterprises are also being encouraged to produce consumer goods. The need to organize the production of consumer goods at defense industry enterprises has been debated in the press.²⁵ According to reports, the production output of light industry was 14.2 percent higher in September 1970 than in September 1970, but this growth is far from enough to satisfy public demand.²⁶ The Chinese press has noted that in spite of the increased output of cotton fabrics, the level of consumption has not risen much (for almost 10 years the annual per capita output has remained the same). The per capita output of many food products is still low—for example, vegetable oil is produced in quantities equivalent to around 2 kilograms per capita, while the figure in many other countries ranges from 15 to 25 kilograms.²⁷

According to data for May 1970, there are 70,000 enterprises in PRC light industry, but the number of persons employed in the industry is approximately 10 million (usually, only workers). Light industry accounted for around 20 percent of the total gross industrial product. New light industry enterprises were being built in 1970.

Agriculture

In accordance with the decisions of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum (December 1970) and the Second Session of the Fifth NPC (June 1970), more attention is being paid to agricultural development in the PRC. The "Draft Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on Some Questions Connected

with Accelerated Agricultural Development," discussed at the plenum, should occupy an important place in the agrarian policy of the current Chinese leadership. The draft summed up the results of agricultural development in the last 29 years and specified concrete measures for the quicker development of agricultural production.

The Third CCP Central Committee Plenum and the Second NPC Session had to admit that agricultural development had been extremely slow in the last 20 years, that it had not kept up with population growth, that this rate of development did not meet national requirements, and that the problem of grain production had still not been solved. As a result, per capita agricultural output had not only failed to grow, but had even decreased. It was noted, for example, that "the nationwide per capita grain output in 1977 was slightly smaller than in 1957, and there were still more than 100 million people in rural areas whose diet was insufficient." In the years since 1957, the amount of land used for the cultivation of agricultural crops has not increased, but has actually decreased by more than 6.7 million hectares. Due to the low level of agricultural development, the peasantry is still having serious financial difficulties. For example, the average annual rural per capita income in 1977 was slightly over 40 yuan, but the income of approximately one-fourth of all members of production brigades was under 40 yuan and "in some places even simple reproduction is difficult to maintain."

The concrete steps stipulated as ways of developing production forces in agriculture included increasing state capital investments in agricultural production, which will bring the state's share up to 18 percent, increasing other forms of state financial assistance to production brigades, and using local financial revenues mainly in agriculture and in industries serving agriculture.

In an attempt to heighten the interest of collective farms in the development of agricultural production, the PRC State Council raised the state purchase prices of grain and other farming and animal husbandry products considerably after the summer grain harvest in 1979. Grain purchases were not supposed to increase in 1979, and in the future they are supposed to decrease by 2.5 million tons. Grain purchases that would inconvenience the peasants were prohibited.

In the field of agricultural modernization, plans were made to gradually change the structure of agricultural production, in which grain production has always been given top priority and the production of commercial crops, animal husbandry, forestry and other branches have been ignored. There is now an improper relationship between the two main branches of agriculture--farming and animal husbandry. Animal husbandry accounts for only around 20 percent of the gross agricultural product.

Plans were made to increase deliveries of agricultural equipment, chemical fertilizers and industrial consumer goods to rural areas, and to expand commercial trade and private subsidiary farming.

in accordance with the plan for national economic development, the PRC State Council increased proportional capital investments in agriculture from 10.7 percent in 1978 to 14 percent in 1979. Total allocations for agricultural needs, including credit and other sources, should amount to 17.4 billion yuan for the year, which is slightly higher than last year's figure.

At the same time, the Chinese Government announced that more funds would not be allocated for agricultural development in the near future. It was reported, for example, that "in the 3-year period of national economic 'regulation,' funds allocated by the state for agriculture will be limited."²⁸

The question of agricultural mechanization in the near future has been reconsidered. Previously, in accordance with the ten-year plan for national economic development (1975-1985), 85 percent of all basic agricultural operations were to be mechanized by 1985. In 1979 this objective was not specified and it has not been mentioned in the Chinese press.

The present objective is a gradual increase in the output of agricultural equipment, its concentration in commercial farming regions and the drafting of comprehensive, long-range plans throughout 1979 and 1980 for the mechanization, electrification, irrigation and chemization of agriculture. The present output of tractors is obviously insufficient for the fulfillment of agricultural mechanization assignments. There was still an acute shortage of spare parts for agricultural machinery and irrigation equipment and of fuel and manpower in 1979. Repair facilities were inadequate. At present, less than 25 percent of all farm land in the nation is cultivated by machine. An equally difficult situation is taking shape in the area of agricultural chemization. Only 6.9 million tons of chemical fertilizers (calculated in terms of active substance) were produced in the nation in the first 7 months of the past year, or 17.3 percent more than in the same period of last year.

In 1979 the PRC State Council raised state grain purchase prices by 20 percent. For above-plan grain sales, the price was raised another 50 percent. The purchase prices of cotton, oil-bearing crops, pork and some other products of agriculture and auxiliary trades were raised. The prices of these products rose 24.8 percent on the average.²⁹ These increased purchase prices and the exemption of some production brigades with low income from the agricultural tax should increase rural income by 7 billion yuan.³⁰

In 1979, despite the decision regarding the comprehensive development of agriculture, priority was still being given to the cultivation of grain crops. Approximately 80 percent of all farmland in China,³¹ or an area of around 80 million hectares, is reserved for grain. "Unstable, slow development" has been characteristic of grain production for many years now.

In the first half of the year, attempts were made to guarantee a good harvest of summer grain crops, which provides the nation with around half of its total wheat and rice supplies and 35-40 percent of the gross grain yield. Besides this, the summer harvest was supposed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the steps taken by the Chinese leaders to accelerate all agricultural development. For this purpose, some workers not engaged in productive labor were transferred to grain farms in a number of regions. In some regions rice fields were reduced in size to enlarge the area sown to other grain crops.

Weather conditions in the first half of the year were unsuitable for the cultivation of agricultural crops.

Other factors having a negative effect on the harvest were "errors in administrative work," "low management standards" and the "incorrect reaction in some locations and regions" to the decisions of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum and the Second Session of the Fifth NPC.

In 1979 the yield of early rice and winter wheat (in 8 of the 15 main regions) was slightly higher than last year's. According to the estimates of foreign experts, the gross yield of early rice in 1979 was below last year's level.³²

Summarizing the results of the summer grain harvest, the Chinese press noted that the total yield was 64.9 million tons, or 5.5 million tons more than in 1978.³³ But these figures do not provide a complete picture of the total yield of summer grain crops as they apparently do not include the early rice yield. In past years, the early rice harvest amounted to 30-35 million tons. Last year it probably fell below the planned level (more than 40 million tons). On the whole, the summer grain harvest (wheat, early rice, other grain crops, sweet potatoes and potatoes, calculated in grain units), according to estimates, fell below the plan indicator and amounted to 90-95 million tons.

The relatively low growth rate of grain production in the summer created considerable difficulties in the fulfillment of the gross grain yield plan for 1979. According to official data for the last 8 years (1971-1978), the average annual rate of increase in the summer grain yield was 7.3 percent, and the rate for the fall harvest was 1.4 percent.³⁴ Appeals to make up for lost time, to fulfill grain yield plan indicators in the fall harvest, appeared in the press. Steps were taken to enlarge areas sown to mid-season and late-season rice and other crops. For example, areas reserved for mid-season rice were enlarged by 267,000 hectares.³⁵ Great hopes were placed in the fall harvest. The objective was set of overfulfilling the planned grain yield for 1979, bringing it up to 325 million tons,³⁶ or 6.5 percent above the officially announced grain harvest in 1978 (305 million tons). As the Chinese press reported, however, this objective was not attained, and only 315 million tons were gathered in the nation. According to our preliminary estimates, the grain yield was 275 million tons.³⁷

The gross grain yield figure published by the PRC State Statistics Bureau in 1978--304.8 million tons, including sweet potatoes, potatoes and soybeans--was apparently overstated. Conditions were particularly severe in the case of commercial grain production. In connection with this, in November 1979 the PRC State Council held a conference on grain procurements, at which it was pointed out that the demand for grain was not being satisfied despite the increase in yield. At this conference, a decision was made to purchase grain over and above the plan, particularly from farms where there had been a good harvest.

Cotton is an important commercial crop in China. In the last 10 years the output of this crop has grown extremely slowly. The yield is still low, and in some regions it is even decreasing. For example, in the northern part of the nation the yield of cotton fiber in 1978 was 2.3 quintals per hectare instead of the 1973 figure of 4 quintals.³⁸ In some regions the cotton sowing schedule was disrupted, and in others the crop suffered from spring frosts. In 1979 the harvest of cotton fiber was the same as the year before--2.2 million tons. The press reported a relatively good harvest of tea, silkworm cocoons and fruit. The output of sugar beets, sugar cane, flax and other bast crops, as well as tobacco, was smaller than in 1978.

In 1978, according to the Chinese press, farmers gathered a good harvest of rape--one of China's principal oil-bearing crops, used for the production of around one-third of all vegetable cooking oil. By 20 August 1979, more than 990,000 tons of this crop had been delivered to procurement points, or 300,000 tons more than in the previous year. The peanut harvest appeared promising. In the main provinces where this crop is cultivated (Liaoning, Hebei, Henan and Shandong) the total area sown to peanuts was enlarged by 227,000 hectares in the past year.³⁹

The animal husbandry branch is still underdeveloped. The plowing of pastures and meadows for the cultivation of grain in a number of animal husbandry regions in recent years has diminished the fodder supplies of animal husbandry. Almost none of the grain produced on the new plots is used for fodder. The livestock herd is growing too slowly.

Ever since the end of the "Cultural Revolution" the Chinese leadership has been encouraging peasants to raise hogs (hog-raising is the main source of meat) on their private farms (around 80 percent of all the hogs in the nation). This policy is having definite results--the herd of hogs in the nation is growing more quickly and, according to estimates, numbered approximately 245 million head in 1979.

The shortage of food for the population and raw materials for light industry has forced China to purchase grain, cotton and other agricultural products abroad. According to preliminary data, imports of grain, primarily wheat, in 1979 should amount to around 11 million tons--that is, more than in 1968. The chief suppliers of grain to China are Canada, the

United States, Australia and Argentina. China spends around 1.5 billion dollars on the purchase of grain abroad. Just as in past years, China continued to purchase soybeans, soybean oil and sugar. For example, purchases of soybean oil and soybean in the United States were expected to total, respectively, 78,500 tons⁴⁰ and 80,000 tons. Sugar imports in 1979, according to estimates, will remain at the previous year's level--1.5 million tons. More cotton has been purchased in recent years. These purchases amounted to 230,000-240,000 tons in 1977-1978, and around 500,000 tons in 1978-1979.

Table 2

Output of Main Agricultural Products in 1978-1979

Product	1978		1979		1979	
	(est.)		Prelim. est.	Plan	in % of 1978	
Gross grain yield ¹ (millions of tons)	265	(304.8) ²	275	(312.5)	104.0	(102.5)
Cotton fiber (mil- lions of tons)	2.2	(2.2)	2.2	(2.4)	100.0	(109.1)
Hogs (millions of head)	235	(301.3)	245	(309.5)	104.3	(102.7)

1. Including sweet potatoes and potatoes, converted into grain units according to a coefficient of 4:1, and soybeans.
2. The figures in parentheses are: in 1978--data of the PRC State Statistics Bureau; in 1979--plan, excluding hogs (according to data in the Chinese press for 1 July 1979). The data of the PRC State Statistics Bureau, according to many Soviet and foreign experts, for 1978 do not reflect the actual state of affairs at the present time.

In conclusion, we must say that events in 1979 have demonstrated the tremendous, sometimes insurmountable difficulties standing in the way of the accomplishment of national economic "regulation."

The changes the Chinese leaders have made in national economic management and the measures they have planned could apparently play a definite positive role in the establishment of prerequisites for economic development. But the policy of "regulation," which envisages the continuation of the Chinese leadership's course aimed at the further militarization of the country and the reinforcement of military-industrial potential with limited resources, will afford no possibility of solving, within the 3-year period earmarked, all of the complex economic and social problems that came into being in the nation after the "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution" or to correct existing economic disparities.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 29 June 1979.
2. Ibid., 24 March 1979.
3. Ibid., 28 June 1979.
4. Ibid., 29 June 1979.
5. Ibid., 30 June 1979.
6. BUSINESSWEEK, 5 November 1979.
7. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 30 October 1979.
8. RENMIN RIBAO, 13 September 1979.
9. Ibid., 26 November 1979.
10. Ibid., 26 January 1979.
11. FINANCIAL TIMES, 5 October 1979.
12. BEIJING RIBAO, 16 September 1979.
13. GONGREN RIBAO, 26 May 1979.
14. BEIJING RIBAO, 13 May 1979.
15. GONGREN RIBAO, 26 October 1979.
16. Ibid., 14 March 1979.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 July 1979.
18. Ibid., 29 June 1979. The total output of coal for centralized distribution in 1979 was set at 354-366 million tons in the plan.
19. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 1, pp 66-67.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 May 1979.
21. Ibid., 29 June 1979.
22. RENMIN RIBAO, GONGREN RIBAO, 1 April 1979.
23. RENMIN RIBAO, 29 June 1979.

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 31 August 1979.
26. Ibid., 23 October 1979.
27. Ibid., 27 August 1979.
28. Ibid., 29 August 1979.
29. Ibid., 22 June 1979.
30. BEIJING REVIEW, 1979, No 26, p 11.
31. JINGJI YANJIU, 1979, No 1, p 38.
32. JAPAN TIMES, 8 August 1979.
33. RENMIN RIBAO, 2 September 1979.
34. Ibid., 1 August 1979.
35. Ibid., 19 September 1979.
36. Ibid., 15 August 1979.
37. Including sweet potatoes and potatoes (calculated in grain units according to a coefficient of 4:1) and soybeans.
38. RENMIN RIBAO, 5 June 1979.
39. Ibid., 19 September 1979.
40. ASIAN WALLSTREET JOURNAL, 2 June 1979.

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CSO: 1805

**PROVEN VANGUARD OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE (COMMEMORATING THE FIFTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIETNAM COMMUNIST PARTY)**

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOST in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 47-52

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

STRUGGLE OF THE JCP FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 53-72

[Article by Professor I. I. Kovalenko, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] In the 1970's rapid economic growth rates in Japan were followed by depression, and then by a severe and prolonged crisis. The situation within the nation, according to Japanese Communists, was marked by the exacerbation of the structural crisis of Japanese state-monopolistic capital, which was reflected in unprecedented inflation and depression, the aggravation of the crisis of democracy and freedom and the decline of culture and education. This process was accompanied by a decline in the influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the debilitation of the entire system of government.

The Japanese economic crisis, which began in the first half of the 1970's, dealt a severe blow to the workers' standard of living. The nation's economic strength was in the hands of the largest financial and industrial groups--Mitsubishi, Mitsu, Fuyo, Daiichi and Sanwa. These gigantic companies control 21.9 percent of the capital of all Japanese companies and 23.9 percent of all assets. If we add the companies in which 10 percent of the assets are controlled by members of these groups, the total number of companies in their sphere of influence will rise to 8,416 and represent 41 percent of the capital of all companies in the nation and 39.9 percent of all assets.¹

Big monopolistic capital, which has concentrated the nation's wealth in its hands, dominates every sphere of life and government activity, robs the people and encroaches upon their vital interests and political rights. It is dominant in central and local politics and forces the government to conduct a foreign and domestic policy serving the interests of monopolistic enterprises and answering their demands.

Monopolistic capital, which dominates economics totally, has also intruded boldly into the sphere of politics. The Lockheed and Grumman scandals, which represented only the tip of the iceberg, showed the Japanese public all the ugly truth about the plutocratic political machine. The overt

bribery of political parties and statesmen is the other side of the coin of monopoly domination. All anticommunist parties and organizations are regularly nourished by the monopolies, which not only pay them, but even request their favorite political tunes.

Government and financial circles are trying to overcome the consequences of the severe economic crisis which overtook the nation in 1974-1975 at the public's expense by launching an organized offensive against the vital interests of the workers. The crisis was accompanied by a massive increase in the number of unemployed, which did not fall below 1 million for several years, even according to official statistics, and the mass bankruptcy of small and medium-sized enterprises (around 1,500 a month). Business circles are shaping up and reorganizing enterprises by means of mass lay-offs and more pronounced intensification of labor. Wages are being held at a low level, but prices are constantly rising. Grants and stipends are being reduced throughout the nation and medical assistance funds have been cut. At the same time, taxes are rising. The worst form of mass taxation is the rising sales tax, which, in turn, leads to a constant rise in prices and the cost of living.

While a small handful of monopolists and big capitalists freely make use of the nation's tremendous wealth, the number of poor has risen to 10 million, and most of the population has to be satisfied with a low income. Welfare payments to the disabled, the ill, single mothers, senior citizens and the victims of war, particularly the atomic bomb victims, are extremely insignificant in size. Countless tragic suicides and cases of child abandonment due to financial difficulties have become commonplace in Japan today. Environmental pollution has also become an extremely serious problem, creating additional difficulties for the average Japanese citizen.

In addition to their economic difficulties, the people are suffering from a lack of political rights. On the pretext of "defending the free society," ruling circles and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are restricting such public rights as freedom of speech, conscience and political activity. Unconstitutional violations of civil rights can be observed at plants and enterprises throughout the nation. The administration organizes the surveillance of party members and labor activists and discriminates against them in matters involving job promotions, wages and so forth. Employers are forming "alternative unions" and are restricting the workers' right to form their own associations, they are prohibiting or restricting the political activity of members of the JCP [Japan Communist Party] and League of Democratic Youth at enterprises and they are resorting to violent despotism, employing groups of hooligans for this purpose.

In Japan, just as in other developed capitalist countries, the main conflict between reactionary and democratic forces is connected with differing interpretations of the government of the future. In the beginning of the 1970's, this conflict took extremely acute form.

The first major political battle of the 1970's broke out at the time of the gubernatorial election in Kyoto prefecture in April 1970. Labeling the JCP the number-one enemy, the government and the Liberal Democratic Party took every opportunity to prevent the only progressive candidate from winning the election. They created an alliance of three parties (Liberal Democratic, Democratic Socialist and Komeito) on an anticommunist basis and made every effort to overthrow the democratic administration of the prefecture, headed by Governor Ninagawa, which had been supported by a united front for 20 years.

The combined efforts of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party (JSP), the General Council of Trade Unions (Hohyo) and other democratic organizations, however, inflicted another serious defeat on the LDP and its allies, united on the basis of anti-communism, and caused events in this important region to develop in the JCP's favor. The Kyoto election, just as the somewhat earlier gubernatorial election in Tokyo, in 1969, proved to the people that the future belongs to the united front supported by the JCP.

Another definite victory was won when democratic forces succeeded in compelling ruling circles to conclude a new treaty with the United States, not for the long range as was the case in 1960, but through the simple renewal of the existing treaty, which provided democratic forces with the prospect of putting an end to the military-political alliance with the United States by establishing a democratic government and proclaiming a policy of peace and neutrality. The tactics employed by leftist forces under these new conditions consisted in extending the struggle against the "security treaty" into the future, instead of limiting this struggle to just the year of 1970, and pursuing the formation of a government which would cancel the "security treaty," which is hated by the entire population, and thereby relieve Japan of its dependence on the United States. In this way, the fight against the "security treaty" entered a new phase.

The projected course of Japanese action in the 1970's was precisely defined at the 11th JCP Congress in July 1970. This is a course of peace and neutrality, a course leading toward real independence, which should put an end to the Japanese-American military alliance. The congress stressed that the 1970's would be a period of confrontation between anticommunist reactionary forces striving to strengthen the alliance with the United States and pursuing the rebirth of militarism and imperialism under the conditions of this dependence, on one side, and, on the other, democratic forces pursuing the establishment of a peaceful and neutral Japan. The congress noted that the extremes in this confrontation would be represented by the Liberal Democratic Party and Japan Communist Party.

The congress noted that the 1970's held the promise of the dismissal of the LDP Government through the agency of the progressive united front's platform, the formation of a democratic coalition government and the cessation of the conservative party's lengthy period of reactionary rule.

An 11th Congress resolution said that the victories won by the leftist camp in the gubernatorial elections in Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka and the mayoral elections in Kyoto, Kawasaki and other cities vividly demonstrated that "it is precisely a united front, based on joint struggle by the JCP and JSP, that represents the only means of guaranteeing the successful advancement of democratic forces as a whole."²

The 11th JCP Congress charged the party with a specific task--to fight for the creation of a united front, which would stand for peace and neutrality, democracy, a rise in the standard of living and the formation of a democratic coalition government based on this front. The chief responsibility of this government, according to the JCP, would be the cancellation of the Japanese-American "security agreement," the transformation of Japan into a peaceful and neutral country, the implementation of a democratic policy, the prevention of militarism's rebirth, the protection of public life, the conduct of an independent economic policy and the democratic development of education and culture.³

When the JCP advocated a democratic coalition government at the 11th Congress, it did not regard this as a slogan for action which could be accomplished the next day. "This slogan," said JCP Central Committee Chairman K. Miyamoto, "is propagandistic in nature and points out what we must do next. We must not forget that the balance of power today, unfortunately, does not allow for the creation of a united front, and that our party is not a really powerful party as yet."⁴

Questions of party construction were given considerable attention at the congress, and the objective was set of turning the party into a force strong enough to implement the necessary reforms within the framework of the united democratic front's program.

The strengthening of the party's position in parliament was called the most important task facing all party organizations. The need to energize the work of party and progressive forces toward broader influence in local government was given serious consideration. The party believes that strong influence on the local level will simplify democratic forces' struggle against the existing regime and their creation of a democratic coalition government.

The JCP Congress defined the struggle for stronger influence in parliament as a policy of "popular parliamentarism," which it called the opposite of bourgeois parliamentarism. "There is no question that we have nothing in common with bourgeois parliamentarism, which ignores mass movements and suppresses them, assuming that everything will be decided by parliamentary elections. Besides this, we are not cherishing the slightest illusions about the class character, limitations and shortcomings of bourgeois parliamentarism, which is impeding the just expression of public wishes and imposing various limitations on the activities of democratic parties even within parliament. But this does not diminish the significance of popular parliamentarism whatsoever. In other words, we must seriously

consider the possibility of a truly democratic, progressive system of representation--a parliament which, as our program stresses, is the highest government body both in name and in fact."⁵

"Our party has an important responsibility to the people and the truth," said JCP Central Committee Chairman K. Miyamoto at the 11th Congress. "On the basis of human liberation, or working class liberation, and respect for the democratic wishes of the majority, it must boldly and wisely make every effort to find the particular path, leading to socialist revolution and socialist construction, which will minimize sacrifices."⁶

In search of this path, the willingness of Japanese Communists to work with other democratic parties, not only during the formation of the democratic coalition government but later as well, right up to the construction of socialism, was announced at the 11th JCP Congress. The idea of guaranteeing the unrestricted existence of various political parties in all stages of the revolutionary process was proposed. "In the independent democratic Japan," a resolution of the 11th JCP Congress stresses, "freedom of action will be guaranteed to all political parties, including those which criticize or oppose the government as long as they do not take steps to destroy the democratic system of the people by force; it will also be quite natural that the party winning the majority of parliamentary seats in elections will govern the country."⁷

Guided by the decisions of the 11th Congress, in January 1971 the JCP set forth a program for the formation of a united front on the local level, based on the achievement of unity in the following three tasks: 1) to withdraw from the Japanese-American military alliance and strive for the neutralization of Japan; 2) to put an end to politics in the interests of big capital and conduct a policy aimed at the defense of human life; 3) to fight against the all-round restoration and consolidation of militarism and for the expansion of democracy. Although the "middle-of-the-road" parties (the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito) rejected these three points and the JCP was hesitant on this matter, the JCP's practical steps to carry out this three-point program has aroused the interest of the general public.

Subsequent events confirmed the accuracy of the 11th Congress' line of uniting democratic forces in the process of anti-imperialist, antimilitary struggle. In the two successive campaigns after the congress, which evolved into nationwide battles, at the time of local government elections (April 1971) and the elections to the House of Councillors in June of the same year, the JCP won even more public support in spite of the intensified anticommunist crusade.

As a result of these elections, the party increased its representation in local government by more than 600 deputies. In subsequent mid-term elections the number of JCP representatives in local government constantly rose, and exceeded 2,500 by May 1972. This was 3 times as many seats as those held by the Komeito Party and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).

standing on the united front for reform, which had been achieved in 16 prefectures on the local level), the Communists, joining forces with the Socialists, won many important victories in elections for the heads of local administrative organs and in gubernatorial elections. In five prefectures--Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Chiba and Saitama--and in Kawasaki, Yashikawa and other cities, representatives of progressive forces became the leaders of local administrations.

As a result of this, the JCP, in conjunction with the JSP, became the ruling force in various regions, the population of which exceeded 30 million, or almost one-third of the nation's entire population.

In the elections to the House of Councillors, the party won more than 1.3 million more votes than in previous elections in local electoral districts. In all, the JCP was supported by 4.88 million citizens in the elections to the House of Councillors. The party began to control ten seats in the House of Councillors, and the party faction in both houses began to number 24.

The JCP's next triumph took place in the 1972 parliamentary elections, when it was able to put 38 deputies into the House of Representatives and to create a faction of 39 people in this house (including 1 deputy who ran as the candidate representing all progressive forces). Overtaking the DSP and Komeito, the Communist Party moved up to second place among opposition parties. If we compare the number of votes gathered by the JCP in these elections (5.7 million) to the number won in the same elections in 1960 (3.2 million), we can clearly see that the JCP increased voter support for its candidates 1.8-fold. This was a definite spurt ahead.

"The regression of the LDP and the rapid progression of the Communist Party," JCP documents note, "signified that, as predicted at the 11th Party Congress, a new stage has begun in the development of Japanese politics, distinguished by 'confrontation between the LDP and JCP.' It is true that ever since the general elections of 1972 the political situation in Japan has been distinguished by the JCP's rapid advancement and has taken an absolutely different direction. A serious defeat has been suffered by the anticommunist contrist line of 'alliance by two parties and one grouping,' which consisted in attempts to put together a DSP, Komeito and right-wing JSP coalition or a coalition of Socialists, Komeito and Democratic Socialists. The JCP has more influence in parliamentary procedure, and the tactic of conspiring to alienate the JSP has become impossible in parliamentary activity. Parliament is acquiring a more important role, not as the scene of bargaining and appeasement, but as a place for confrontation between LDP policy and the common demands of the people."

The JCP victory in the 1972 elections brought closer the prospect of creating a united front of all progressive forces with the aim of forming a democratic coalition government. If reformist forces had been able to conclude a political agreement for the purpose of establishing a democratic

coalition government and had created a united progressive front, serious changes might have taken place in Japanese politics.

The three objectives declared in 1971 (the policy of peace and neutrality, economic policy serving the public interest, and the defense of democracy), which had united communists with socialists, trade unions and other democratic forces in several prefectures in a struggle for their attainment, were made the basis of the program for progressive unity on the national level by the Japan Communist Party.

The decisions of the 12th JCP Congress (November 1973) represented a sizable step in the drafting of this program. The congress called upon progressive forces in the nation to form a democratic coalition government based on the three objectives or the principles of renewal. Explaining the purpose of this appeal, Kenchiro Ueda, member of the JCP Central Committee Presidium, said at the congress that this meant the creation of a "government to defend the vital interests of the people and democratic reforms, which, within the existing constitutional framework, would attain national goals--the three goals of renewal, namely: the guarantee of Japanese sovereignty and security, peace and neutrality, and political and economic democracy. This government will conduct a nationwide policy, based on a collective program drafted by all political parties and political forces making up the united front of progressive forces."⁹

According to the JCP, the attainment of the three goals of renewal would represent a sizable portion of the work involved in defending the public standard of living and democratic reforms and in delivering the nation from the severe structural crisis it was experiencing.

Let us briefly discuss the three goals of renewal the JCP set forth as the basis of the proposals approved at the 12th Congress as part of the program of the democratic coalition government. The first goal--the policy of peace and neutrality--envisaged the abrogation of the Japanese-American military bargain; the sequential dissolution of the "self-defense forces"; the legislative reinforcement of the three non-nuclear principles (no possession, no production and no imports of nuclear weapons); the passage of a law by parliament on Japanese neutrality, including a provision renouncing participation in military blocs and prohibiting the deployment of foreign troops in Japan.

With a democratic government of national unity, the JCP proposals point out, Japan would choose the path of non-alignment and would play an active role in promoting the policy of peace and neutrality and maintaining friendly contacts with all nations and peoples, regardless of social differences. The independence and security of Japan would be safeguarded by a system of security in Asia, and later by a worldwide system of collective security.

"A democratic coalition government for the attainment of lasting peace," the decisions of the 12th Congress underscore, "would strive for the creation of an international system of collective security, in which all nations would participate, regardless of their social structure. In the near future, the government will work toward the creation of regional systems of collective security in Asia and the Pacific, in Europe, and so forth."¹⁰

The second goal was economic democracy. A democratic coalition government, the decisions of the 12th Congress pointed out, would take the necessary steps to democratically control and regulate the activities of large industrial enterprises and ensure balanced national economic growth, including the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, agriculture and fishing.

These measures would not be socialist, but they would be taken for the protection of human life and human rights. The government would take immediate measures to solve problems posing the greatest danger to public life: rising prices, high taxes, low wages, environmental pollution, low welfare standards, housing difficulties and so forth.

The proposals of the JCP envisage the institution of democratic planning, which would not signify a complete transition to a planned economy, but would pursue the goal of partial economic planning under the supervision of the democratic coalition government while preserving the bases of the capitalist production method. The only exception would be power engineering, which would be nationalized. This, the congress documents state, would stem from the need to facilitate the utilization of all energy resources--petroleum, coal, hydraulic power, geothermal power, wind power, tides, nuclear power and so forth. Democratic planning would also call for changes in taxation, the budget and the financial system and the regulation of financial activity.

Explaining the purpose of these economic measures, JCP theoretician A. Kudo stresses that they "cannot be equated with socialist policy and cannot even be regarded as the first step toward a socialist economic policy.... They will represent a policy of economic democracy and the chief instrument of democratic control over the activities of monopolistic capital."¹¹

The third goal was the defense of political democracy. The policy of the democratic coalition government regarding domestic reforms would be based on the protection and expansion of democratic freedoms in all spheres of sociopolitical life, including the defense of five existing constitutional principles (people's sovereignty and national sovereignty; lasting peace; basic human rights; parliamentary democracy; local self-government).

The democratic coalition government would provide for the democratic renewal of public administration and the democratic development of education, science, art and culture. The program of the democratic coalition

government would also envisage the institution of democratic parliamentary control over administrative institutions, including police activities, the democratization of the structure of police departments and judicial organs and so forth.

The three progressive goals, as JCP documents noted, were intended to serve as a beacon, lighting the way to the democratic renewal of national politics and escape from the structural crisis the nation was experiencing.

The 12th JCP Congress submitted its proposals concerning the program of the democratic coalition government to other parties for examination.

It was noted at the 12th Congress that the program of a united front government should embody a community of action, goals and policy while respecting the independence of all political forces making it up. The JCP proposed that differences of opinion in the ideological sphere and the political plans of each party and political force be shelved during the discussion of the collective program for a coalition government.

The JCP regarded the formation of a democratic coalition government as one of the intermediate steps leading to the formation of a government of a national democratic united front, envisaged in the party program as a prerequisite for anti-imperialist, antimonopoly, democratic revolution. The democratic coalition government would be expected to clear the path for the arrival of the government of a national democratic united front.

The JCP did not limit its efforts to cooperation with the socialists. It felt it would be expedient to establish contacts with other forces as well, with the hope of acquiring their support for the idea of a united front. In this respect, it must be said that the JCP gave a great deal of consideration to the question of guaranteed freedom of conscience in various stages of social development and the achievement of mutual understanding with religious believers in so-called "worldly matters." The JCP believes that the creation of a united front in Japan on the basis of national accord will be impossible without the support of the religious segment of the Japanese population.

At the suggestion of the JCP, talks were conducted with the influential Soka Gakkai Buddhist society. In December 1974 a 10-year agreement was signed by the JCP and Soka Gakkai, in which the two sides undertook to defend the public interest, fight against social injustice, promote public well-being, eternal peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons, combat neofascism and defend democracy and basic human rights. When opinions regarding the means to these ends differ, the two sides should act in accordance with their own principles, but when these opinions coincide, they should act jointly. The agreement stated that Soka Gakkai would "display no hostility toward scientific socialism and communism" and that the JCP "would unconditionally support freedom of religion in any social structure, including freedom of religious propaganda."

This agreement, as JCP documents pointed out, envisaged "the possibility of progressive cooperation between the party of scientific socialism and religious organizations." Although this agreement was never implemented due to negative pressure exerted by Komeito on the Soka Gakkai leadership, its conclusion was of fundamental significance, transcending the bounds of the two parties concerned, and could have had considerable influence on further developments in the nation if the two sides had been able to put their plan to work.

Supplementing the theory of the united front with specific content, the JCP launched a campaign for national accord in 1975 with the aim of national salvation and progressive reforms. The JCP believes that the united front should not be limited to progressive parties and organizations alone, but that the prerequisites for its creation should also include dialog and debate in the broadest segments of the Japanese public in regard to fundamental problems in national development. The JCP has organized many meetings and talks with various organizations and groups. Within 1 year after the campaign "for national accord" had been launched, 45 national conferences and 4,600 local meetings had been organized.

Carrying out the instructions of the 12th Congress, the party urged the working class and all workers to wage a vigorous struggle against the onslaught of the monopolies and for their own rights and vital interests. It drafted a comprehensive program for Japan's emergence from the economic crisis by which it had been stricken since the end of 1973, asking the public to judge its proposals on economic development, which set forth a specific program for the democratic reorganization of the Japanese economy and aroused great interest in all segments of the Japanese population.

In connection with the declining standard of living, the JCP coined the slogan: "Respond to the most massive postwar economic crisis with the most massive popular movement!" The party ordered communists to lead the work of organizing a powerful popular movement in defense of the vital interests of the laboring public. It drafted proposals on problems in local self-government, culture and education and submitted them to the public for examination. These proposals called for improvement in the status of municipal government employees and teachers, the democratization of education and the prevention of cultural stagnation. The JCP also raised the important issue of protecting children from the noxious effects of the mass media, demanding, in particular, the prohibition of pornographic television programs. Despite the resistance of reactionary circles, the proposals of the JCP were enthusiastically received by the democratic public and produced some concrete results (the prohibition of automats for the sale of pornographic items and so forth).

The JCP was the political force which consistently warded off attacks on the workers movement and the persecution of labor activists. In 1976 the JCP issued an appeal "For Freedom in Production." Under the influence of this appeal, workers and trade unions launched a struggle to establish

democratic conditions in the production sphere and to restore the freedoms of the laboring public.

The JCP made a tremendous effort to unite unorganized workers in unions, as the presence of these workers represented one of the weak spots in the Japanese labor movement. As a result of the JCP's efforts, the number of new union members exceeded 40,000 in the 3 years following 1975. Although this is not a high figure, the very fact that unorganized workers were convinced to join trade unions represented an important step in the further expansion of the labor movement.

The party organizations of the JCP found many new ways of defending the common demands of the workers. Here are some examples. Under party supervision, a successful fight was waged for the restoration of the backward Tikuho region (Fukuoka Prefecture) which was suffering from mass unemployment. The struggle became so extensive and organized that the authorities had to adopt a comprehensive plan for the restoration of the entire region. The experience of the movement on Hokkaido is also of interest. Here, 290,000 seasonal workers were hit hard by the revision of a law on guaranteed employment. During the course of a movement initiated by the JCP, resolutions were passed in support of the workers by 119 city, town and rural legislatures. The authorities and employers had to make a number of serious concessions.

Fighting for the interests of the peasantry, the party drafted a comprehensive program for the restoration of agriculture, unequalled by the program of any other party in the nation. Using this program as a tool, the JCP instituted broader dialog with agricultural cooperatives, various peasant organizations and the broad peasant masses. As a result of the communists' efforts, around 10,000 have joined peasant unions in recent years. Rural propagandists and organizers have become more active at promoting JCP policies in rural areas.

It must be said, however, that most of the peasants are still supporting the LDP. In order to win the votes of peasants engaged in the cultivation of rice, the government subsidizes rice production, purchasing it from producers at prices exceeding the retail cost. The policy of the government and the LDP, which is aimed at winning the peasants over to their side at the expense of the government, is arousing increasing criticism from opposition parties.

The party is still giving a great deal of attention to work with intermediate and small businessmen, many of whom see the JCP as their defender and are taking a more active part in general democratic undertakings organized by the party.

The problems of youth and women must be considered when a democratic future is planned for Japan. Clubs organized by party sections and groups of the League of Democratic Youth for the discussion of current events and

the role of youth have recently become quite popular among young men and women in Japan. By 1977 there were more than 12,000 such clubs in the nation, with 70,000 members. The reason these clubs became so popular was that they were a convenient form of social involvement for young people, who are searching for ideals in today's society and for lively discussions, during the course of which they can find answers to important questions.

The party hopes to conduct more intensive political work among women, who now represent one-third of all hired workers in the production sphere. In rural areas, women constitute 60 percent of the agricultural labor force. The JCP is urging women to take an active part in public life. Party documents stress the importance of converting the democratic energy of women, who make up more than half of the population, from a largely potential force into a real force serving the cause of progress.

An important part of the party's activity is political work with the intelligentsia, which is in favor of the democratic development of science and culture and of a united front for renewal. The JCP is waging a tireless struggle against cultural decay and is seeking a way out of the present cultural crisis. The party is strengthening its influence with the masses by organizing the artistic intelligentsia, which shares the party's outlook and has expressed a desire to play an active part in the struggle for the democratic renewal of Japanese society.

The party was able, for example, to organize social studies societies in many universities and, in 1976, to hold a national congress of sociologists and establish the Japan League of Social Studies Societies. This united, on the national scale, all of the societies which were once closely connected with the student movement and had a positive effect on it but had ceased their activity long ago.

Along with the quantitative increase in the number of participants in spring labor demonstrations, workers' strikes and the peasant struggle, the energization of the activity of middle population strata and the radicalization of the intelligentsia, there has also been a further expansion of the democratic movement's social base due to the involvement of more and more new population strata in the struggle and the increasing political awareness of the popular masses. One vivid example of this is the active participation of the particular segment of the population which was, until recently, directly influenced by the LDP, in the struggle against environmental pollution, cuts in agricultural production and large-scale real estate speculation.

The plan for the democratic reorganization of the national economy, which was submitted to the people by the Communist Party in 1977, has aroused great interest in Japan. The economic program of the JCP envisages measures to correct defects in the state budget, raise taxes for big capital and reduce military spending. At the same time, the JCP is demanding that the government pass the necessary laws in the public interest,

alleviate the position of small businessmen and elevate the standard of living of workers, peasants and all laboring population strata.

The economic crisis of 1974-1975, which affected the interests of the overwhelming majority of Japanese, the unprecedented rise in the prices of consumer goods and galloping inflation brought about unparalleled expansion of the antimonopoly movement and created a situation in which the establishment of a united progressive front and the implementation of the JCP proposals regarding the formation of a democratic coalition government became objectives that were completely realizable in the near future, if not immediately.

Above all, it should be noted that, despite the existence of serious differences between the JCP and JSP, their policy-planning objectives had much in common, establishing a basis for broader cooperation. Most of the members of the JSP oppose American imperialism and Japanese monopolistic capital, are fighting against the resurgence of Japanese militarism and in defense of a peaceful constitution, and are demanding the dismantling of U.S. military bases and the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Japanese territory. Socialists want peace and they want Japan to be a neutral, independent democratic nation. The rank-and-file members of the JSP are pursuing a ban on nuclear weapons, seeking peace and security in Asia, supporting the national liberation movement and fighting for better living conditions for Japanese labor.

Official JCP documents repeatedly stress that joint action with the JSP will be of considerable significance for the subsequent unification of all laboring segments of the population in a united national democratic front.

The appeal to unite the forces of Japanese democrats on an antimonopoly basis and to carry out social reforms can also be found in documents of the Japan Socialist Party. The Japanese Socialists worked out the idea of forming a popular coalition government, which would replace the one-party government of the conservatives and carry out fundamental social reforms. The goals, means and methods of this coalition are set forth in the "Program for a Popular Coalition Government," adopted by the 37th JSP Congress in 1974. It sets forth the three chief political goals of the united front, which are, in general, the same as the JCP's three major objectives of democratic reform. They are, firstly, the cancellation of the Japanese-American "security treaty," the peaceful and democratic development of Japan and a struggle against the resurgence of imperialism and militarism; secondly, a struggle in defense of the life and rights of the people and against the anti-people policy of the monopolies; thirdly, a struggle to uphold human dignity through the defense of constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights, the restoration of democracy and the transformation of society, education and culture.¹²

According to the JSP, the popular coalition government should rest on the basis of an antimonopoly popular front. The democratic government should

be made up of representatives of democratic organizations and movements, united in a popular front, with all progressive groups and parties making up its basis.

The existence of specific and largely similar programs of economic reform, set forth by the JCP and JSP, and their regular joint statements in defense of the public interest attest to the presence of favorable objective conditions for a more powerful struggle by democratic forces in the nation and the unification of their efforts in the fight against monopoly rule and for democracy and social progress.

Nonetheless, the JCP and other progressive forces have not been able to draft a broad program of collective action in connection with fundamental issues in the struggle against imperialism and reaction and in defense of the vital interests of the people. The difficulty of achieving united action by democratic forces stems, in particular, from the fact that the leaders of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) have proposed the "reorganization" of opposition forces, meaning the creation of a strong reformist party, with the DSP, Komeito and the JSP right wing serving as its basis. This idea has been supported by some JSP politicians.

Reactionary forces launched a frenzied offensive against democratic and progressive forces, setting as their immediate objective the prevention of a united front with JCP and JSP participation and, as a long-range objective, the transformation of the JSP into a typical social-democratic party or its disappearance from the political scene. The maneuvers of Japanese ruling classes were aimed at ultimately isolating the Communist Party and preventing its active participation in domestic politics. The plans for the so-called reorganization of opposition parties were camouflaged behind appeals for the creation of a coalition to overthrow the LDP government, but they are actually aimed at perpetuating dissent among Japanese democratic forces and keeping them from establishing a government. If this "reorganization" should be successful, a two-party system could spring up in Japan, and this will give rise to additional difficulties in the formation of a united national democratic front.

In December 1970 a JSP congress unanimously opposed the "reorganization of opposition parties." But some of the leaders of this party have taken a vacillating stand not only on the question of an organized united front, but also on the possibility of long-term joint action with the JCP. Expressing the feelings of this segment of the party, the JSP declared a policy of "efforts, multilateral in form, to solve some problems inside and outside parliament" for the purpose of consolidating all opposition parties. It "denied the possibility of founding this unity on cooperation with any particular party."¹³ In connection with this, AKAHATA reported that an analysis of these documents suggested that "the Socialist Party, on the one hand, will not only turn its back on joint struggle and on a united front of democratic forces, not only in its adherence to its present line, but also in the future, for a long period of time,...but, on the other hand, the JSP is actively pursuing the creation of a 'middle-of-

the-road coalition not striving for radical change' with the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito."¹⁴

Japanese Communists and Socialists have still not been able to work out a common approach to the formation of the united front. For this reason, joint JCP and JSP actions have generally been limited to isolated statements on specific matters. Nonetheless, the JCP and JSP have taken several joint measures with positive results.

In the mid-1970's, the LDP and monopolistic capital had to take immediate steps to prevent the further advancement of the JCP. All possible means were put to work to discredit the JCP and to fill the public with suspicion and worries about Japan's future. The LDP again brought up the idea of instituting a system of small electoral districts, which would guarantee it an absolute majority of deputatorial mandates with only 40 percent of the total vote; the leaders of the LDP quickly launched a movement for the organizational expansion of their party's ranks and for the augmentation of the JIYU SHIMPO press organ's group of readers to 5 million individuals. An extensive anticommunist campaign was launched once again in the nation, with the slogan "defend the free society"; additional attempts were made to put together an anticommunist coalition made up of the "middle-of-the-road" parties. In other words, desperate efforts were made to prevent the creation of a united progressive front.

Under the conditions of the crisis and contradictions of the existing system of government, according to the JCP, Liberal Democrats and their government, with U.S. support, "made the transition to a broad-scale anticommunist offensive and the policy of splitting up progressive forces to stop the regression of the LDP."¹⁵

This offensive, which was launched under the banner calling for the defense of the "free world," was regarded by ruling circles as a long-range strategy aimed at preserving the existing system of reactionary government. The spearhead of the attack was pointed at the Japan Communist Party.

All possible means are being used in the attack on the Communist Party, including various "cases" invented by the secret police back in the dismal 1930's, events in neighboring China, among them the notorious "Great Cultural Revolution" and "exposure of the gang of four," the claims of ruling circles to part of the Kuril Islands, which are an integral part of Soviet territory, and exaggerated commotion over questions of Japanese-Soviet fishing relations, which are settled in accordance with established international practice.

One new feature of this anticommunist campaign is the fact that financial circles are no longer limiting themselves to the offer of financial assistance to the LDP, but are actively involving themselves in the campaign, mobilizing all available forces and means to this end. They are attacking the working class, primarily progressive workers and communists. Big

financial capital is participating directly and vigorously in election campaigns. With the aid of economic leverage, the business community is organizing broad support for LDP candidates, and sometimes for the candidates of centrist parties.

The police are inventing more and more slanderous rumors and lies to discredit the JCP and are supplying the bourgeois mass media with the appropriate materials for utilization for anticommunist purposes. It has been established, for example, that the research division of the cabinet of ministers conducts instructive conferences for representatives of rightist bourgeois newspapers and offers them various types of provocative information from allegedly reliable sources. In this connection, the Bungei Shunjiu Publishing Firm earned a scandalous reputation by instigating many anticommunist outbursts. Various kinds of terrorist groups are being used more frequently against party activists. These groups assault the buildings of party organizations and commit acts of physical terror.

The anticommunist offensive is not only being carried out by the LDP and the business community. Rightist opportunist leaders and backward elements from the Komeito and DSP opposition parties are joining the energetic fight against the JCP. They are allying themselves with the ruling LDP against the JCP and the left wing of the JSP. In this way, they are not only performing a great service for the LDP, but are also preventing the creation of a united front of democratic forces.

The "middle-of-the-road" parties (Komeito and DSP) advocate a united front without JCP participation and are urging the Socialist Party to reject the idea of creating a nationwide united front. The leaders of Komeito and the DSP have refused to conduct a joint struggle in dealing with such urgent matters as the "Lockheed scandal," the improvement of living conditions for the laboring public, the Japanese-American "security treaty" and others.

The combined mass demonstrations by democratic forces were weakened in the mid-1970's by the schismatic actions of Komeito and the DSP. For example, in the gubernatorial elections in Kyoto in 1974 and Osaka in 1975, Komeito and the DSP took the side of the ruling party, giving it considerable support in the fight against democratic forces.

The Maoist schismatics and their agents in Japan have inflicted severe wounds on the party and on its efforts to unite the broad popular masses for the resolution of problems facing the nation and people. The fight against Maoist subversive activity has diverted the forces and attention of party members away from their chief objectives. The party has fought an irreconcilable battle against Maoist intervention in the internal affairs of the communist and democratic movement in Japan.

"Representatives of the Chinese Communist Party," a work entitled "Fifty Years of the Japan Communist Party" stresses, "have employed the increased

tendency toward the restoration of Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations as a means of intervention in Japanese affairs. They have not only supported the subversive activity against the party by anti-party elements which blindly obey their orders, but, utilizing the social democrats who oppose communism, parties taking an intermediate stand, and even part of the LDP, have also begun to put together a political front aimed against the JCP. Exerting pressure on journalists, they have discouraged them from criticizing their domestic and foreign policy line. They have exposed themselves even more as persons indulging in great-power intervention and striving to impose their plans on the Japanese people and the democratic movement. The 'Rengo Sekigun' (United Red Army) incident also proved that these people are trying to force Japan to accept the idea of armed struggle in the spirit of the thesis that 'rifles breed authority.' The party has pointedly criticized the aspirations of the Mao Zedong-Zhou Enlai clique to a kind of 'social colonialism,' to the domination of other parties and peoples, which lie at the basis of their intervention. It has proved that a firm stand must be taken to prevent great-power intervention and to allow the Japanese people to lay their own path to the future."¹⁶

At the end of 1975, when ruling circles launched a particularly broad campaign of slanderous attacks on the Communist Party and its leaders, groundlessly accusing them of displaying contempt for the democratic rights of the individual, the party, which was preparing for the parliamentary elections planned for the end of 1976, held a special congress, the 13th (July 1976). The congress adopted the "Declaration of Freedom and Democracy." This document was something like a JCP charter, supplementing and amplifying the policy-planning objectives of the party and the decisions of party congresses. It stated that the Japanese people should be fully endowed with the following freedoms: freedom of existence, civil and political freedoms and national freedom. The declaration stressed that all of these freedoms were being severely restricted and suppressed in contemporary Japan. The JCP exposed ruling circles' habit of encroaching upon the elementary rights and freedoms stipulated in the constitution.

Revealing the seamy side of bourgeois democracy, the declaration called upon Japanese workers to fight for their real rights and democratic freedoms. In particular, the declaration stressed that the historic significance of the doctrine of scientific socialism was that, while attaching great importance to the political liberation of the people, it taught that the individual could only achieve real liberation by liquidating the system of exploitation. This goal could be attained by putting an end to the capitalist system and building a socialist and communist society, in which there would be no class differences or conflicts.

In our nation, the declaration noted, which is a highly developed capitalist country but is dependent on the United States, the Communist Party, defining future guidelines for social progress, sets the immediate objective of democratic renovation of the country with the aid of a democratic coalition government. It then intends to build an independent, democratic

Japan by carrying out an anti-imperialist, antimonopoly democratic revolution and progressing toward socialist revolution and, eventually, the construction of a communist society.

In a socialist Japan, the leading branches of industry and other means of production now controlled by big capital will be owned by the entire society. Production for the sake of society and the public, and not personal profit, will be the basic principle of economic activity. The workers will play an active role in the management and control of enterprises. Planned economic management, leading to the rich development of productive forces, will guarantee the people high levels of material and spiritual well-being--higher than even before.

In a developed nation such as Japan, the declaration points out, the deciding step toward the socialization of the economy consists in the socialist nationalization of large enterprises, which constitute the most important economic sector. In such branches as medium- and small-scale industry and trade, agriculture and medium- and small-scale fishing, private businesses will remain in existence and their active role in the national economy will be respected.

The JCP has set the following objective for all stages of the Japanese society's development--staunch defense of public sovereignty and free participation by the public in politics. It will guarantee freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of speech, the press, assembly and association and the freedom of workers to declare solidarity and take collective action.

In order to safeguard public sovereignty, a state structure in which the highest body will be a parliament, resting on universal suffrage, will be established and reliably protected in the independent, democratic Japan and in socialist Japan. A multi-party system will be adopted, allowing for the existence of opposition parties, and all political parties will be guaranteed freedom of action. Government will be controlled by the party or coalition of parties receiving the majority of the public vote.

The JCP believes that the protection and expansion of civil freedoms will be an essential condition for the safeguarding of basic human rights and public sovereignty. Each citizen will be granted freedom of expression, including the guaranteed freedom to utilize the mass media.

Carrying out its policy of protecting human rights and striving for a better life, democracy and freedom, the concluding section of the declaration stresses, the JCP will work toward the defense and flourishing of civil and political freedoms and the defense and development of national freedom. The all-round protection and development of these freedoms and democracy have been firmly promised by the JCP, which realizes its responsibility for the people's future.¹⁷

Speaking at the 13th congress, Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa of the JCP Central Committee Secretariat said that "the workers as a class should naturally

play the leading and central role in the institution of socialist reforms," but "the leading role of the working class in socialist reforms does not mean that other classes will have no opportunity to participate in these reforms or that the working class will stand above other strata of the population.... A socialist regime, uniting the broad popular masses and engendered through their support, will not only urge other social classes to participate in socialist construction but will even be based on a coalition of the forces supporting socialism, on a broad alliance uniting the working class with all classes and strata of the population,"¹⁸

The elections to the House of Representatives (December 1976) and House of Councillors (July 1977), which were held after the 13th, special congress of the JCP, took place in an atmosphere of continuous massive slanderous attacks on the JCP by the bourgeois mass media, intense nationalist propaganda in the nation and the revival of anticommunist prejudices in centrist opposition parties and backward social strata. The JCP suffered a serious defeat, losing 19 seats in the House of Representatives and 4 in the House of Councillors. The party also suffered considerable injury in local elections.

The 14th congress of the JCP was held from 17 through 22 October 1977. It summed up the results of party activity since the time of the 12th congress, directing attention to the positive aspects of party activity and party achievements as well as the reasons for its lack of success in the parliamentary elections of 1976 and 1977.

As the accountability report of the General Committee to the 14th congress noted, "at all times and in all nations, the revolutionary movement has never developed along a straight, broad and even road, it has tempered itself, achieving successes and even experiencing serious failures, moving ahead along a difficult and winding path until it discovers the path to victory. The two election upsets suffered by our party represent one of the bends in the road traveled by the entire revolutionary process,"¹⁹

Admitting that progressive forces "had to retreat under the conditions of crisis and the declining political influence of the LDP," the congress stated: "The main problem here is that a united front of progressive forces has still not been established, and that these forces have not been able to reveal the prospect of a progressive future to the broad popular masses which are taking a discerning, or even negative, view of the policy of the Liberal Democrats."²⁰

The congress reaffirmed the party's determination to continue the anti-imperialist, antimonopoly struggle, to staunchly defend the interests of the workers, to unite them and to pursue the formation of a national democratic united front, with the construction of a peaceful, neutral, democratic Japan as its immediate objective.

In connection with the attempts of Japanese ruling circles, now resting on the support of Beijing, to divert progressive forces away from their

struggle against the policy of military alliances and the militarization of the country, much attention was given at the congress to the elucidation of the party's foreign policy line.

"Our party," the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th JCP Congress states, "leading peaceful and democratic forces, in strengthening its solidarity with anti-imperialist, peace-loving forces in all nations; it is protesting all signs of intervention in internal affairs, pressure on other countries and the policy of war and aggression conducted by American imperialism; it is demanding the dismantling of American military bases on Japanese territory and in all parts of Asia and is persistently fighting for the dissolution of all military blocs and the liquidation of all military bases in Asia, the total independence of all Asian people, the establishment of relations of peace and friendship between all states on the basis of five peaceful principles, and the creation of a genuine system of collective security in Asia, which will be participated in by all states, regardless of differences in social structure."²¹

The congress underscored the Japanese people's particular responsibility in the fight against American intervention, since the United States is using Japan as an instrument of its aggressive policy in Asia. Speakers at the congress stated that the question of liquidating the Japanese-American "security treaty" did not only concern the fate of the Japanese people, but was also an international problem, the outcome of which could affect the future of Asia. The accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th party congress, which was presented by Chairman T. Furea of the Central Committee Secretariat, expressed the certainty that "the Japanese people, as a result of nationwide struggle, will throw off the yoke of the Japanese-American 'security treaty' and will complete the transition from the pro-American policy of maintaining this aggressive military alliance to the complete restoration of sovereignty and the development of the nation along the path of independent peaceful policy, the path of independence, democracy, peace and neutrality."²²

The JCP feels that the only reasonable method of escaping the national crisis connected with the existence of the Japanese-American military alliance will be a move toward non-alignment and neutrality. The party pointed out the fact that Southeast Asia is once again becoming a principal target of U.S. global strategy. In the event of new military provocations in this region, Japan will be used as a support base by the United States and, under these conditions, the Japanese-American "security treaty" could take the most dangerous turn for the Japanese. This course of events is being stimulated by the U.S. Administration's demand that Japan take on a considerable portion of the expense of maintaining American troops on the Japanese islands and increase military and other assistance to South Korea.

The congress noted that the reorganization and reinforcement of the Japanese-American military alliance are being accompanied by the mounting

danger of the rebirth of Japanese militarism. As early as the 11th congress, the JCP was already discussing the danger of the rebirth of militarism in the nation, including the possibility that Japanese troops would be sent overseas. Since that time, Japanese militarism has become much stronger; the situation has reached a point at which the Japanese parliament is debating the passage of laws to cover "extreme circumstances."

"From the domestic political standpoint," the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th congress underlines, "it is an extremely serious problem that the stronger underlying tendency toward fascism of the Japanese type is one and the same as the dangerous tendency toward a rebirth of militarism."²³ Proceeding from this analysis, the 14th JCP Congress stressed that the attitude toward the "security treaty" was one of the touchstones which would reveal which of the Japanese stood for progress or reaction, sovereignty or dependence and, finally, war or peace.

The 14th congress charged communists with the responsibility of launching a nationwide struggle against the dangerous development of the Japanese-American military alliance and exposing those who directly or indirectly support military alliance with the United States. The congress pointed out the fact that American and Japanese reactionary forces were being assisted by the Chinese leadership, which is persistently trying to make leftist political parties and organizations renounce their traditional struggle for the peaceful and neutral development of Japan and is attempting to involve them in its hegemonistic plans by creating an international anti-Soviet front with Japan's participation.

"The apologists of the 'security treaty,'" the accountability report of the Central Committee to the 14th congress said, "now include even those who once spoke out loudest of all for its cancellation and against the resurgence of militarism. As soon as China was motivated by strategic consideration, related to its attitude toward the Soviet Union, to praise the Japanese-American 'security treaty,' these people, blindly following China's lead, made a 180-degree turn. It must be said that this unprincipled apostasy revealed the pitiful and petty spirit of those who lick the boots of overseas forces and feel no sense of responsibility for the fate of Japan and its people."²⁴

The congress proposed Japan's move toward non-alignment and neutrality, stating that only this course would provide new opportunities for the resolution of foreign political and economic conflicts now being faced by Japan.

A move toward non-alignment, in economic relations as well as politics, will benefit Japan. This kind of policy, according to the JCP, will open new avenues for economic development and simplify the resolution of the natural resource problem. "If Japan, embarking on a course of non-alignment and neutrality, resolutely renounces the previous relationship

of the exploiting capitalist countries to the exploited developing countries and establishes a relationship of truly mutual goodwill and equality with the developing countries, this will indisputably offer it new ways of solving the resource problem."²⁵

The 14th congress recognized the need to view the struggle for the formation of a democratic coalition government in a broader context, not limited to the decade of the 1970's. "Even if various difficulties are encountered in the advancement toward this goal," a congress resolution notes, "the formation of a democratic coalition government on the basis of the unity of progressive forces will sooner or later be accomplished by means of nationwide struggle. History is moving in this direction, and no resistance or opposition on the part of the opponents of renewal can impede this process."²⁶

The question of improving party work for the purpose of expanding its ranks and ensuring success in parliamentary elections was given considerable attention at the congress.

Armed with the decisions of the 14th congress, Japanese communists began broad-scale political, indoctrinational and organizational work with the masses, which strengthened and broadened party authority and increased the workers' trust in the party. By the 37th anniversary of the JCP, which was celebrated in June 1979, the party had more than 420,000 members. The readers of the central JCP organ, *AKAHATA* ("Red Banner") newspaper, numbered 3 million. This is a major triumph for the JCP if we consider that the party had 40,000 members and *AKAHATA* had less than 100,000 readers in 1961.

Another example of the JCP's increasing influence was its great success in the latest parliamentary elections, held in October 1979. The party won 5.8 million votes and put 39 deputies into the lower house of parliament, and if the two candidates of united democratic forces are counted, the JCP faction in the lower house now consists of 41 individuals. The party is now represented by 57 deputies in the highest legislative body. The communists were particularly successful in large industrial centers--Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. The influence of the JCP also increased noticeably in rural regions, where the party won more than 10 deputatorial mandates. This is all the more indicative since rural Japan has always been the private preserve of conservative forces and has traditionally voted for LDP candidates.

The JCP's rapid advance in these elections was due to its slogans, popular with the masses, calling for struggle against the militarization of the country, for the abrogation of the Japanese-American military treaty and against Japanese participation in the dangerous aggressive plans of the United States and Beijing, aimed at intervention in the internal affairs of Asian and Pacific countries. During the campaign, the party firmly

advocated the development of peaceful and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and exposed the truth about the provocative campaign of reactionary circles in regard to the "mounting Soviet military threat."

This rapid advancement in the 1979 elections, however, is not being regarded as any kind of final limit by the JCP. The party leadership feels that these successes are still not enough to ensure the creation of a united national democratic front and make a radical change of government in Japan a real possibility. Summing up the results of the elections, Comrade Miyamoto stressed that the number of seats won by the JCP in parliament is still insignificant if regarded in light of the enormous problems the party will have to deal with in the near future.

Between the 14th JCP Congress and the present, the JCP membership grew by 40,000, as a result of which the total membership figure is now 400,000. Although the assignments set by the 14th congress have not been carried out in full, this is the highest number of JCP members in the party's history.

The JCP has recently also been quite successful in augmenting the reading audience of the party's central press organ, *AKAHATA*. The number of its subscribers has now reached the maximum figure of 3.4 million.

The party educational network has also been considerably broadened and organizationally strengthened. As the draft resolution of the 15th congress points out, the number of graduates of party courses has risen to 62,000 and the number of party members attending lectures in the primary educational system has reached 162,000. Meetings of party organizations are being held on a much more regular basis (approximately half of all the party organizations in Japan meet three or four times a month).

"The entire party," the draft resolution of the 15th JCP Congress states, "is now taking part in monthly campaigns to fulfill public promises, campaigns for the propaganda of party policy and the reinforcement of party ranks and pursuing the attainment of an objective set at the 14th congress, which stipulated that party membership should reach 500,000 and the number of readers of its press organ should rise to 4 million by the time of the 15th congress.

"Building on these successes, we must do our utmost to overcome all obstacles and establish a mass vanguard party, strong enough in the quantitative and qualitative sense to successfully move ahead and triumph in the struggle for a new social administration."²⁷

Japanese observers are now admitting more and more that the main confrontation of the 1980's will be one between the Japan Communist Party, expressing and defending the interests and desires of the broad laboring masses, and the Liberal Democratic Party, protecting the interests of big monopolistic capital. It is already apparent even today, however,

that the JCP has become an influential force in Japanese society, supported by millions of Japanese workers, while the ruling LDP, torn apart by internal conflicts, is losing one position after another. This deep-seated tendency is not only reflected in the course of parliamentary battles, but also on other fronts of today's class struggle in Japan.

FOOTNOTES

1. ZENEI, 1977, No 419 (special issue), p 107.
2. AKAHATA, 7 July 1970.
3. ZENEI, No 312, p 293.
4. Ibid., p 124.
5. Ibid., 1970, No 312 (special issue), p 49.
6. Ibid., pp 69-70.
7. Ibid., pp 148-149.
8. Ibid., 1971, No 319 (special issue), p 27.
9. Ibid., 1972, No 329 (special issue), p 40.
10. Ibid., p 45.
11. "Nihon-no mirai-o hiraku kagakuteki shakaishugi," Tokyo, 1972, p 292.
12. "Nihon shakaite-no sanjunen," Tokyo, 1974, pp 870-871.
13. "Nihon shakaite koryonbunkenshu," Tokyo, 1978, p 306.
14. AKAHATA, 5 December 1971.
15. ZENEI, 1977, No 419, p 85.
16. "Nihon kyosanto-no gojunen," Tokyo, 1972, pp 243-244.
17. ZENEI, 1976, No 400 (special issue), pp 52-71.
18. Ibid., p 109.
19. Ibid., 1977, No 419, pp 76-77.
20. Ibid., p 35.

21. Ibid., p 84.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p 104.
24. Ibid., p 105.
25. Ibid., p 106.
26. Ibid., p 36.
27. "Information Bulletin for Abroad. Central Committee of JCP," Tokyo,
No 422, p 110.

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JAPAN AND LATIN AMERICA: THE ZAIBATSU APPROACH

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CSO: 1805

CONTEMPORARY PROPAGANDISTS OF THE 'OPEN DOOR' POLICY

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[Article by V. N. Nikiforov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] Since the beginning of the 1970's, particularly in the second half of the decade, more and more books and articles have been published in the PRC on historical subjects, including topics in world history and international relations. The absolute void that existed in Chinese historical science in the second half of the 1960's, following the notorious "Cultural Revolution," is now being rapidly filled. This could only be cause for joy if the authors of the new books and articles had taken the objective and conclusive approach that is generally required of historical works. Many contemporary Chinese publications prove that, unfortunately, this is not the case.

We have before us an article published in China in 1979. Its fundamental significance is great: The author, Wang Xi, raises no less an issue than the radical reassessment of the entire history of Chinese-American relations. The article was printed in SHIJIE LISHI ("World History") magazine, in issue No 3 for 1979.

It is not only obvious that the author of the article does not wish to be taken for an orthodox Maoist, but he goes even further and almost totally discards the "Marxist-Leninist" terminological basis that was once characteristic of Maoist works, consisting of terms, phrases and quotations that were incorrectly interpreted but were nonetheless Marxist in origin; Wang Xi's article contains only one meaningless phrase about history's obligation to serve "proletarian policy." If this phrase is discounted, the article could be totally ascribed to any bourgeois author.

It was characteristic of the "scientific style" of the period of "Cultural Revolution," as all of us still remember quite well, that Mao's ideas were actually regarded as the highest criterion of truth. Contemporary works, particularly the Wang Xi article now being analyzed, are characterized by the pretense of objectivity and frequent appeals for "serious, scientific generalization," "objective scientific judgments," "serious criticism and discussion" and the "use of primary sources" (pp 16, 18).

It would seem that this approach could only be applauded. After all, what kind of historical science would we have without the conscientious treatment of sources! Who can deny that the criterion of truth is experience, and not a quotation from Mao.... Let us see, however, how these general pragmatic instructions are employed by the author of this article in his treatment of historical material.

The history of American-Chinese relations was the subject of many studies by Chinese scholars prior to 1949 and during the first period of the PRC's existence. The Soviet reader is familiar, for example, with the books of the famous Chinese historians Hu Sheng, Liu Danian and Qin Benli.¹ All Chinese progressive authors always agreed with the indisputable fact that capitalist America belonged to the category of foreign aggressors.

In the opinion of historian and philosopher Hu Sheng, reinforced by the entire content of his previously mentioned book, "the aggressive policy of American imperialism in China has as long a history as the policy of other imperialist countries. Various imperialist powers have tried to enslave China. The leading role among them for more than 50 years after the first 'opium war' was played by England. After 1894 Japanese imperialism became the chief aggressor in China. But since 1899 the struggle to dominate China has been waged under cover of the 'open door' doctrine of American imperialism, and it was at that time that the continuous years-long struggle between the United States and Japan for supremacy in China began. Whereas Japanese imperialism has long been regarded by Chinese people as their number-one enemy because of its brazen treachery, insidiousness and brutality, American imperialism has always camouflaged its brutal and bestial features with a hypocritical mask and is therefore an even more dangerous enemy."²

Naturally, we do not know whether the opinions expressed by Chinese scholars in the early 1950's coincide with their present views. But we do wish to point out something else here: The books published in the 1950's still exist, and no one has ever refuted their conclusions. For example, the author of the excerpt quoted was able, in our opinion, to summarize the policy from each power and to describe their proportional significance in the Far East quite well, in complete accordance with the facts and in the context of the entire history of China's relations with the capitalist powers. It is a fact that the chief imperialist forces here have traditionally been England, Japan and the United States; at the end of the 19th century Japan became the most active of these forces, and the United States took over this role later. Other powers which were conducting an imperialist policy at that time--tsarist Russia and France--are not even mentioned by Hu Sheng in his conclusion as he believed that they played a secondary role (naturally, he does discuss these states in his book).

We have cited this one work because its author, in our opinion, was able to express this idea most fully; in general, however, the same views were held by many Chinese, Soviet and other authors. Let us see what the 1979 article offers in place of this.

What is "new" in Wang Xi's discussion of this matter is primarily his ascription of primary significance to the "serious role" played by the problem of China's "territorial integrity" (p 12). The imperialist powers "for 109 years...conquered piecemeal" the territory of China, while the United States was supposedly the only one of the leading imperialist states which "did not seize Chinese territory." While the author admits that this absence of direct territorial conquests in China was the result of "apprehension and the lethargy of the U.S. State Department," opposition on the part of England and Japan and other historical causes, he nonetheless feels it is a "remarkable fact" that the United States did not have the energy to seize any tasty tidbits away from China prior to 1950.

Here is the "new" theory in a nutshell (actually, this was suggested for a long time by American imperialist historians): Russia, naturally, was the "chief enemy"; the United States was the only power which did not invade China (p 12); these are the two poles between which all elements of the history of China's relations with the outside world should supposedly be distributed from now on.

But what about the fact that the United States planned to invade China several times, even though it could not carry out these plans for a long time? This fact is unimportant to the author because he has a second theory to set forth: "The preservation of standards in international relations is nothing other than practice and reality" (p 12). Fine, the reader will say, if he is at all familiar with the "practice" of the Americans and all other imperialists in China, but what happened to this pitiful practice and "reality" in 1950, when American imperialism openly seized, and is still controlling, the island of Taiwan--the largest segment of Chinese territory populated by Chinese and still unreturned to the PRC? Or how should we interpret such historical realities as the "open door" doctrine in China, which was declared--and everyone knows this--precisely by American imperialism in 1899-1900 and which served for a long time as the legal basis for the semicolonial exploitation of China?

The answer is quite simple, the author replies: The occupation of Taiwan was nothing more than "a regrettable episode in the history of Sino-American relations," and it is fortunately now over, "now that the United States has acknowledged Taiwan to be an integral part of Chinese territory" (p 13). As for the "open door" doctrine, Wang Xi has yet another theory, a third one, which, in the author's opinion, allows for the free creation of a "new" history of American-Chinese relations.

The theory is the following (pp 13-14). From the very beginning, Wang Xi says, the "open door" policy, declared by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay, contained a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, Hay's note recognizes the presence of imperialist spheres of influence in China and demanded "equal opportunities" for the United States. On the other, the note formally set forth the principle of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. Wang Xi is correct in pointing out this contradiction. Moreover, he presents a long list of U.S. violations

of the principle of China's territorial integrity and sovereignty: the U.S. Government's encouragement of tsarism's policies in Manchuria in 1900, its recognition of Japan's "special rights" in Manchuria and Mongolia in 1908 (the Root-Takahira Agreement), another recognition of Japan's "special interests" in China in 1917 (the Lansing-Ishii convention), and the provision of Japan with supplies of American fuel during the period of Japanese aggression in China in 1931-1941. The author of the article justifiably concludes from all this that the "open door" policy was essentially always a reflection of the U.S. desire to "safeguard and broaden U.S. economic and political interests in China. It would seem," the author remarks with a hint of embarrassment, "that the 'justice,' 'concern for others' and 'selflessness' discussed by some American historians never actually existed" (p 14).

The matter seems quite clear: The "open door" policy was essentially imperialist and colonialist (it is true that the author of the article avoids this kind of class judgment as much as possible, but this does not change the meaning of his comments). But no, it is precisely here that the line of reasoning undergoes an unexpected reversal in the article. As we recall, Wang Xi postulated at the beginning of the article that the "open door" policy was contradictory. Now he moves on to the second facet of this policy.

The "open door" policy, he asserts, played a "definite role in the objective deterrence or postponement of imperialist aggression against our nation" (p 14). What can we say about this? The "open door" policy (which was, incidentally, formally adopted at that time by all imperialist states) was the reflection of a temporary compromise by these powers on the issue of China, and their admission of the fact that, given the existing balance of power in the Far East, no one power was capable of exploiting China all alone. But the "open door" doctrine did not in any sense signify the refusal of its creators to exploit the Chinese people. On the contrary, it sanctified this exploitation with the principle of equal "opportunities" (opportunities for exploiters). Judging by the total content of the doctrine, the preservation of China's formal "integrity" (combined with the preservation of foreign bases, concessions and spheres of influence in China!) was expressly intended to serve the goals of the collective exploitation of China by international imperialism.

As for the statement in the Hay doctrine regarding the preservation of Chinese sovereignty, what real sovereignty could there have been under the conditions of the foreign concessions and spheres of influence in China, an entire system of unfair treaties, the lack of customs independence for China, the collection of debts and contributions by force, the existence of extraterritoriality and the occupation of several Chinese regions by foreign armed troops! Under these conditions, the equality declared in the Hay doctrine for the exploiting powers represented the practical and commercial purpose of the doctrine, while the principle of "respect for Chinese sovereignty" was a formal screen or figleaf.

Naturally, it is a matter of personal taste if Wang Xi and the editors of SHIJIE LISHI prefer collective forms of colonial slavery to individual forms. But they are absolutely certain that the Chinese people do not share this opinion. At any rate, as early as 1924--that is, when the imperialists "open door" policy was at its peak--the founder of the revolutionary democratic movement in China, Sun Yat-sen, wrote: "The present condition of China is much more shameful than that of any colony. For example, Korea is a colony of Japan and Annam is a colony of France (this was then the status of Korea and Annam, or Vietnam--V. N.). Do they play a role in international relations? Certainly not. All countries treat them as slaves: Korea is treated as Japan's slave and Annam is treated as France's slave. But although Korea and Annam are slaves of foreign states, each is only the slave of a single power. China, on the other hand, is now the slave of all the great powers, since any state which maintains contractual trade relations with China acts like our master.... We are controlled by at least ten masters and, consequently, China is in a much worse position than Korea, where only Japan is the master, or Annam, where only France is the master."³

Hu Sheng, the Chinese historian quoted above, correctly defined the role of the American "open door" doctrine, in our opinion, as something serving not only for the legal declaration of collective imperialist rule in China, but also for the utilization of the Ch'ing dynasty's reactionary Beijing Government as an instrument of imperialism. "The powers," Hu Sheng wrote, "naturally had no intention of preserving the total independence and sovereignty of China. In their interpretation, the 'preservation of integrity' signified only the formal preservation of China's independence and the 'preservation of the integrity' of the dominant position of the Ch'ing Government, which was already totally decayed and accustomed to trading on China's interests...."

"It is absolutely clear that the imperialist powers wanted to protect the Ch'ing Government, and even to preserve it, because it was their diligent slave.... Besides this, all of this helped in deceiving the Chinese people and nurturing their illusion that China was not completely lost."⁴

Liu Danian, a historian who is still famous in the PRC even now, once gathered abundant factual material which was conclusive proof of the value and purpose of the "open door" policy. "The open door policy," this author concluded, "was a reflection of the fact that the United States... was still not strong enough. It is no secret that the United States could not make the transition to a 'closed door' policy in China--that is, the policy of the open occupation of all China--until the end of World War II."⁵

On the one hand, we have volumes of special studies, an abundance of analyzed facts and substantiated conclusions. On the other, we see Wang Xi's unsubstantiated article, which asks us to ignore all previous views and turn all of the conclusions and opinions in regard to the "open door" policy upside-down. Could this article really outweigh historical

analysis? The author of the 1979 article violates the first rule of objective and serious research: He disregards scientific continuity, ignoring the compulsory duty of historians to consider the discoveries of their predecessors--either by using them as a foundation for future research or by discerningly nullifying them in new research. The author does none of this.

In his above-cited book of the early 1950's, Liu Danian wrote: "Hoping to deceive the Chinese people, the American imperialists distorted the facts, constantly asserting and loudly broadcasting that the 'open door' policy, which meant actual aggression in China, was supposedly a 'guarantee' for China, a slogan aimed precisely at guaranteeing China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. But the American aggressors did not take the risk of saying a single word about their habit of resorting to this slogan simply for the purpose of undermining Chinese sovereignty, expanding their privileges in China and intervening in Chinese affairs. All of this clearly testifies to the exceptional hypocrisy, baseness and dishonesty that were long characteristic of the American aggressors."⁶

This is what a Chinese historian wrote in the 1950's. We must repeat that we do not know the present views of this author on this matter, but we must recognize the fact that the book "The History of American Aggression in China" has retained its scientific value: It is specific, the conclusions stated in the work are solidly backed up by an abundance of facts, and the author's class approach is obvious. And the author's assertion that any discussion of how the "open door" policy was aimed at preserving the integrity and sovereignty of China was motivated by the "hope of deceiving the Chinese people," is essentially a good slap in the face to such contemporary authors, like Wang Xi, who are now praising the "objectively beneficial" consequences of the American "open door" doctrine.

The fundamental difference between Wang Xi's article and the works of his predecessors is his unjustified division of the essentially single "open door" doctrine into two allegedly absolutely opposite doctrines, so as to then call the "positive" side of the "open door" policy, invented by the apologists of American imperialism, the real meaning of the doctrine, and to actually depict the negative, aggressive side of the policy as an alien admixture which only interfered with the manifestation of the doctrine in its pure form.

Confused about the reasons for the inconsistency of U.S. policy in China, Wang Xi devotes an entire section of his article to a discussion of internal conflicts in the United States, indicating that the Washington Administration was pressured at different times by groups of different states with varying degrees of interest in political activity in the Far East. Here the author ignores the fact that the disputes between these groups generally concern the rates, dates and scales of aggression in China, but could not change the essentially imperialist nature of U.S. policy.

"Actually," the author of the article states "the United States, given the need to observe...the two provisions (the recognition, on the one hand, of China's integrity and sovereignty and, on the other, spheres of influence and 'equal opportunities')--Y. X., could not implement the 'open door' policy..." When the policy was being implemented, the United States displayed its indecision, reflected in vacillation between working against or with other powers, and it was the latter that was chosen more frequently" (p 13). In Wang Xi's view, the real purpose of the "open door" policy was to give the United States a chance to fight more vigorously against its rivals in China (particularly, naturally, against Russia).

It turns out that it was not the "open door" doctrine in itself that played a negative role for China, but its inconsistent implementation, not the imperialist essence of U.S. policy in China, but the insufficient energy displayed by American imperialism in its struggle with its rivals. But what if American imperialism had found the strength to "go beyond bounds," i. e. it had competed more vigorously with its rivals in the Far East--would this have been in the interest of the Chinese people?

By all indications, the author is trying to imply that the answer to this question would be a positive one. But history has already answered this question, and the answer was nothing like the one suggested by the author to the reader. It is a fact that U.S. ruling circles displayed sufficient determination and consistency in opposing its chief rival--Japan--during World War II and immediately afterward; it is fact that they could have occupied China in place of Japanese imperialism at some time. Was this in China's interest? The Chinese people expressed their unequivocal opinion: They rose up and threw the pro-American clique of Chiang Kai-shek out of their country, counteracting all of his patrons' efforts to prevent this.

As we can see, the entire line of reasoning in Wang Xi's article is not only unsound from start to finish, but is totally inconsistent with the facts. The "old" works by Chinese historians of the 1950's are a favorable contrast to this article. Although Wang Xi's work was printed in a historical journal and the author pretends to take a "businesslike and scientific" approach, the article does not belong in the sphere of historical science and has absolutely no scientific value.

Apparently, the article appeared in SHIJIE LISHI for purely "practical" reasons. The author defines his assigned task in the following words: "To promote mutual understanding between the people of the two countries--this is the responsibility of Chinese and American historians, and it is one they cannot delegate to anyone else" (p 17). The promotion of mutual understanding between people is a noble goal, but such methods as the distortion of historical facts and the practice of turning historical theories upside-down can hardly serve noble goals. Moreover, as Wang Xi's entire line of reasoning demonstrates, the author interprets

Sino-U.S. "mutual understanding" in a unique way; otherwise, why would he have wasted so much effort on a sophistic justification of the American aggressive "open door" policy.

Wang Xi feels it is his duty to explain to the new generation of Chinese, who do not know of the "excellent qualities" of American imperialism, that the Americans are "cheerful, upright and industrial people who are striving for the greatest efficiency in all areas" (p 17). We Soviet people share the Chinese author's good opinion of the personal qualities of the American people. But the "open door" policy in China, the justification of which is the central theme of Wang Xi's article, was not the policy of the American people, but the policy of ruling imperialist circles in the United States. Now this Chinese journal, appealing for all-encompassing rapprochement with the United States, implies in this article that the basis for this rapprochement could be, for example, some variant of a "consistently" implemented "open door" policy in China.

Naturally, the contemporary Beijing pragmatists who assigned this duty to the editors of SHIJIE LISHI, have published Wang Xi's article in the hope that the "consistent" implementation of the "open door" policy could be limited to a specific framework. In his article, Wang Xi employs the utilitarian interpretation of historical experience to specify precisely which types of American policy in China he regards as impermissible. Above all, he criticizes missionary work (pp 16-17), which is the subject of a special section. The missionaries, in Wang Xi's words, were closely connected with the entire system of unfair treaties forced on China...some of the privileges enjoyed by the missionaries in China even surpassed the privileges of foreign businessmen (for example, the missionaries' right to travel into the heart of the country and acquire property there). The influence of American religious forces on U.S. policy toward China was always negative. At the same time, the author admits that American missionaries opened academic and medical establishments in China and that many Chinese scholars and political figures were brought up under their influence.

Another section of the article, twice as long, discusses the study of China by American historians. The author appeals for mutual understanding between the United States and China: The United States must recognize the complete independence and viability of the new China, and the Chinese side is prepared to admit that the United States, with all its capitalist "defects" (in the author's words), still possesses "colossal developmental potential." Wang Xi acknowledges that American scholars are ahead of the historians of the PRC in the study of history (p 17).

In all fairness, we must give the Chinese historian credit for listing the numerous errors of American historians and discussing their biases and their justification of colonialism. "We," he stipulates, "intend to seriously discuss and criticize their hypotheses." Wang Xi makes a particularly interesting remark about the famous work by University of

Michigan Professor A. Feuerwerker, "China's Early Industrialization." "Feuerwerker," the Chinese author writes, "has put his whole soul into his work...but not one of the main theses set forth in the book is backed up by first-hand material" (p 18).

The amount of attention given to this subject in Wang Xi's article indicates that certain groups of Chinese historians believe it is their important duty to thoroughly acquaint themselves with U.S. historical science. They are already fantasizing about broader friendly contacts with U.S. Sinologists, tempting overseas work assignments at Hartford and other American scientific centers and the opportunity to examine the personal archives of the inventor of the "open door" doctrine, John Hay.

Wang Xi's remarks appear to delineate the bounds beyond which U.S.-Chinese rapprochement should not go, in the opinion of the author and the editors. In the first place, the deep ideological penetration of Chinese society by the Americans would be impermissible (this thesis, as we saw above, is set forth in the author's criticism of missionary work); in the second place, mutual understanding must be established between the PRC and the United States through the definite revision of American and Chinese historical works.

The last section of Wang Xi's article, in which he discusses the traditions of friendship both sides should cultivate, should be invulnerable to criticism. Is it not true that there were friendly and bright episodes in the relations between the American and Chinese people? We would expect the Chinese author to discuss the defense of the Chinese people by American democrats and humanitarians (such as Mark Twain) and the criticism of American imperialist policy in China by the Communist Party of the United States of America. To our amazement, however, the author says nothing about this in this section.

Instead, he provides the following examples of American-Chinese friendship (p 19): the hard labor of Chinese workers in the United States, countless numbers of whom died while building a railroad stretching across the North American continent from the East to the West; the names of the prominent American friends of Mao Zedong--E. Snow and A. L. Strong--who helped the Maoists spread the cult of Mao and falsify the history of the Chinese revolution; the name of the notorious Dr Hatema (Ma Haide), whose functions in Mao's clique of closest associates are still something of a mystery.... This, it turns out, is the category of friends the contemporary Chinese author is seeking in the United States!

There is one thing that cannot be denied about Wang Xi's article: It is consistent from start to finish. It appeals for "friendship" not with the American people, but with American imperialism. The Beijing pragmatist is prepared to justify and permit a certain degree of American colonialism in China, which he associates with the "open door" doctrine. Abandoning all of the seriousness and objectivity he advocates, the author falsifies

the history of American-Chinese relations just as much as the condemned Chinese historians of the period when the "gang of four" ruled.

But truth always has the advantage over lies, and this is not an empty phrase. The Chinese people, who already said an unequivocal "no" to American colonizers and all their doctrines once, will not approve of the friendly overtures now being made to imperialists in their name.

Complex and contradictory processes are now taking place in Chinese historical science. Many customary dogmas about Mao as the executor of all great feats in modern Chinese history are becoming shaky; many of the names crossed out by the Maoists are once again being written into the book of history; the desire to write and read the truth is becoming stronger in Chinese authors and readers of historical works. Once a process has started, it cannot be stopped. The time will come when all history, including the history of American-Chinese relations, will be rewritten in China objectively.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hu Sheng, "The Aggression of the Imperialist Powers in China" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1951; Liu Danian, "The History of American Aggression in China" (translated from the Chinese), second edition, Moscow, 1953; Qin Benli, "The History of the Economic Aggression of American Imperialism in China" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1951.
2. Hu Sheng, *Op. cit.*, p 302.
3. Sun Yat-sen, "Selected Works" (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1964, p 458.
4. Hu Sheng, *Op. cit.*, pp 164-165.
5. Liu Danian, *Op. cit.*, p 87.
6. *Ibid.*, p 90.

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BEIJING'S POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

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[Article by A. V. Kudryavtsev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The Latin American continent is one of the regions farthest away from China, and China had virtually no official relations with these countries right up to the beginning of the 1970's.¹ Nonetheless, Beijing's policy toward Latin America is distinguished by the same features as its global foreign policy line. Just as in all other regions, it is colored by the hegemonistic, antisocialist and anti-Soviet aims of the Chinese leadership.

The Chinese leadership began to display more interest in Latin America at the end of the 1950's, when the continent was rocked by stormy revolutionary uprisings. They reached their peak with the triumphant victory of the Cuban revolution, which marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of Latin America. The geographic proximity of the continent to the United States, the main imperialist power, the vulnerability of the diversity of U.S. interests in this region in connection with intense anti-American and anti-imperialist feelings and the broad scales of the liberation movement were largely responsible for Beijing's heightened interest in this region.

The objective and subjective difficulties involved in getting a foothold in the Latin American countries--their great distance from China, the tense relations between the PRC and the United States and, consequently, the hostile feelings of the majority of Latin American governments for people's China and other difficulties--did not promise Beijing any real prospect of official relations with the states of this continent. For this reason, the Chinese leadership relied chiefly on ideological penetration. Its goals consisted primarily in attempts to impose the Maoist influence on the liberation movement developing in Latin America and on its militant vanguard--the communist parties--for the purpose of strengthening its claim to leadership among revolutionary forces and to open a new front of struggle against the international communist movement. At the same time, Beijing tried to take advantage of anti-American feelings

in the countries of this region, which the United States had traditionally regarded as its "strategic rear."

After failing in their attempts to impose Maoist ideas on the Latin American communist parties, the Chinese leaders openly launched a fierce struggle against them under the cover of "autorevolutionary" theses. The schismatic activity they began in 1963 in communist parties, progressive trade unions, student federations and other democratic organizations, which were founded and functioned under the conditions of a heated class battle against internal reaction, was supposed to weaken the communist parties, deprive them of mass support and, in the broader context, subvert the communist movement on the continent.

By the mid-1960's, the Chinese leadership had set up several sectarian Maoist groups in the Latin American countries, which were made up of factionists and schismatics operating within the communist parties, various petty bourgeois elements and politically immature youths. Supported by these forces, Beijing launched a noisy campaign for immediate "people's war" everywhere against U.S. imperialism and its proteges on the one hand, and against "Soviet revisionism" as a "saboteur of people's war" on the other.

Decisive opposition by the Latin American communist parties in the 1960's subverted the Chinese leadership's attempts to impose its goals on revolutionary forces and disintegrate the communist movement. But Beijing's schismatic line inflicted considerable injury on the cause of stronger unity. Latin American reaction employed, and sometimes openly encouraged, the provocative sorties of the Maoists to heap repression on the communist parties, progressive trade unions and democratic, youth and student organizations. Maoism promoted the more energetic practice of anticommunist policy by bourgeois circles and assisted them in their attempts to break up and disorient the revolutionary movement.

This process was reflected, in particular, in the publication of various "studies" in the Latin American countries in the 1960's, which were supposed to "bury" scientific socialism, as it had allegedly "collapsed" in the process of the "Sino-Soviet dispute,"² or to frighten the public with the danger emanating from Maoism as the "most aggressive variety" of communism.³ There was a simultaneous noticeable attempt on the part of U.S. ruling circles to utilize Beijing's course in their regional policy. In the early 1960's, American historian and diplomat Adolf Berle was already openly advising Washington to use the "Chinese factor" to undermine the influence of international socialism in Latin America.⁴ At the end of the 1960's, the American C.I.A. published a special study containing extremely promising forecasts and judgments in regard to this possibility.

Beijing's policy toward the revolutionary movement in Latin America in the 1960's was a step toward its present open alliance with imperialism in this part of the world. Under present conditions, this kind of alliance

is held together not only by the objective agreement of the interests of both sides, but also by their conscious desire for closer cooperation in line with official government policy.

Since the early 1970's, when rapprochement with the capitalist world was openly advocated in the CCP after the Ninth Congress, the Chinese leadership has departed from its previous bankrupt tactic of speculating on "ultrarevolutionary feeling" and has been striving for closer relations with ruling circles on this continent, regardless of their sociopolitical leanings. Beijing has declared its willingness to conduct relations with the Latin American countries in line with established international standards, verbally excluding the possibility of flagrant pressure and intervention in domestic affairs.

As a new basis for the development of Sino-Latin American relations, Beijing has announced the collective responsibility of fighting against "superpower hegemonism," which has been declared the main obstacle in the way of the "just struggle of the Latin American people." This course, the Chinese press stressed, "has already become an irrepensible historical current."⁵

Beijing propaganda tirelessly reiterated its "firm support" for the views of the Latin American countries in the international arena, which allegedly stemmed from the "common historical fate" of China and Latin America, the fact that the PRC belonged to the "Third World" and China's "resolute rejection" of superpower ambitions. Although it had just barely recovered from the excesses of China's own "Cultural Revolution," Beijing began to demonstrate its "particular respect" for the historical heritage of the Latin American continent. The Chinese press reported the existence of cultural and commercial ties "since time immemorial" between both Pacific coastlines and even the spread of "popular beliefs" and "legends" about friendship with China in the Latin American countries.⁶

Beijing's numerous statements in favor of stronger relations with Latin America were accompanied by some practical steps. For example, propaganda about the "people's war" and the activities of local Maoist organizations was sharply curtailed; Beijing began to pointedly display concern about the continent's internal socioeconomic problems, positively assess the role of ruling circles by associating it directly with "the rapid development of the antihegemonistic revolutionary-democratic movement" and institute the broad-scale practice of large unilateral purchases of Latin American goods with immediate or even advanced payment.

An important factor which enhanced the effectiveness of this foreign policy activity was the parallel thaw in relations between the PRC and the United States. As several Latin American press organs noted, this process, in a number of cases, actually signified a "green light for progression along the same road."⁷ A genuine "Chinese boom" was seen in the Latin American countries during the course of Beijing's rapprochement with

Washington. The bourgeois mass media, which had just recently used Maoism as a pretext for exaggerated statements regarding the "communist threat," began to take even greater pains to praise the "pragmatic policy" of the Beijing leadership, "which had returned China to the world community." Certain political circles began to propagandize the development of economic contacts with China as something just short of a "unique panacea, capable of solving specific problems in international trade."⁸

To carry out its plans, Beijing made use of the progressive currents in Latin American politics, which have been getting stronger since the end of the 1960's. Their chief purpose is more intensive struggle for economic independence and real political independence and an attempt to play a more important role in international affairs. It was no coincidence that one of the first countries on this continent (after Cuba) to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, in December 1970, was Chile, where the Popular Unity coalition had triumphantly taken power. A year later, relations with the revolutionary military government of Peru were normalized. Contacts were rapidly established with the young Caribbean countries which had won independence in the anticolonial struggle. By the beginning of 1980, the PRC had also established relations with Argentina, Mexico, Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Brazil, Surinam, Barbados and Ecuador, the governments of which were motivated primarily by the hope of gaining economic benefits from the development of relations with the PRC.

Beijing's move toward the establishment of intergovernmental relations with the countries of this continent, despite the multileveled nature of this process, did not change the basic, fundamental essence of its Latin American policy. The Chinese leadership still viewed relations with Latin America in the context of its great-power hegemonistic plans, aimed at penetrating this region and encouraging these countries to work toward global Maoist policy objectives.

It should be noted in particular that, in taking this course, the Chinese leadership is speculating on its parallel interests with the forces for imperialism and Latin American reaction, which are striving to prevent the further development of revolutionary, liberation, anti-imperialist and anticolonial processes in Latin America and to keep it in the position of their "strategic rear," a unique "private preserve" of confirmed anti-communism and shameless exploitation. These goals are to be attained through the methods of economic expansion, the arousal of anti-Soviet feelings and the support of reactionary dictatorial regimes. It is along the well-traveled rails of this policy that the Chinese leadership hopes to ship the baggage of its own great-power expansionist plans for the Latin American continent.

One of the chief areas of Beijing's foreign policy activity in Latin America consists in subversive operations against socialism's outpost in the Western Hemisphere--the Republic of Cuba. As early as the mid-1960's,

Beijing was already striving to "punish" Cuba for its refusal to bend to the Maoist will by unilaterally making sharp cuts in exports of Chinese rice to this country and simultaneously considerably reducing purchases of Cuban sugar. The Chinese embassy in Havana distributed Maoist slanderous materials in Cuba and even tried to establish secret contacts with representatives of the country's armed forces to deceive them into betraying the government. The Chinese leadership's actions were definitely repulsed and were described by Fidel Castro in his traditional speech on the seventh anniversary of the revolution on 2 January 1966, and in the 6 February 1966 issue of GRANMA newspaper, as a scandalous example of flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba and actual participation in the imperialist blockade of the island.

Beijing's present policy toward Cuba is closely related to its growing interest in the Caribbean basin. This region, which occupies an important strategic position, is the location of a concentration of acute political, ideological and socioeconomic conflicts. The main front of these conflicts runs between the United States and socialist Cuba. The development of anticolonial, anti-imperialist movements in the region, inspired by the example of the achievements of the first socialist country in the Western Hemisphere, is arousing obvious discomfort in the United States, which regards this region as an important sphere of its economic, military and political interests or, in fact, as its southern flank and a "quarantine" zone around Cuba.⁹ In the 1970's, Washington made several attempts to destabilize conditions in the countries that had chosen the path of independent development--Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guiana--striving to undermine the increasing prestige of the Cuban revolution in these countries and frightening them with the threat of armed intervention.

Beijing's foreign policy activity in the Caribbean basin is promoting imperialism's plans in this region. The Chinese leadership has displayed increased interest in this region since the mid-1970's. Its policy here is aimed primarily at creating political friction by provoking the United States into the adventurist channel of intense confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and it is simultaneously connected with the hope of achieving stronger mutual understanding with the United States on an anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban basis.

The Chinese leadership has not given up its hope of pushing the USSR and United States into a military conflict, which it has been nurturing since the time of the 1962 Caribbean crisis. It is no coincidence that questions pertaining to Soviet-U.S. military confrontation over the allegedly mounting Soviet "military threat" invariably figure in Beijing propaganda about the state of affairs in the subregion. The Chinese press has provocatively aroused a big commotion over the "buildup" of Soviet naval strength on the Soviet "base" in the Caribbean. In 1978 it took up the popular American myth about the "danger" posed by Cuba in connection with the Mig-23 fighter planes, and a year later panic-stricken cries from Beijing--"the bear, armed to the teeth, is breaking down the doors of

America"--accompanied the slanderous campaign launched on the pretext of the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

As relations became stronger between the PRC and the United States and Chinese diplomacy became more active in the Caribbean, Beijing made increasingly overt attempts to prevent detente in U.S.-Cuban relations. As Fidel Castro stressed, it became known that, in secret negotiations with representatives of the Washington Administration, the Chinese leadership had cautioned the United States against returning the Guantanamo Naval Base to Cuba and lifting the economic blockade of the island.

The extent to which the Chinese leadership is tempted by the idea of setting the United States against Cuba and the related idea of a possible global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is attested to by the persistence with which the Chinese leaders have complained about Washington's alleged "excessively soft" treatment of Cuba. When Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council visited the United States in January-February 1979, he openly insisted on the need to "teach it a lesson" along with Vietnam. The same idea was expressed in the beginning of May by Vice Chairmen Ji Pengfei and Wulanfu of the NPC [National Peoples' Congress] Standing Committee. Beijing's candid statements once again demonstrated how dangerous its inflammatory policy is for the cause of peace and public security. As Cuba's GRANMA newspaper stressed, the Beijing rulers' demands that the United States oppose the Cuban revolution proved once again "how far Maoist counterrevolutionary policy has regressed by attempting to form an alliance with imperialism."¹⁰

In 1974 a new and important step was taken in the development and substantiation of the Chinese leadership's pro-imperialist, anti-socialist policy line in the Caribbean basin. In an article entitled "The Battle of the Two Superpowers in the Western Hemisphere," Beijing openly alleged for the first time that the presence of Soviet naval forces in this region was supposedly "threatening" not only the Latin American countries, but also "the United States itself, its strategic ties between South and North America, and the Panama Canal and Strait of Magellan--these two strategic canals connecting two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific."¹¹ By circulating this kind of provocative rumor, the Chinese leadership naturally did not seriously expect to worry U.S. ruling circles, which were certainly aware of the actual state of military and political affairs in the Caribbean. The Chinese leaders expected something else: On the one hand, to make a bid for closer mutual understanding with Washington on the basis of the imaginary Soviet and Cuban "threat," and on the other, to suggest to the Latin American countries that the neocolonial presence of the United States on this continent (including military presence) was dictated exclusively by the need to counteract "Soviet expansion." The logical conclusion to be drawn from Beijing's thesis was that first it would be necessary to unite in a struggle against the Soviet Union, for the purpose of "clearing a path" for the subsequent "settlement of accounts" with imperialism.

This policy is directed not only against the Soviet Union and Cuba, but also against the vital interests of the Caribbean states and Latin America as a whole. The PRC leadership is trying to undermine their growing ties with the socialist world. Besides this, Beijing is trying to break up the united anti-imperialist front in the Caribbean. For this purpose, it is making energetic use of economic "assistance" as leverage, as well as the influence of the relatively sizable Chinese overseas bourgeoisie.

Since 1978 Chinese diplomacy has been much more active in the Caribbean countries. It has been accompanied by the escalation of the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaign launched in the West. In the middle of the year, several Caribbean states and neighboring countries were visited by most impressive delegations. In June, a delegation headed by Vice Chairman Ji Pengfei of the NPC Standing Committee visited Mexico and Venezuela, and Vice Chairman Geng Biao of the PRC State Council visited Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guiana in July. The Chinese side has attempted to channel all negotiations with the leaders of these countries in the direction of inflammatory speculation against the Soviet Union and Cuba. The almost total lack of even indirect criticism of imperialism and colonialism in the Chinese statements was in sharp contrast to this.

Just before and during the sixth conference of the heads of state and government of the non-aligned states in Havana, Beijing intensified its slanderous attacks on Cuba in an attempt to discredit its important positive role in the movement for non-alignment and to complicate its relations with active participants in the movement, including Jamaica, Guiana, Peru and other countries. It is indicative that it was precisely at this time that imperialist circles began to start provocative debates in the developing countries over Cuba's "right" to participate in the movement for non-alignment and to organize the conference. There were also signs of obvious unanimity in the attempts of Beijing and reactionary forces in the United States to depict the victory of progressive forces in Grenada, which had overthrown the anti-people regime of E. Gairy, as a Soviet and Cuban "intrigue," allegedly connected with Soviet and Cuban attempts to "take advantage of the existing state of affairs" for the purpose of the "further infiltration of the Caribbean."¹²

All of this testifies to the Beijing leadership's intention to engineer its policy in this region with a view to closely coordinated efforts with imperialism and its support.

The present foreign policy behavior of the Beijing leadership in the Latin American countries is quite vividly illustrating that it is still deeply hostile toward the cause of revolutionary, liberating reforms on the continent. Carrying out instructions from Beijing, local Maoist groups are fighting a real war against progressive, anti-imperialist regimes. In Peru, the leaders of the Maoist "Marxist-Leninist communist party" and several other pro-Beijing groups have openly opposed the revolutionary military government which took power in 1968, calling it "reactionary"

and branding its important structural reforms "false." In 1973-1974 and again in 1976, when Peruvian reactionary forces attempted a counteroffensive, the Maoists escalated their subversive activities in this country considerably. In several cities, particularly Arequipa, Puno and Cuzco, they, as well as various rightist and leftist extremist groups, provoked disorder and confrontations between some segments of the laboring population and the authorities. The far-reaching plans of the Maoists are attested to by the underground warehouses of weapons and Maoist propaganda literature discovered in some regions.

In Bolivia the Maoists tried to organize an armed struggle against the patriotic military government of J. J. Torres. Their activities made it much easier for reactionary forces to plan and carry out a rightist military coup in August 1971. Similar tactics were employed by pro-Beijing elements in other countries--Chile, Uruguay and Ecuador.

In a number of cases, Beijing has officially had to deny its involvement in provocative actions by local Maoists, demagogically complaining about their "lack of understanding" of the "dialectics" of the processes occurring in their countries. But this does not change the essence of the Chinese leadership's approach to anti-imperialist, liberating reforms. Although Beijing is passing itself off as a supporter and defender of the interests of the Latin American countries in the international arena, it is trying to force these countries to abandon their anti-imperialist aims and is provoking them into confrontation with the socialist world.

A special role in these plans is assigned to the imposition of anti-Soviet objectives camouflaged as "opposition to superpower hegemony." Virtually none of the meetings between the Chinese leaders and representatives of governmental, political and business circles, culture, science and the mass media in the Latin American countries, and even summit-level meetings (with Mexican Presidents L. Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, Prime Minister E. Williams of Trinidad and Tobago and Guianese President A. Chung and Prime Minister F. Burnham), have taken place without political advice regarding the need for more intensive struggle against the "superpowers" and, in a number of cases, overt anti-Soviet attacks. It is noteworthy that the Chinese leaders have made the most overt attempts to turn their negotiating partners against the Soviet Union in the small countries of this region, which urgently need political and economic support. By doing this, Beijing is cynically flouting the existing norms of international relations and is manifesting its great-power, dictatorial position.

The Chinese leaders attach great significance to contacts with representatives of the mass media. They are trying to turn certain publications in these countries into permanent sounding boards for Beijing propaganda and effective instruments to direct public opinion in favor of China. Beijing's hostility toward revolutionary liberation forces frequently gives it access to large Latin American publishing firms, newspapers,

magazines and television networks. Making use of these, the Chinese leadership is methodically and expansively inviting editors and officials from major Latin American newspapers and magazines to visit China and are sending groups of Chinese journalists to visit these countries. In May 1978, a delegation from the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, headed by the agency's Deputy Director Mu Qing, visited Venezuela and Guiana and indirectly made the necessary political preparations for the Latin American visits of the delegations of Vice Chairman Ji Pengfei of the NPC Standing Committee and Vice Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council. At this same time, the PRC ambassador in Venezuela paid a call on the editors of ULTIMAS NOTICIAS and offered the newspaper staff extensive information about the development of Sino-Venezuelan relations and the international situation.

The Chinese leadership is counting primarily on representatives of mounting Latin American bourgeois nationalism to support its foreign policy ideas. Both its right wing and a large segment of its left wing often take the same approach to anti-imperialist, liberating processes in their countries, actually interpreting them as nothing more than the "rebellion" of the "Third World" people against "international centers of power," the "rich nations" and the "superpowers." The views of these generally influential political and ideological currents are often distinguished by traces of anti-Sovietism and echoes of Maoist ideas. In Colombia, representatives of these circles, who include, in particular, the nation's former Presidents M. Pastrana and L. Camargo, are insisting on the "humane Marxism" that is allegedly preached by the Maoists and are praising Mao for his break with the fundamental Marxist conclusion regarding the historic role of the proletariat and for his break with the Soviet Union.¹³

The Chinese leadership regards the nationalistic ambitions of the grand Latin American bourgeoisie, which is striving to augment its role in the hierarchical system of the global capitalist economy at a time of anti-imperialist struggle, as one of the factors contributing to the introduction and development of antisocialist extremist currents in the developing countries. For this reason, Beijing has an interest in energizing and stimulating these processes. In connection with this, it attaches considerable significance to speculation on the attempts of bourgeois circles in some Latin American countries to grossly exaggerate the importance of demands for the international recognition of the rights of littoral states to unilaterally expand the zone of their territorial waters to 200 or more nautical miles. Along with these forces, Beijing propagandists have stated that this movement, of which the Latin American countries were the "pioneers and initiators," represents a "new page in the struggle of the Third World against great-power hegemonism" and that it has supposedly acquired "worldwide historic significance"¹⁴ and is "spreading to Asia, Africa and even Northern Europe."

The main purpose of this Beijing campaign was to provoke friction and conflicts over the attempts at the unilateral division of the coastal zone, to undermine the foundations of international law of the sea and to create

chaos and confusion in international affairs. The nature of this Chinese activity was clearly demonstrated by Beijing's position at a number of international conferences on the law of the sea, particularly the conference in Caracas in July-August 1974. It is no secret that Beijing was responsible for the radical difference in the positions of the various sides. Some Latin American representatives believed that the conference ended in failure due to the "complexity of the problems and the contradictory nature of various interests,"¹⁵ as well as "the stand taken by the great powers." The Chinese side deliberately impeded the constructive work of the conference and began to talk about the Third World's "great victory" over the "superpowers"¹⁶ after the conference, clearly calling upon certain states, particularly the Latin American countries, to proceed along the path of confrontation. The Chinese leadership tried to use certain other issues for similar provocative and inflammatory purposes, particularly the issue of the Latin American nuclear-free zone (the Tlatelolco Agreement).

Economic problems have recently been the center of attention for Beijing in its approach to the Latin American countries. This change reflects primarily the peculiarities of the intraregional and international situation. The movement for real economic independence has become stronger in the Latin American countries. It is being accompanied by increased activity on the part of Latin American representatives at various economic conferences, including those within the UN framework, and on the part of old and new regional and subregional trade and economic associations, such as the Andean Group, the Latin American Economic System, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and others.

The economic struggle of countries in this region has also become more anti-imperialist in nature. This desire for a new economic order based on democratic principles and the objections to uncontrolled activity by transnational corporations were expressed in the documents of the March 1975 conference of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Lima, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in May 1972 in Santiago and the non-aligned conferences in August 1972 in Georgetown and August 1975 in Lima.

Although Beijing has tried to pass itself off as a supporter of Latin American economic liberation, it has actually tried to weaken its anti-imperialist potential and to turn economic issues into a sphere for the separation of the national interests of the Latin American countries and the worldwide socialist community.

Beijing persists in giving the struggle of the Latin American countries for economic independence an "anti-superpower" interpretation. The PRC press has implied that the struggle against "hegemonism" in the area of economic relations represents some kind of "crucial point" in the "national democratic revolution" in Latin America.¹⁷ These views have been preached by Beijing in bilateral contacts with representatives of the

Latin American countries and in international economic forums in these countries. Beijing diplomacy tries to avoid the discussion of the pressing problems of the developing countries by confining all conversation to condemnation of "superpower hegemonism." At the UNIDO conference in March 1975 the Chinese delegation asserted that the "struggle against hegemonism has spread to the sphere of economics."¹⁸

Beijing propagandists have used every opportunity to exaggerate the "anti-hegemonistic" significance of new Latin American trade and economic associations and alliances of the countries exporting coffee, bananas, bauxite and other products, interpreting their activity as an example of "collective self-reliance" and "joint opposition of the superpowers." When Guianese Prime Minister Burnham met with Deng Xiaoping in March 1975, the latter made special mention of their role in the policy of using "raw material as a weapon." The Chinese leaders are not concealing their desire to direct the activities of these integrated associations into the channel of confrontation with the socialist world. To discredit Soviet economic policy in the Latin American countries, Beijing is denigrating the nature of Soviet-Cuban relations and is spreading absurd lies about the Soviet Union's wish to "lure" the Latin American countries into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which it regards as nothing other than "an instrument of the neocolonialist policy of social-imperialism." The expansion of egalitarian and mutually beneficial ties between the nations of this continent and the socialist community is being contrasted to the prospect of rapprochement with China and the developed capitalist powers, including the United States.

After Mao Zedong's death, the Chinese leadership took greater pains to establish and advertise its "exemplary" broad-scale relations on a commercial and economic basis with the more influential Latin American countries--Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. At the beginning of 1977 the PRC concluded a trade agreement with Argentina, and in May 1978 it signed a series of documents on agricultural imports. In January 1974 a trade agreement was concluded with Brazil, and in November another agreement was signed on shipments of Chinese petroleum in exchange for iron ore and the products of Brazilian metallurgy.

One of Beijing's chief objectives, in addition to purely political goals, is access to modern Western technology and the diversified system of capitalist foreign economic relations. It has already established close contact with several Latin American countries in the spheres of nuclear power engineering, petroleum production and agriculture. Typically, Chinese representatives tried to establish commercial contacts primarily with branches of large transnational monopolies controlled mainly by U.S. capital. In Brazil, for example one of China's leading trade partners is the Mendes Juniors electric power company, which is only formally national and which signed a contract in Beijing in November 1978 for the construction of a hydroelectric power station in the Yangtze River canyon and agreed to supply the technology for the production of various

hydraulic assemblies. In Argentina, Beijing prefers to deal with the large Bunge y Born agricultural monopoly. It is also no coincidence that the PRC trade and economic exhibit in Mexico in November 1975 was not held in the capital, but in the small Mexican city of Tijuana. Situated on the border with the United States, it is the location of the ranches of many large U.S. corporations, the assets of which include a large portion of the revenues from Latin American trade with China.

In essence, Beijing is trying to "link" its economic relations with the Latin American countries to its policy of further convergence with the United States and the developed capitalist powers. Having no opportunity to openly advise the Latin American states to ally themselves with the United States, since it discredited itself long ago with neocolonialist ambitions, the Chinese leadership has resorted to a roundabout maneuver. Beijing propaganda has persistently advocated Canada and the members of the European Economic Community as promising economic partners for the Latin American countries. This was the purpose of the itinerary of Ji Pengfei's recent visit to Venezuela, Mexico and Canada. At a September 1978 UN conference on technical cooperation between the developing countries, the Chinese delegation frankly advised the alliance of the "second" and "third" worlds. The Chinese press has repeatedly described the "advantages" of stronger ties between the Caribbean community and the European "Common Market."¹⁹

Despite the active support of the United States, local pro-imperialist circles and the powerful propaganda machine representing them, the Chinese leadership's efforts in the Latin American countries have not aroused the anticipated response. And this is not surprising. The tendency toward escalated anti-imperialist struggle and stronger egalitarian and mutually beneficial ties with the socialist world is constantly making progress in Latin America. This policy is regarded in the Latin American countries as an important factor in their struggle for real economic and political independence. One of the most characteristic features of this tendency is the development of direct contacts between the Latin American countries and CEPA.²⁰ Beijing's pro-imperialist, anti-Soviet activity in international organizations is also not working. For example, the Chinese delegation was unable to achieve the inclusion of a point in regard to the "superpowers" in the final resolution of the Lima UNIDO conference in March 1975. A similar attempt at a UN conference in Buenos Aires in September 1978 also failed. The delegates at this conference unanimously approved of the Soviet-proposed resolution on the development of technical cooperation between the developing countries.

The goals and means of Beijing's present policy line in Latin America took their most vivid and visible form in its approach to revolutionary democratic reforms in Chile. The victory of the broad popular movement in 1970 was contrary to the views and actual interests of the Chinese leadership, primarily because it contradicted the Maoist postulates denying the possibility of a variety of revolutionary avenues, including the

peaceful type.²¹ Naturally, Beijing's hostility toward the Popular Unity Government stemmed from more than "theoretical" differences. By making references to theory, the Chinese leadership tried to conceal its profound dissatisfaction with the development of liberation processes in Chile. The activities of Salvador Allende's Government, resting on an alliance of the workers and popular movement, in which the Communist Party of Chile played an important role, and the profound socioeconomic reforms carried out by this government objectively kept Beijing from realizing its hegemonistic, pro-imperialist ambitions.

Having no opportunity to openly oppose the popular government, the Chinese leadership decided to play a double game: To display interest in the development of relations on the one hand, and to engage in subversive activity on the other. From the very first days that the Allende Government was in power, a Maoist group--a "revolutionary communist party"--joined the active struggle against it under the demagogic slogan of "people's war." In 1971 the Chilean Maoists, following Beijing's orders, somewhat modified their activity. At a plenum of the "revolutionary communist party" central committee, a decision was made to oppose not the entire Popular Unity bloc as a whole, but just the Communist Party of Chile, as the most organized and cohesive force in the popular coalition. Provocatively accusing it of "hegemony," the Maoists tried to push the communist party out of the political arena, arouse distrust between the parties making up the coalition and to bring about its disintegration. The Chinese leadership simultaneously attempted to speculate on the success of the Allende Government by calling it an example of the implementation of Maoist ideas under Latin American conditions. Statements by Chilean Government officials were always given an "antihegemonistic" interpretation in Chinese propaganda. Even the bourgeois press in Chile admitted that Beijing hoped to develop nationalistic tendencies.²²

Between December 1970, when diplomatic relations were established with Chile, and the middle of 1973, the PRC signed a number of trade and economic documents with the Chilean Government, including a promise of 92.5 million dollars in credit. Most of these promises remained on paper.

When it became more and more obvious that the Chilean Government would not follow Beijing's lead and when the internal political situation began to deteriorate, Beijing started to act with a view to an anticipated fascist takeover. The PRC leadership actually refused to give Chile the promised economic assistance by lamenting, as Zhou Enlai did in a letter to Salvador Allende on 23 February 1973, the "limited economic possibilities of the PRC." In an atmosphere of genuine imperialist blockade, Beijing cynically cautioned Chile against outside economic support, mainly implying Soviet economic assistance.

The Chinese leadership tried to use its attitude toward the events following the military fascist coup of 11 September 1973 to demonstrate its willingness for further rapprochement with imperialism and Latin American

reaction. For this purpose, it quickly abandoned all of its plans to preserve the remnants of its "revolutionary" prestige in some petty bourgeois strata. Beijing withdrew from the international campaign of solidarity with the Chilean patriots. In the days of the coup, the Chinese Embassy refused to give refuge even to the Maoists it had urged to fight against Popular Unity. As some articles in the Western press noted with truly Maoist cynicism, "At the cost of a few intellectuals who were not all that necessary, Beijing maintained its firm presence in yet another Latin American country."²³

One characteristic feature of the present Latin American policy of the Chinese leadership is much more energetic activity to establish the closest possible relations with reactionary military dictatorships. Beijing is doing everything within its power to ensure the genuine flourishing of Sino-Chilean relations. In 1976 and 1977 Beijing extended credit totaling around 220 million dollars to the Chilean regime.²⁴ A solid legal contractual basis was laid for relations with the Chilean militarists when the junta's Minister of Foreign Relations H. Cubillos visited China in October 1978, Minister of the Economy, Development and Reconstruction R. Kelly went to China in April 1979 and PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Chen Jie went to Chile in June 1979. As a result of the ensuing talks, an entire series of documents was signed, particularly on the exchange of permanent military missions, the resumption of the activity of a joint commission on bilateral cooperation, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and large-scale commercial transactions.

All of these visits reaffirmed that the relations between the two sides were based on the solid agreement of their antisocialist and anti-Soviet interests with active imperialist patronage. In particular, for example, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua expressed great satisfaction with the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban position of the junta when he met with Cubillos and insisted on mutual support, related directly to the objective of forming the "broadest possible united front" for struggle against the Soviet Union. In turn, the junta's emissary fiercely attacked the USSR, Cuba and Vietnam. Judging by all indications, Beijing intends to actively promote the Chilean regime's emergence from international isolation. The Chilean press has underscored Beijing's "unsolicited" offer of "assistance to Chile in the international arena." In turn, the junta is mediating China's rapprochement with reactionary military dictatorships. As Luis Corvalan, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile, stressed, Beijing's alliance with the Pinochet clique "proves that the Maoists are prepared to make any alliance, even with overt fascists, for the sake of carrying out their great-power plans."²⁵

The evolution of Beijing's Latin American policy toward increasingly open and close convergence with imperialist and reactionary forces has drawn a distinct line between its interests and the interests and goals of the broad revolutionary, liberation and democratic forces in the Latin American countries. The Latin American communist parties are leading

the fight against Maoism on this continent. The treacherous policy of the Chinese rulers was sharply rebuked at the conference of the communist parties of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1975 in Havana. Its final declaration, signed by 24 of the continent's communist parties, stressed that "it is the duty of all the communist parties in Latin America to fight against this policy of betraying the cause of unity and solidarity, betraying the best traditions of the world revolutionary movement."²⁶

The Maoist policy of undermining and breaking up the workers movement is being opposed by such major labor associations as the Labor Confederation of Colombian Workers, the United Confederation of Peruvian Workers, and leading trade unions in Jamaica and other countries.

The Beijing hegemonists' piratical aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam aroused profound indignation in Latin America. Speaking at a mass meeting in Havana, Fidel Castro called this action "the most disgusting betrayal of the revolutionary movement in the history of the world."²⁷ Communist parties, major trade unions, democratic organizations and coalitions of leftist parties resolutely condemned Beijing and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Chinese troops from the Vietnamese side of the historically determined border between the two countries. These forces included the Left Broad Front in Ecuador, the Leftist Alliance in Mexico, the "United People" Coalition in Nicaragua, the Federation of Latin American Journalists and many others. Beijing's aggression aroused alarm and apprehension in Latin American governmental circles, having a sobering effect on those which had carelessly flirted with the Chinese leadership.

Recent events have even created confusion in the ranks of local Maoists. The ideological and organizational disintegration of their schismatic groups has become more pronounced in the Latin American countries. All of this represents more proof of the profound crisis of Maoism.

The antisocialist policy line of the Chinese leadership, aimed at alliance with imperialism and reaction, is a direct threat to the successful development of the revolutionary liberation struggle in the Latin American countries. This line goes against the vital interests of the Latin American people. But the revolutionary liberation process on the continent is not developing according to Beijing's recipes. In accordance with its own distinctive features, it is developing within the bounds of general tendencies of the present era. Its historical perspective is complete national liberation and complete independence, democracy and public well-being, peace and socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. The only exception is Cuba, with which the PRC established diplomatic relations in September 1960.

2. R. S. Mallen, "La polemica chino-sovietica y la revolucion proletaria," Mexico, 1965, p 53.
3. O. Rosarios, "China Roja--lider en America Latina?" Buenos Aires, 1965, p 140.
4. A. Berle, "Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality," New York, 1962, p 114.
5. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 January 1971.
6. BEIJING REVIEW, 1972, No 24, p 19; No 28, p 19.
7. FORO INTERNACIONAL, 1973, No 53, p 40.
8. COMERCIO EXTERIOR, 1971, No 11, p 81.
9. One symptom of this concern was the creation of a special Caribbean group in the State Department in 1977.
10. GRANMA, 24 May 1978.
11. BEIJING REVIEW, 1974, No 22, p 22.
12. BEIJING REVIEW, 1979, No 21, p 28.
13. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1976, No 1, pp 48-49.
14. RENMIN RIBAO, 6 September 1973.
15. JORNAL DO BRASIL, 29 August 1974.
16. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 August 1974.
17. Ibid., 21 February 1977.
18. BEIJING REVIEW, 1975, No 12, pp 16-17.
19. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 April 1978.
20. In August 1975 a joint CEMA-Mexico commission was established. The question of also cooperating with Guiana was discussed at the 78th and 79th sessions of the CEMA executive committee in Moscow in October 1976 and in Havana in January 1977.
21. In an attempt to refute the natural character of the Chilean popular movement's success and to ignore the role of mass Chilean support for the Popular Unity coalition in the 1970 election, Zhou Enlai announced that Allende's victory was largely accidental, the result of the assassination of military Commander-in-Chief R. Schneider by rightist extremists.

22. EL MERCURIO, 31 October 1970.
23. DESTINO, 1976, No 2034, p 41.
24. PRAVDA, 7 April 1978.
25. Ibid.
26. KOMMUNIST, 1975, No 10, p 97.
27. PRAVDA, 23 February 1979.

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY OF THE PRC BEFORE AND AFTER CAMP DAVID

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 103-111

[Article by V. G. Gracheva, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The evolution of PRC foreign policy toward national liberation movements in the Asian, African and Latin American countries in the last 20 years has been determined by the global strategy of Maoism as an ideology and policy, permeated with great-power ambitions and intended to turn China into the deciding factor in international affairs. The desire for world hegemony—this has been the focal point of Beijing policy in the last two decades. "This policy," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the 25th CPSU Congress, "is not only totally alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has essentially become an important reserve for imperialism in its struggle against socialism."¹

In the Middle East, Beijing foreign policy has been engineered and conducted in line with the following "consideration." Above all, the Maoists believe that any escalation of Arab-Israeli conflicts is not likely to affect the welfare of China itself or threaten its national security. The sufficiently great distance between the Arab world and the PRC, the people in Beijing believe, gives the Chinese leaders reason not to worry about China's fate in the event of not only a new Arab-Israeli war, but even conflicts on a larger scale. Moreover, it is precisely a direct military conflict between the Soviet Union, defending the interests of the Arab people, and the United States of America, supporting aggressive circles in Israel, which would be significantly in the great-power interests of the PRC ruling clique. The destructive effects of this Soviet-American conflict, for which Beijing is hoping, should become a prerequisite for the PRC's evolution into a great power, capable of deciding world politics even before China's military-economic potential reaches a high level.

By setting themselves the objective of turning the Arab-Israeli conflict into a permanent source of international tension, the Beijing leaders are not striving at all for the restoration of peace and justice or for the victory of national liberation forces in this part of the world. The

fate of the people in the Middle East is of absolutely no interest to Beijing, and for China, as Mao Zedong asserted in statements that were not for publication, it is not important "who wins" or whether "all of the Jews will be annihilated and the Palestinians disappear from the face of the earth."² One task of primary significance for the attainment of the PRC leadership's great-power goals, which has therefore determined Beijing tactics in recent years, is all-round opposition to the comprehensive political regulation of the Middle East crisis, the fair resolution of the Palestinian problem and the transformation of the Middle East into a zone of peace, cooperation, national independence and social progress.

In this kind of great-Han foreign policy context, Beijing's declarations about the "resolute support of the government and people of China for the just cause of the Arab people" are nothing other than a propagandistic screen for Beijing's counterrevolutionary behavior. The widely advertised Chinese "assistance to the Arabs," ASIA QUARTERLY pronounces, "is limited to the declaration of revolutionary slogans and the expression of the kind of sympathy that does not bind Beijing with any kind of commitment and does not require that any real action be taken."³

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the PRC leadership to conceal the gaping discrepancy between Beijing's militant statements about supporting the Arabs in their battle with Israel and the meager volume of material assistance provided by the PRC. "As for military assistance," former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhhamad Riyad said with regret, "the Chinese would be incapable of giving us this even if our nations were divided only by a narrow boundary strip."⁴

This has also been the opinion of the Israeli leaders. They--more than anyone else in the Middle East--had an interest in the Chinese "presence" and the cultivation of Maoism in the Arab national liberation movement. "The road to peace in the Middle East," said Ben-Gurion, famous political representative of Israel and international Zionism, "lies through Beijing."⁵ Naturally, he was referring to the kind of "peace" that would have been acceptable to the Zionist leaders, a "peace" made possible by the suppression of the Arab national liberation movement. The spread of Maoism in the second half of the 1950's in the form of "leftist" extremism, ultra-revolutionary behavior and the absolutization of "people's war" as the "only true means of fighting Israel" gave Zionists an excuse to accuse the Arabs of "aggression"⁶ and, consequently, to justify a "warning" strike against the Arab countries.

In Tel Aviv (just as in Washington) belligerent statements from Beijing aroused more approval than protest and did not impede the establishment of contacts of an official and unofficial nature. The Zionists were not at all disturbed by the fact that the Chinese press had constantly played up the PRC's "noninvolvement" in the creation of the State of Israel and the division of Palestine, thereby hoping to win the affection of the Arabs. For tactical reasons, Beijing is still officially stating that the PRC has never recognized Israel and supposedly has no intention of

ever doing this. Nonetheless, it is known (although not widely) that contacts between Beijing and Tel Aviv have taken place in the form of an exchange of governmental messages, talks between PRC and Israeli ambassadors in third countries, and so forth. In June 1954, for example, late Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council met in Rangoon with David Hacohen, the Israeli ambassador in Rangoon and a prominent statesman. During the course of this meeting, the Israeli side was not only invited to send a delegation to the PRC to discuss the possibility of economic and commercial cooperation, but it was also informed that the Chinese leadership was "certain that the outcome of the talks would be favorable."⁷ Beijing's intention to establish diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv was announced that same year by Zhou Enlai in an official speech at a session of the Chinese National People's Congress.⁸

It is also not a widely known fact that the Israeli economic delegation which arrived in Beijing in February 1955 was greeted quite warmly and was received, in particular, by the PRC deputy minister of trade, who expressed "particular respect for the people of Israel for their staunchness in the face of all trials" and in the "struggle for independence, in spite of many obstacles." It is clear that one of the "obstacles" for the Zionists was naturally assumed to be the Arab and, in particular, the Palestinian national liberation movement. By the mid-1950's, Israel had already demonstrated its aggressive nature by occupying dozens of Arab settlements covering a territory of more than 6,000 square kilometers and had created a source of constant tension in the Middle East. In spite of all this, even after the conference on Afro-Asian solidarity in Bandung in 1955, where the first Chinese-Arab contacts were established and Beijing had to express support for the Palestinian Arabs' fight "for human rights," the Chinese diplomats continued to assert that the PRC Government "is still striving for friendly relations with Israel."⁹

The PRC's interest in the development of ties with Tel Aviv was so serious that the Chinese ambassador in Rangoon was ordered to convey the official apologies of the Chinese Government to the Israelis for the "pro-Arab" stand taken by the PRC delegation at the Bandung conference.¹⁰ Beijing officials were also hoping that the Israeli leadership would appreciate the total absence of criticism of Israel in the statements made by Chinese speakers at the Bandung conference in regard to the situation in the Middle East.

In the 1950's and again in the 1970's, the intensity of Sino-Israeli contacts depended directly on the position of the United States and the state of Sino-American relations. The United States' hostility toward people's China in the mid-1950's was one of the main factors which prevented Tel Aviv and Beijing from implementing their existing agreement (an Israeli ambassador to the PRC had been appointed as early as July 1950, at the time when the cabinet decided to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing).¹¹ The U.S. Government's "recommendations" to the Israeli Government regarding rapprochement with Beijing, as set forth by

Secretary of State J. F. Dulles, frankly advised Israel "not to establish relations with a regime close to collapse."¹² As PRC policy in the international arena acquired an increasingly apparent pro-imperialist tone, however, the American Administration's feelings about the prospect of establishing official ties with Maoist China also changed, as well as its views on the expedience of using the "Chinese card" in a confrontation between the two social systems. In the early 1970's the convergence of China with the United States of America and with anticommunist regimes defending the interests of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East became a political reality. The normalization of Sino-American relations, in turn, was followed by the news that contacts between the Maoists and the Zionists had been resumed.

By the beginning of the 1970's, officials in Tel Aviv realized that "PRC policy in the Middle East cannot harm Israel because the Chinese are not giving the Arabs any kind of practical assistance (worth worrying about--V. G.)."¹³ Diplomats from Tel Aviv correctly assumed that "China has no reason to ignore Israel in its social and ideological plans. The PRC is probably much closer to Israel than, for example, to Saudi Arabia."¹⁴ The Israeli diplomats could have added that the foreign policies of China and Israel were based on common principles promoting the convergence of the two countries at that time--namely, an extremely nationalistic approach to the setting and attainment of foreign policy objectives; pragmatism to the point of cynicism in international relations; the absence of restrictions on the choice of means to an end; the recognition of the legality of territorial seizure due to a common desire for expansion and the enlargement of spheres of influence; a contemptuous attitude toward the United Nations and the principles of international law; the use of Chinese emigres and the corresponding persons of the Jewish nationality as means of exerting pressure on the policies of other countries; a general anti-Soviet and anticommunist outlook; the attachment of strategic importance to alliance with American imperialism, and so forth. Maoist China and Israel are also united by their common hatred for the Arab national liberation movement, the cause of international detente and the struggle for disarmament and for the prohibition of nuclear tests and nuclear proliferation. The PRC's aggression against socialist Vietnam is amazingly similar to Israel's expansionist treatment of its Arab neighbors.

In its rapprochement with Israel and the United States, Beijing has gone so far that statements by its leaders have begun to sound like the Zionists' claims to Palestine as "the birthplace of all Jews"--that is, the fundamental thesis of Zionism. In a meeting with Howard Squadron, one of the leaders of the American Jewish Congress, for example, Vice Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council said that "the Chinese and Jewish people are united by the kind of love for their homeland that no other people feel."¹⁵

The Chinese leadership's move to openly reactionary positions is the logical result of the political degradation of the Maoists, who deviated from Marxism-Leninism 20 years ago--at first sharply to the "left," and later,

after their claims to a leading role among the developing countries and revolutionary movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America turned out to be groundless and were rejected by the overwhelming majority of young independent states, just as sharply to the right. A country which officially describes the Soviet Union as the "number-one enemy" and the "principal and most dangerous enemy" and has completely betrayed the interests of people fighting against imperialism and neocolonialism, could only have anticommunist and reactionary regimes as its natural allies. In the Middle East these are the regimes of former Shah Pahlavi of Iran, Sultan Qabus of Oman and President Sadat of Egypt.

The change in the PRC's allies in the Middle East, where China has, by the beginning of the 1970's, reduced and, in some cases, completely cut off, its support to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, the Palestine Resistance Movement and other forces standing at the forward edge of the struggle against imperialism, had a noticeable effect on Beijing's stand on Middle East regulation, although it did not change the PRC's general views on the place and significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the system of Maoist foreign policy priorities and its attempt to escalate the crisis in the region to the maximum. The Maoists, who were incapable of having a deciding effect on the development of the situation in the Middle East and independently direct events in a way which would safeguard PRC's great power interests, viewed the energization of U.S. foreign policy activity in the Arab East, aimed at restoring Washington's influence and undermining Soviet-Arab relations, as something favorable to Beijing and chose a course running parallel to the imperialist one.

It is extremely indicative that Beijing's convergence with imperialism and reaction was most overt at times that were quite crucial in the development of the Arab national liberation movement and the consolidation of leftist and progressive forces in the region. For example, after the tragic events of 1970-1971 in Jordan, which gained notoriety as "Black September" and led to a severe military-political crisis in the Palestine resistance movement, Chinese representatives abroad unashamedly expressed their "disillusionment" with the inability of Palestinian organizations to wage "prolonged people's war" according to Beijing recipes and announced China's intention to cut off all military and financial assistance.¹⁶ This kind of loyalty to Israel and the United States was also displayed by the Maoists during the "20-day war" of fall 1973. Chinese representatives in the United Nations indicated in unofficial discussions that the fate of the Arab people in this war was not the factor determining Beijing policy. In a meeting with American congressmen behind the scenes of the UN General Assembly in November 1973, Beijing diplomats, according to reports in the Arab press, assured the Americans that "the PRC will take a moderate stand in regard to the present conflict in the Middle East.... Beijing will not be disturbed by any kind of Arab defeat because this could give rise to differences of opinion between the Arabs and the USSR."¹⁷

On the other hand, Beijing's actual behavior (including its actions in the United Nations) during the "October war" and the Lebanese crisis of 1975-1976, and to an even greater degree in recent times, has been less indicative of a "moderate" policy in regard to the conflict than of hostility toward liberation forces and the betrayal of Arab interests. Between 1977 and 1979 Beijing was one of the few states which approved of the separate bargains launched by President Sadat of Egypt, and it was also one of the few to give Sadat military assistance and moral-political support. When the signing of the documents "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel" (September 1978), as well as the "peace" treaty itself (March 1979), by the leaders of Egypt, Israel and the United States marked the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the development of the Middle East crisis and considerably complicated the conditions of struggle for the just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Chinese leadership took the side of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction.

What other explanation could there be for the Maoists' decision to discard their "fundamental line" in regard to methods of settling the conflict in 1978? Why did the separate talks between Egypt and Israel under U.S. auspices become acceptable as an alternative to the military solution that was regarded as the only possible solution by Chinese rulers in previous years? What were the Maoists guided by when they defined their position in regard to the Camp David documents and the treaty which consolidated the new military alliance of Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv?

Above all, PRC ruling circles were aware of the fact that certain changes had taken place in the Middle East by the mid-1970's that had affected the balance of power in this region. Under the conditions of intensified class stratification accompanied by anti-imperialist and antimonarchic revolutions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Iran and the consolidation of socialist tendencies in the development of Southern Yemen, Saudi Arabian influence grew, reactionary forces became more active in Egypt, pro-Western feelings became more pronounced in several countries and an anti-communist campaign was launched in places where cooperation between various leftist and moderate parties had just recently been developing successfully.

At this same time, the growing severity of the energy crisis in the capitalist world heightened the significance of the Middle East as the principal source of oil and petroleum products. In line with these social and economic changes, U.S. foreign policy activity was more clearly aimed at safeguarding U.S. economic and strategic interests in the Middle East with the aid of military-political blocs controlled and financed by Washington. Naturally, we cannot assume that Beijing, now that it has voiced support for Camp David, will limit itself to an auxiliary role merely for the sake of staying in the United States' good graces. No, the Chinese leadership is trying to use U.S. political expansion in this region bordering on the USSR in its own interests and is urging the American Administration to adhere to a tougher line in relations with the

USSR and the particular Arab countries that are developing productive cooperation with the Soviet Union. "The Chinese," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR noted in a report on the visit of an official PRC delegation to the United States, "appealed to Carter to use American power and prove that the United States is not a paper tiger."¹⁸ These provocative appeals were voiced even more definitely and purposefully in an interview of Deng Xiaoping by American television correspondents. "We truly hope," Deng Xiaoping said, "that the United States will take more effective, more decisive measures to answer the challenge thrown down by hegemonism."¹⁹

For their part, the Maoists have made a maximum effort to assure Washington of their profound satisfaction with U.S. activity aimed at the reinforcement of antisocialist, anti-Soviet feelings in the Middle East. Here as well, the Maoist course ran parallel to the imperialist one. There was a noticeable shift in emphasis in the direction of stronger anti-Sovietism in the Chinese interpretation of the primary causes of the Middle East crisis. Chinese propaganda tried to "ennoble" the actions of the Carter Administration by implying that the United States had initiated the peace talks for the sake of stabilizing the situation in this region and preventing the outbreak of a new armed conflict between the Arabs and Israelis.²⁰

The metamorphosis undergone by Beijing propaganda in 1978 and 1979 proved that Beijing attaches great significance to stronger American presence in the Middle East. The "political flexibility" of the Maoists--or, more precisely, their lack of political principles--is truly boundless: The latest Beijing publications have ascribed the United States the main role in the struggle for peace in this region, in the organization of the peace talks between Egypt and Israel, in the settlement of conflicts and so forth. Judging by Chinese information, the United States is only striving for a comprehensive settlement and is therefore filled with determination to convince Syria, Jordan and the PLO to join in the negotiations with Israel after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and begin the gradual settlement of the Middle East problem.²¹ Moreover, Washington's "peace-making" activity is contrasted to the policy of the USSR, which is brazenly described by the Maoists as the main destabilizing factor in the region.

The position of the Chinese leadership on Middle East regulation at the time the Camp David agreements were signed had already been predetermined by the PRC's actual alliance with the leading Western powers on major international issues. According to Western researchers, since the beginning of the 1970's the Maoists "have taken every opportunity to demonstrate the primary significance they attach to the reinforcement of relations with the United States."²² Vice Premier Wulanfu of the PRC State Council demonstrated, during his visit to Egypt in fall 1978, that Beijing supports and approves of U.S. policy in the Middle East, the separate talks between Cairo and Tel Aviv and the documents signed by Egypt and Israel at Camp David. In essence, this means that the Chinese Government is prepared to limit its demand for the "liberation of occupied

territories" to the withdrawal of Israeli troops only from the Sinai Peninsula,²³ and it is willing to settle the Palestinian issue simply by offering the Palestinians inhabiting the West Bank of the River Jordan the rights of a "national minority" within the framework of "autonomy."

There is no question that the Maoist leadership is aware that most of the Arab countries have refused to support Sadat's policy.²⁴ This is why Beijing propaganda has been cautious, either publishing an "objective" narration of the facts or citing Egyptian and American politicians who have falsified the content and purpose of the Camp David talks. At the same time, the mass media in the PRC vigorously criticize Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, urging the Arabs to counteract "Soviet expansion" and propagandizing a thesis acceptable only to Arab reactionaries--the thesis of the Soviet "threat," which is supposedly "more frightening than the threat posed by imperialism and Zionism."

The Chinese press resorts to the most shameless lies to depict the capitulation and betrayal of the Egyptian regime as "a just position in the interests of the Egyptians, Palestinians and other Arabs." The Chinese leaders, ignoring the opinion of the majority of Arab countries, which censured Cairo at a conference in Baghdad in November 1978, are cynically declaring that "China does not believe that the Arab countries will benefit in any way from taking a stand hostile to the policy of President Sadat." In the latest publications, the talks between Egypt and Israel have been extolled by Chinese propaganda as "the most outstanding event of 1978 in the Middle East."

Beijing actually applauded the "peace treaty" between Egypt and Israel, which set up the military-political alliance of Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv and which is aimed at escalating tension between the United States and the USSR.

There is no contradiction in the fact that the Chinese leaders, for whom the Middle Eastern program still consists in escalating crisis and in provoking armed conflicts, have praised the political initiative of the United States. After all, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty largely maintains the potential possibility of new outbursts of military action in the Middle East (this is attested to by the Israeli operation in southern Lebanon and the air battles between the Syrian and Israeli air forces). Officials in Beijing hope that the Egyptian-Israeli bargain could give rise to a new wave of "leftist" extremism and terrorism in the Middle East, and that this, in turn, could be used by Israel as justification for new "repressive" operations by the Israeli chastizers--and not so much against desperate individuals as against real revolutionary detachments, particularly the national patriotic forces of Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance movement and others.

The very signing of this kind of "peace treaty," which was engineered by imperialism and Zionism in spite of the resolutions and decisions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council and which has undermined the

principle calling for the observance of these decisions by UN members (and this includes China), establishes a dangerous international legal precedent: It legalizes the retention of occupied territory in the hands of the aggressors and ignores the problem of refugees. Both the former and the latter "suit" the Beijing militarists.

It was also of considerable importance to the PRC that the signing of the "peace" treaty between Cairo and Tel Aviv contributed much to the conclusion of a military agreement between Egypt and the PRC, which has been described by the Arab communist press as "Chinese aggression against the Arab people."²⁵ In connection with the Maoists' true attitude toward Arab interests, it is extremely indicative that Chinese weapons are being offered to Egypt at a time when Egypt is no longer in the position of confrontation with Israel, and these weapons therefore cannot be used in a general Arab struggle. On the contrary, these weapons are being sent to Egypt for the purpose of strengthening the Sadat regime within the country, helping to overcome the foreign policy isolation incurred by Cairo in the Middle East as a result of its convergence with Israel, and, if the need should arise, turning these weapons against the Arab revolutionary movement. "Indignation has been aroused by the policy of the Beijing leaders," said General Secretary Nayef Hawatme of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, "who supports Sadat and are prepared to give him military assistance. Beijing's intention to supply the betrayer of the Arab race with weapons and combat equipment, which the latter probably plans to use against the national liberation movement in Africa and in the Arab world instead of against Israel, only underscores the close coordination of U.S. and Chinese actions in the Middle East in the interests of strengthening the position of imperialism and reaction and striking a blow at forces for liberation and progress." It is no wonder that the part played by the United States in the preparations for this agreement and its conclusion was called the "main" and "deciding" role by President Sadat.²⁶ There is no doubt that the United States would not have aided in the conclusion of any military agreement if the possibility of its use in a fight against Israel remained. The pro-American policy of the PRC in the Arab world has led, according to the American press, to a situation in which China "is actively represented in the Middle East in the military sphere for the first time."²⁷ The Maoists could regard this kind of joint action as U.S. compensation for the stand taken by the Chinese leadership in regard to the "peace" treaty between Egypt and Israel and American intervention in the process of Middle East regulation.

For Maoist China, the most far-reaching consequence of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty will probably be the official establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tel Aviv. The Chinese leaders have been mentioning this possibility for quite some time. As early as 1973, for example, Ji Pengfei predicted in a conversation with Italian Foreign Minister G. Medici that "the PRC will most probably stop being antagonistic toward Israel as soon as the conflict is resolved to the Arabs' satisfaction."²⁸ In 1978 and 1979 the Chinese leaders, realizing that

supporting the American peaceful initiative in the Middle East would be important from the standpoint of PRC nationalist interests, agreed to new contacts with Israeli officials (particularly H. Herzog, Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations, Israeli Defense Minister E. Weizman and others) to "urge" the conclusion of a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt in the PRC's own interests. The signing of the "peace treaty" eradicated the formal barriers that had kept the PRC from recognizing Israel de jure.

Beijing's approval of the separate talks was properly assessed in Tel Aviv and gave rise to a new wave of pro-Chinese diplomatic activity by the Zionists. In particular, Israel's willingness to establish diplomatic, consular and trade relations was confirmed in statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. The expansion of economic cooperation between the two countries (in particular, the assistance of Israeli economic experts in the implementation of the program of "four modernizations") is already a fait accompli. As for mutual assistance in other areas, such as the collection and exchange of intelligence data, Chinese and Israeli special services have already been cooperating in this sphere for more than 1 year, and even for more than 10. Their first joint operations included attempts to organize the political assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the UAR and the bombing of the American Embassy in Cairo.²⁹ The latest of these operations include terrorist acts, diversionary maneuvers and agitation aimed against the Iranian religious figures who are leading the anti-monarchic revolution.

In the countries which do not agree with President Sadat's course, the PRC's stand on Camp David has indisputably undermined the political authority of the Chinese leadership, and this has forced the Maoists to resort to maneuvers and new declarations in support of the Arab people.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskii kursom. Rech' i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 5, Moscow, 1976, p 459.
2. This remark by Mao Zedong was quoted in a speech by then Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua in Tianjin on 20 May 1975.
3. ASIA QUARTERLY (Brussels), 1977, No 3, p 226.
4. Ibid., p 234.
5. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1978, No 4.
6. E. O'Ballance, "Arab Guerrilla Power, 1967-1972," London, 1974, p 21.
7. M. Brecher, "Israel, the Korean War and China. Images, Decisions and Consequences," Jerusalem, 1974, p 69.

8. THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 23 September 1954.
9. "A Sino-Soviet Perspective in the Middle East," U.S. Congress, Hearings, Washington, 1972, p 31.
10. H. Brecher, Op. cit., p 69.
11. Ibid., p 45.
12. "A Sino-Soviet Perspective in the Middle East," p 31.
13. AL-SABA (Beirut), 12 February 1973.
14. CHINA MAIL (Hong Kong), 18 February 1974.
15. NEW YORK POST, 9 January 1979.
16. MA'ARIV (Tel Aviv), 27 July 1971.
17. AL-SHAAB (Beirut), 6 November 1973.
18. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 18 March 1979.
19. BEIJING REVIEW, 16 February 1979, No 7, p 17.
20. Ibid., 2 February 1979, No 5, p 21.
21. Ibid.
22. JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES (Beirut), August 1973, vol III, No 1, p 133.
23. Geng Biao, as the NEW YORK POST reported on 9 January 1979, frankly said in his talk with H. Squadron that "the Israelis should give up most of the occupied Arab territories." This remark does not differ in any way from the statements made by American diplomacy.
24. Taking the Arab states' sharp protests against Sadat's capitulation into account, Beijing felt it was necessary to publicly justify his "peaceful" initiative--firstly, by the severe economic crisis that had overtaken the country as a result of excessive expenditures on military needs and war losses, totaling 40 billion dollars, and secondly, by problems supposedly "created" for the Egyptian economy and defense by the Soviet Union.
25. AL-NIDA (Beirut), 8 June 1979.
26. ASH-SHARK AL-AUSAT (London), 8 June 1979.

27. FINANCIAL TIMES, 6 June 1979.
28. M. Brecher, Op. cit., p 125; JERUSALEM POST, 10 January 1973.
29. D. Richard, "The Chinese Secret Service," New York, 1974, p 457.

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CSO: 1805

**COST ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET-CHINESE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
(1949-1966)**

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 p 112-118

[Article by L. V. Filatov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

PRESENT-DAY IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 119-130

[Article by V. F. Feoktistov, candidate of philosophical sciences, and G. N. Yashchenko, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The ideological struggle in the CCP, which became more intense when Maoism was established as the dominant ideology and policy in the PRC, is still a characteristic feature of domestic politics in the nation. This struggle reflects the profound ideological and theoretical crisis of Maoism, which has been unable to provide the Chinese society with a scientifically substantiated program for socioeconomic and political development. After conflicting with the objective requirements of Chinese development and encountering the growing dissatisfaction of workers with the anti-people policy, Maoism had to resort to a series of political and ideological maneuvers in an attempt to find an escape from the blind alley into which it has led the nation. The current Chinese leadership, however, is hoping to find this escape in the old and bankrupt methods of great-Han social-chauvinism, militarism and anti-Sovietism. Consequently, the ideological struggle in the CCP is still marked by hostility toward Marxism-Leninism.

When the present PRC leadership came to power, this struggle touched upon the issue of the ideological content of Maoism as a whole and, above all, the form Maoism should take as a great-power nationalist, militarist and social-chauvinist ideology--a "leftist" or rightist form.

By the beginning of the 1970's Maoism had acquired the form of an ultra-"leftist" ideology. Its main characteristic was the idea of "barracks communism" combined with the artificial exacerbation of "class struggle." The ideological and political content of Maoism was confined to the idea of "continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship." The theoretical elaboration of this idea was accompanied by propaganda of Mao's belief regarding the "class of the new bourgeoisie in the party"--his belief that "under socialism, the bourgeoisie is to be found within the party." In other words, this theory was connected with the frank and complete identification of "revolution" with the intra-party struggle of the Maoists against their political opponents. The domestic policy doctrine based on

this "idea" aimed all party and governmental activity at maintaining Maoism's dominant position in Chinese society by escalating the atmosphere of permanent "class struggle." This was the practical purpose of the absolutization of Maoism's leftist ultra-revolutionary appeals.

The incompatibility of the Maoist ideological and political doctrine in its leftist ultra-revolutionary form with the program for internal political stability and production development became apparent in 1975-1976 (during the campaign for struggle against the "rightist tendency to revise correct conclusions"). At that time, the ultra-"leftists" opposed all attempts to reject the aims of "class struggle" and replace them with the "three directives of Chairman Mao": study of the "theory of proletarian dictatorship," the achievement of "solidarity and unity" and the development of production. During the course of this campaign, this interpretation of the "three directives" was called a total departure from Maoism and its criticism evolved into a fierce political battle. The author of this interpretation, Deng Xiaoping, was politically discredited and once again dismissed from public office.

This last outburst of internal political strife in Mao Zedong's lifetime demonstrated that even the Maoist leadership recognized that the time had come to revise the ideological and political content of the Maoist doctrine and renounce its leftist ultra-revolutionary excesses. For this reason, in the end of 1976 the modification of the ideological and political doctrine of Maoism became the most salient feature of ideological life in the PRC. But this revision was undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the social status of Maoism and saving it from total bankruptcy, since the Maoism that had been taken to absurd lengths in its leftist ultra-revolutionary version had quite graphically exposed its incompatibility with the vital requirements of social development in the PRC and (the main consideration for Beijing leaders) provided no chance of effectively implementing the Maoist great-power chauvinist strategy. This revision was accompanied by a fierce and prolonged struggle. Various segments of the Chinese leadership disagreed over the ways, means and methods of implementing general hegemonistic plans, although these disagreements never concerned the social-chauvinist, militarist and anti-Soviet essence of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" and although they all agreed in general on the strategic objectives of his policy.

The struggle over interpretations of the "Thought of Mao" went through two stages, differing from one another both in terms of the composition of the opposing groups, the forms and methods of struggle and the depth of the revision of Maoist doctrine as a whole.

The Engineering of the First 'Updated Version' of Maoism

The first stage began in September 1976, when the new leadership headed by Hua Guofeng came to power, and ended with the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977. This was the stage of ideological (and not only ideological)

struggle against the "gang of four"--a group of Mao Zedong's closest associates, who had once vigorously propagated Maoism in its ultra-"leftist" form. The "instructions" and "ideas" of Mao, calling for internal political stability and the accelerated buildup of China's military-industrial strength, became part of the current ideological lexicon. At this time, the main objective was to work out a new version of Maoism as, purportedly, the "theory of socialist revolution and socialist construction."

The nature and scales of the revision of Maoism's ideological and political doctrine were defined in the very first statements by the new leadership immediately after Mao Zedong's death. First of all, assurances were made of loyalty to the "Thought of Mao" and the firm resolve to "complete the work begun by Chairman Mao." In propaganda on ideological matters, the more active use of Maoism as an ideological weapon in the world arena immediately became apparent, and Maoism began to feed parasitically on Marxism more than ever before. Anti-Sovietism was declared the focal point of PRC foreign policy.

The propaganda about more intensive "class struggle" under socialism was curtailed, and more general questions concerning the role of the "Thought of Mao" in the history of China and of mankind in general were given primary consideration. Mao himself was extolled as a revolutionary leader and theoretician, "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era" and "the great teacher of the international proletariat and of oppressed nations and peoples" and his ideas were called an "encyclopedia of Marxism." At this point, two of Mao's theories were being cited as his main theoretical achievements--the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" and the "theory of new democratic revolution," the first of which was quite persistently associated with the struggle against "contemporary revisionism."¹

Attempts to revise the leftist ultra-revolutionary "Thought of Mao" were most evident after the arrest of the "gang of four," the members of which were accused of "deliberately contrasting revolution with production, politics with economics and the class struggle with the production struggle," which was described as overt anti-Maoism. During the course of the campaign for criticism of the "gang of four," instructions were issued which attested to the revision of some aspects of Mao's ideological and political doctrine. In particular, Hua Guofeng's statement that "the intensive development of the socialist economy is one of the chief responsibilities of the proletarian dictatorship" replaced Mao's famous postulate which confined the proletarian dictatorship only to punitive or external functions, while the instruction that "Chairman Mao teaches us that the life of the party lies in its unity" signified a departure from the thesis regarding the inevitability of intensive intra-party struggle as a "law" of party functioning.

The course chosen by the Hua Guofeng leadership--that of overcoming the leftist ultra-revolutionary features of Maoism--was revealed quite clearly after the publication at the end of December 1976 of Mao's work "On the

Ten Most Important Relationships," which pertained primarily to questions of economic policy. Readers were informed that this work contained a definition of the "great avenue to socialist construction" and that this work represented "Chairman Mao's contribution to the theoretical treasures of Marxism." After centering its ideological work around this essay by Mao, the new PRC leadership made a sharp turn in the direction of the popularization of Mao's economic ideas, and Mao Zedong himself was depicted as the "greatest theoretician" in the field of political economy.

In this way, an updated version of Maoism as the "theory of socialist construction" took shape, and the domestic policy doctrine of Maoism was defined as "the dialectical combination of the objectives of revolution and production" and was amplified in the directive "to always remember Chairman Mao's instruction that the purpose of revolution is to provide scope for the development of productive forces."²

The publication of the fifth volume of "Selected Works by Mao Zedong" in April 1977 was an important step toward the confirmation of this new version of Maoism. Officially, the works in this volume were presented to public opinion as "theoretical summarization of the socialist revolution and socialist construction." This engendered a new tendency in apologies for Maoism--intensive speculation on the prestige of the Chinese revolution and more distortion of the history of the CCP and PRC, contrasting the experience of the PRC to the experience of the international communist movement for the sake of exaggerating Mao Zedong's "services" and in contradiction of well-known facts. Mao Zedong was given credit for all of the victories won by the Chinese people in the revolutionary struggle and in the construction of a new China under CCP supervision despite all of "Mao's lines." The fifth volume of Mao's works was called "a chronicle of the victories of this great struggle and its scientific summarization." Depicting all of the positive experience of the Chinese revolution as something inseparable from Mao's own political and theoretical activity, the Hua Guofeng leadership stressed the "innovative character" of this activity, which was supposed to serve as historical substantiation of the thesis regarding the development of Marxism by Mao Zedong. In particular, it was asserted that socialist reforms in the PRC, the credit for which was assigned completely to Mao Zedong, represented a unique "experience in the immediate (!) accomplishment of socialist reforms and socialist construction" and, for this reason, "the summarization and generalization of this experience by Chairman Mao Zedong will be of great theoretical value in the history of Marxism's development."³

The "great theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" was still being called the main element of the Maoist legacy. It was depicted as the latest achievement of Marxist thinking, allegedly providing a solution to a "new problem, for which there was no correct answer in the international communist movement for a long time": whether classes and the class struggle exist under proletarian dictatorship. The official press asserted that Mao Zedong, "for the first time in the history of the

international communist movement, provided a scientific answer to this question pertaining to the historic destiny of the proletarian dictatorship." In this way, the new Chinese leadership did not merely put Mao on the same level as the founders of Marxism-Leninism, but even gave him, and only him, the credit for the theoretical resolution of the problem of social relations in the socialist society. As for the content of "continued revolution," it was essentially interpreted--in accordance with the same "directives of Mao"--as "class struggle against the bourgeoisie within the party" and against "the chief danger--the restoration of capitalism." Just as before, the establishment of the "great theory" was associated with the struggle against "contemporary revisionism," and an instruction was issued to "follow the precepts of Chairman Mao and finish the fight against Soviet social-imperialism."

As for the "class struggle" under socialism, now this so-called "revolution" began to be interpreted not only as a political problem-solving process, but also as a factor "aiding in the rapid development of productive forces."

In the very beginning of 1977, Mao's appeal "to mobilize all positive factors inside and outside the nation and turn China into a powerful socialist state," from his work "On the Ten Most Important Relationships," was elevated to the status of the "basic line" of party and state activity. The propaganda about this line was constantly accompanied by reminders of "Mao's directive" concerning the need to find a "course of socialist construction suitable for Chinese conditions"⁴ and differing from the Soviet course. The features of this idea about the "basic line" became distinct after February 1977, during the propaganda campaign regarding the "Anshan Combine Constitution, written personally by Chairman Mao,"⁵ and later the "experience of Dazhao and Daqing," which was declared a "specific avenue of transition to communism."⁶ The propaganda about the "basic line" eventually reiterated all of the tenets of the Maoist "Policy of Three Red Banners"--the "Great Leap Forward," the people's commune and the new general line (Mao's appeal to build socialism according to the principle "bigger, faster, better and cheaper"). In essence, the idea of "continued revolution" was equated with the idea of military-barracks communism.

Maoist ideological doctrine was presented in its final form in this stage of its revision in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress, the slogan of which was continuation of the "revolutionary line of Mao." The congress established Maoism as the official ideology, equating it, however, with Marxism-Leninism with the aid of the formula "Marxism-Leninism is the thought of Mao Zedong," whereas previously the "Thought of Mao" had been raised above Marxism-Leninism as its "highest point." The ideological doctrine was made up of the following components: 1) the "theory of new democratic revolution," which allegedly opened a "new avenue for the liberation of all oppressed nations and oppressed peoples in the world" 2) the "great theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," which was passed off as the "only true" theory of socialist

construction under present conditions and was defined as the "most important Marxist achievement of the present era" and a "summarization of the historic experience of proletarian dictatorship in the post-Lenin era" in China and in the rest of the world; 3) the "theory of the three worlds," serving as the theoretical basis of the antisocialist, anti-Soviet line in the international arena.

It should be stressed that the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" was still the fundamental basis of this new version of Maoism. The main theme of Hua Guofeng's report at the 11th Congress was the "precise elucidation" of this theory, according to which it was defined as an "integral theory"—that is, as the ideological and theoretical basis of all CCP activity, whether in the sphere of politics or in the sphere of economics. In contrast to the traditional interpretation, according to which this theory stemmed directly from Mao's postulates regarding the existence of antagonistic classes and intense struggle between them in the socialist society, Hua Guofeng said that this theory was based on Mao Zedong's "conclusions" with respect to the two types of conflicts: "basic" (between productive forces and production relations, and between the basis and superstructure) and "major" (within the superstructure).

In accordance with the thesis about "basic" conflicts, the objective of "continued revolution" was set as a means of achieving a "dialectical combination of revolution and construction" in line with Mao's idea about the "three great revolutionary movements" ("the class struggle, the production struggle and the scientific experiment"). The "class struggle" in the economic sphere began to be interpreted in line with the "Thought of Mao" of the late 1950's—that is, as a component of economic policy guaranteeing physical production growth. Instructions like the following were issued: "Stimulate production by taking revolution seriously," and "establishing internal political unity by working on the basic link (that is, 'class struggle'—Author)."

At the same time, during the discussion of "major" conflicts in the superstructure, Hua Guofeng reduced the "great theory" to the "instructions of Chairman Mao on intra-party struggle during the period of socialism," and Ye Jianying called it an "integral doctrine on struggle against individuals in the party who have power and are taking the capitalist road." Correspondingly, the "revolution in the superstructure" was confined just as before to a "class struggle," analogous to the "Cultural Revolution," which "will be reenacted many times in the future." The CCP Charter of 1977 once again records the resolution of "class conflicts" as the "basic party line for the entire period of socialism." Judging by published documents, the objectives of "construction" were never specifically discussed and the congress limited itself to general appeals for a buildup of economic strength in the spirit of the Maoist general line of "bigger, faster, better and cheaper."

Maoist ideological doctrine was later recorded in this form in the documents of subsequent congresses of PRC public organizations--trade unions, the "Komsomol" and women's federations.

Therefore, the Hua Guofeng leadership embarked on the revision of Maoist ideological and political doctrine as it existed in the mid-1970's by refusing to absolutize its ultra-"leftist" excesses and by promoting Mao's ideas about the need for internal political stability and the accelerated buildup of economic strength. In general, these ideas represent the same old concept of military-barracks communism and are aimed at more intensive struggle for the realization of hegemonistic ambitions in the international arena. The current revision has not made the slightest change in the essence of Maoism as a social-chauvinistic ideology. As a result of this modification, Mao's ideological legacy is being propagandized in full, which signifies that an attempt is being made to save Maoism from absolute disrepute, on the verge of which it was balancing in the mid-1970's.

New Stage in the Ideological Struggle and the Further Modification of Maoism

The second stage of the ideological struggle in the CCP was distinguished by a tendency toward the further revision of Maoist ideological and political doctrine in the rightist pragmatic spirit. This was no longer simply a matter of overcoming the excesses of the "leftist" version, but a replacement of the leftist ultra-revolutionary "Thought of Mao" with rightist opportunistic ideas. This tendency, the birth and development of which were connected with Deng Xiaoping's return to active political life, was aimed at the actual revision of the ideological doctrine set forth in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress and defended by Hua Guofeng. All of this led to a fierce battle between the followers of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, but the matter did not go as far as open political confrontation. During this stage, the struggle against the "gang of four" also began to be used to camouflage the further revision of some Maoist concepts. In essence, this was Deng's struggle for the recognition of the course of establishing a "personal theory of socialist construction," but one based this time on a combination of the "Thought of Mao" with the experience of the "four modernizations."

After the 11th CCP Congress, while the Chinese leadership was drafting the economic program for the "four modernizations," it became obvious that the course aimed at the "dialectical combination of revolution and production" had not put an end to speculation as to which of these was the decisive or main element. It was at this time that the first attempts were made to substantiate the transformation of the economy into a self-sufficient unit and the central object of party and governmental concern. This indicated a tendency toward the rejection of the Maoist principle regarding the priority of policy.

This tendency was officially recognized in the documents of the First Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress] (February-March 1979), which offhandedly confirmed the "basic line" of continued "class struggle" and called the "four modernizations" the "general objective of the new historical period." In contrast to the 11th Congress' line of achieving internal political unity through "class struggle," this session declared a policy of reviving and energizing the "united front," and added yet another of Mao's "great theories" to ideological doctrine--the theory of the "united front," based on "Mao's teachings about the two types of conflicts," particularly the rightist opportunistic concept of "conflicts within the people."

A new process of the modification of Mao's ideological legacy was begun after the NPC Session for the purpose of adapting it to the policy of the "four modernizations." This policy was of a clearly defined militaristic and hegemonistic nature and, for this reason, its substantiation included the entire portion of the "Thought of Mao" which advocated the accelerated buildup of China's military-industrial strength. This issue did not give rise to any disagreements within the Chinese leadership. On the other hand, however, the policy of the "four modernizations" was too reminiscent of the "Great Leap Forward" in its methods, and this gave rise to sharp differences of opinion, particularly in regard to the instruction to "stimulate production by taking revolution seriously." Propaganda about the leading role of productive forces in social development and appeals to overcome voluntarism and utilize economic methods of administration and control were heard more clearly. Mao Zedong began to be depicted as an advocate of technological progress and the extensive use of the achievements of contemporary science, including economics, in the national economy, and an opponent of excessive egalitarianism and the "Great Leap Forward." Propaganda concerning the "experience of Dazhao and Daqing" was gradually curtailed. This aroused objections from some segments of the CCP leadership. The "economic" tendency was contrasted to the "Thought of Mao," which stressed the priority of policy. Recognition of the need for economic methods of social control, particularly financial incentives, was accompanied by a revival of the thesis regarding their auxiliary nature and the principle that "policy is the commanding force." In response, this principle was attacked, the secondary importance of policy as a superstructural phenomenon was pointed out, and the view was expressed that "it is not policy that determines the direction of economic development, but just the opposite--economics determines the development of policy."⁸ In turn, the opponents of this view began to assert that the "basic principle of Marxism consists in the realization that everything revolves around the class struggle," and their opponents responded by repeating the statements about the "most fundamental principle of Marxism." The fight between the supporters and opponents of the further revision of Maoist doctrine took the form of "ideological debate."

The debates began in early May 1978 with criticism of certain statements, ascribed to Lin Biao and the "gang of four" and characteristic of the time of the "Cultural Revolution," alleging that the "Thought of Mao" was

the "highest point of Marxist development." According to the press, the purpose of the debates was to determine the "correct attitude toward revolutionary leaders and their teachings." The "theory of the highest point" was rejected as a "metaphysical view," which allegedly denied the need for the "further development of Marxism-Leninism--the Thought of Mao Zedong." As a counterbalance to this, the objective of "correcting," "enriching" and "developing" this theory and creating "new theories" was declared.⁹ The debates later centered around the idea that "experience is the only criterion of truth." Statements like the following appeared in the press: No theory, including the "Thought of Mao," can serve as a criterion of the accuracy of a line or course, because the only criterion of truth is experience. In essence, this was being done to deprive Marxism-Leninism of its status as the theoretical basis of practical activity and to permit any and all revisions and, if necessary, "sifting" of the "Thought of Mao," guided only by practical considerations, after which "new theories" could be deduced from current experience. In this way, it was proposed that the "Thought of Mao" still be employed as the "banner of ideological struggle," including struggle in the international arena.¹⁰

The leadership's attitude toward these debates was expressed at the all-China conference on political works in the PLA (People's Liberation Army) (May-June 1978). At this conference, Hua Guofeng announced the objective of more intensive political work in line with the "Thought of Mao."¹¹ The essence of his position was reflected in the following theses: "The general objective of the new historical period is based on Chairman Mao's theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," for which reason it is necessary to firmly adhere to this theory and "utilize revolutionization as the leading force for modernization"; Mao's ideas about the "fundamentals of political work in the army are irrefutable," and "the main consideration at the present time is the...revival and extensive spread of the best traditions established by Chairman Mao in the field of ideological and political work in the army." This work was to be "based on the complete and precise comprehension and application of the thought of Mao Zedong." As a counterbalance to this position, Deng Xiaoping announced and tried to substantiate a policy of revising the principles and traditions of political work.¹² He said that it had been more than 40 years since Mao Zedong had established the "fundamentals of political work" and that great changes had taken place in this time, "necessitating corresponding changes in the methods, content and requirements of political work." In general, he said, this work "must acquire a new character." Deng stressed that he was advising "reliance on real facts in the search for truth," contrary to "some comrades," who were insisting on a "search for phrases by Marx, Lenin and Mao and behavior in accordance with these phrases." To substantiate his position, Deng cited the same basic tenets which Mao had once employed to substantiate the departure from Marxism on the pretext of its "creative development in line with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution": "Reliance on real facts in the search for truth," "beliefs based on reality" and the "combination of theory with practice." These premises, according to Deng, represented the "final and

basic viewpoint of the thought of Chairman Mao" and the "most fundamental principle of Marxism," guaranteeing "a correct attitude toward revolutionary leaders and their teachings."

In October 1978 the discussion began to center around "freeing the consciousness," which essentially meant acting in accordance with reality and not taking "directives" into account. Moreover, this applied primarily to the "theory of continued revolution." Under the influence of Deng's views, it was no longer "Mao's teachings about conflicts" that were regarded as Maoism's main theoretical achievement, but "the great teachings of Chairman Mao on experience," or the "theory of experience." Materials pertaining to the ideological and theoretical doctrine of Maoism no longer contained references to the "great theory of continued revolution," and the content of this doctrine was now defined as the "theory of new democracy," the "theory of the three worlds" and the "great teachings about the two types of conflicts,"¹³ which substantiated the division of society not into classes, but into the "people" and the "enemies of the people." As the Chinese press underscored, the "gnosiological debate" established the ideological prerequisites for the decisions of the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (December 1978).

The decisions of the Third Plenum reflected some of the results and consequences of the ideological struggle between the followers of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng. The plenum resolved to "transfer emphasis to the four modernizations"--that is, to center party activity around economics. The end of the "class struggle" against the "gang of four" was announced. The status of the "Thought of Mao" was defined as the ideological and theoretical basis for the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." In other words, the "Thought of Mao" was recognized primarily as a "theory of socialist construction," and as later events testified, the thesis concerning the priority of "revolution" and "class struggle" was actually discarded, at least in propaganda.

Under the influence of the Third Plenum's decisions, significant changes took place in PRC ideological life throughout January-March 1979. They were marked by a tendency toward the increasingly obvious revision of the ideological and political doctrine of Maoism in line with rightist opportunism.

Firstly, since the beginning of the past year ideological life in the nation has been distinguished by the criticism of "ultra-leftist views" for almost the first time in the last two decades. It was announced that the previous definitions of the "line of Lin Biao and the gang of four" as "ultra-rightist" or "leftist in form but rightist in essence" were incorrect; the directive was issued to "thoroughly criticize the ultra-'leftist' essence" of this line.¹⁴ Criticism was escalated to the accompaniment of appeals to "put an end to the mistaken belief that ultra-leftist views are better than ultra-rightist views." Moreover, this belief was described as the main obstacle preventing the triumph of the "correct ideology."¹⁵

All of this was supposed to convince the public that the rightist tendency was the "only correct" alternative to the ultra-"leftist" line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

Secondly, the method of mass ideological and political campaigns was openly renounced as something harmful to the nation's economic development. "The Slogan 'Stimulate Production by Taking Revolution Seriously' Can No Longer Be Used"--this was the title of an article printed in RENMIN RIBAO in March 1979, which noted that the constant ideological and political campaigns, including the "Cultural Revolution," had "represented for a long time the chief obstacle to the development of productive forces."¹⁶

Thirdly, propaganda stressing the continuation of the "class struggle" was actually curtailed. It was replaced by propaganda regarding the revival and energization of the "united front"--the alliance of the CCP with political parties of the national bourgeoisie living in China and abroad. The "united front" was propagandized as one of the "miraculous resources" of the CCP during the stage of "socialist revolution and socialist construction," and its energization under present conditions was called the basic guarantee of the successful accomplishment of the "four modernizations." The main theme became the "great theory of Chairman Mao on the united front"--the idea of the "new democracy," which centered around the idea of a coalition government and the concluding part of this theory--the "teachings about the two types of conflicts." Propaganda based on this "Thought of Mao" postulated the sociopolitical unity of PRC society and completely denied the antagonistic nature of relations between the national bourgeoisie and the workers. The concept "proletarian dictatorship" was given a bourgeois liberalist interpretation, and the concept "socialist democracy" was called a course toward "mutual control of the activities of the CCP and bourgeois parties within the framework of the united front."¹⁷

Proceeding from the same "Thought of Mao," propaganda discussed the need to consider the "economic interests of the people," including the national bourgeoisie, which began to be depicted as a friendly class which had contributed to "socialist revolution and socialist construction" and would be called upon, "under new historical conditions," to also make "its contribution" to the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." It was this reasoning that was used to substantiate the need for broader "economic democracy," particularly the replacement or "supplementation" of the proletarian, socialist principle of planned economic management with the principle of free competition, and land pricing with the free play of pricing factors in the market.¹⁸

The vigorous attempt to "restore" Maoism in line with rightist opportunistic views aroused suspicion in the group advocating the preservation of the ideological and political doctrine of Maoism in the form in which it had been set forth in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress. At the end of April 1979 the rightist tendency was countered by appeals for more intensive mass ideological and political work under the slogan of reviving the "best traditions of the party." An ideological campaign was quickly

launched to promote "the bold and frank declaration that socialism is good." This campaign was based on "four principles": adherence to the "socialist course," "proletarian dictatorship," "CCP guidance" and "Marxism-Leninism as represented in the thought of Mao Zedong."¹⁹ The line of making extensive use of "economic methods," which actually signified a line of close economic cooperation with the West that would lead to the loss of the nation's economic independence, was once again countered by the line of "self-reliance." The energetic discussion of the relationship between "ideological and political indoctrination" and "economic methods" was resumed. Statements characteristic of the Maoist concept of military-barracks communism appeared in the press.

After encountering this pronounced opposition, Deng's group decided to promote its line by slightly modifying it. For this purpose, in the beginning of May 1979 it set forth the theory of the "three great movements for freeing the consciousness," which essentially denied that Marxism-Leninism had played a part in Chinese history and, consequently, refuted any attempted move toward the theory and practice of scientific communism in the PRC.²⁰ According to this "theory," the contemporary history of the Chinese society was divided into three eras of "consciousness-freeing"--that is, eras of the qualitative updating of ideology: 1) the "May 4th movement" of 1919, as a result of which China "became acquainted with Marxism"; 2) the "zhengfeng" movement of 1942-1945, when Marxism, in a "Sinized" version conforming to the "Thought of Mao," began to have a "tangible effect on social development in the nation," and 3) the current "great movement for freeing the consciousness," having the purpose of "making a new contribution to the progressive ideology of mankind" on the basis of "a combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism as represented in the thought of Mao Zedong with the specific experience of the four modernizations." Therefore, this "theory" proposes an even more radical rightist and pragmatic revision of the "Thought of Mao" than ever before. The intention to accomplish the profound qualitative updating of official ideological doctrine has been announced. On the grounds that socialism is supposedly a "new" and "insufficiently analyzed phenomenon" and that there are many "forms of socialism," the theory also appealed for the "comparison of various forms of socialism for the purpose of finding the best socialist course." The use of "ready-made forms"--or, in essence, the use of the experience of the socialist community--was discouraged. The accomplishments of the "four modernizations" was elevated to the status of a "grand revolution," "leading to corresponding multifaceted changes both in the sphere of production relations and in the superstructure." The last thesis could also be used as substantiation of the need for considerable change in the political and economic structure of the PRC.

As a result of this struggle, by the end of May 1979 the ideological campaign for the "bold and frank declaration that socialism is good" was obviously floundering, giving way to a new wave of noisy criticism of the "ultra-'leftist' essence of the line of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four.'"

After the Second Session of the NPC (June 1979), the tenets of the theory of "three great movements for the freeing of consciousness" began to be energetically propagandized and included in official documents, which meant that the influence of Deng's group and its "line" were growing. The Second Session of the Fifth NPC admitted, however, that the immediate accomplishment of the "four modernizations" would be impossible and announced a policy of "regulation, transformation and organization." The session also confirmed the line of using "economic methods" in their rightist opportunistic interpretation by declaring a policy of the energetic use of "all expedient forms in international practice for the attraction of overseas capital," which, strictly speaking was also the aim of Deng Xiaoping.

By the end of 1979 the second round of the struggle over interpretations of the "Thought of Mao" in the Beijing leadership resulted in the appearance of a new, compromise "version" of Maoism. Although the elaboration of this version may not have been completed, its primarily rightist, nationalist and opportunist nature is already quite evident.

According to this new interpretation of Maoism, the driving force in the development of Chinese society ("major conflicts") in the current stage is not the "class struggle," but the resolution of conflicts (!) connected with the "four modernizations" under the conditions of "sociopolitical unity." Moreover, it has been asserted that the resolution of this "major conflict" will necessitate reforms both in the sphere of production relations and in the superstructure, and the character of these reforms has been contrasted to the extreme-"leftist" course. The accomplishment of the "four modernizations" is being defined as a "profound revolution."

At the same time, the new "version" also contains this "balancing" directive: "Denials of the existence of class struggle must be resisted as much as assertions that it is becoming broader and more intense." The term "class struggle" itself is not being interpreted as a struggle against any specific class or group of classes, but as a struggle against "isolated hostile elements," and it must, in the first place, "be centered around the accomplishment of the four modernizations," and not vice-versa, as was believed prior to the Third Plenum of the CCP, and in the second place, be conducted not as a broad mass campaign, but as a pursuit based on state laws.

The ideological and theoretical basis of this social policy was declared to be "Mao Zedong's teachings about the two types of conflicts," which substantiated the division of society into the "people" and "enemies of the people." Moreover, the criterion of this division would be the attitude toward the "political line"—that is, toward the policy of the "four modernizations." To illustrate the matter more clearly, an old directive dating back to the national liberation struggle was resurrected: "Unite all forces that can be united." But this was no longer to be done through "class struggle" or with the aid of the "Thought of Mao" in general, but by carrying out the program of the "four modernizations."

The social base for the accomplishment of this program was defined as the working class, the peasantry, the national bourgeoisie and, in general, "patriots supporting socialism," and attention began to be focused on members of the national bourgeoisie, since they had been "re-educated into individuals of the new type."

It was ultimately admitted that mass ideological work was "necessary along with economic methods," but it was to be conducted under the slogan of "consciousness-freeing" and in line with the appeals for struggle against "two ideological errors": "excessive respect for instructions from above" and "dogmatism."

Ideological and theoretical work emphasized the "establishment of a personal integral and complete scientific theory of socialist construction on the basis of the close coordination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism as represented in the Thought of Mao Zedong with the great experience of the four modernizations."²¹ This is how yet another formula was invented for the disavowal of Maoism's odious features and the preservation of its essence.

For a fuller understanding of the situation, it should be noted that isolated Marxist-Leninist statements are frequently, and with increasing frequency, woven into the canvas of ideological propaganda (in spite of the directives criticizing the use of "phrases" by Marx, Engels and Lenin). This "application" of Marxism, however, does not go beyond the usual bounds of Maoist ideological speculation. Marxist-Leninist tenets are generally used only as declarative reiterations of self-evident truths, which are now being used to substantiate the present Maoist course of the "four modernizations," just as "Marxism-Leninism" was once used to substantiate the thesis regarding the growing intensity of "class struggle." The actual attitude of the present Chinese leadership towards Marxism-Leninism was revealed in the directive to "establish a personal theory of socialist construction" by combining the "Thought of Mao" with the experience of the "four modernizations," in which there is essentially no room for Marxism-Leninism.

This analysis of ideological and political processes in the PRC since the new leadership came to power indicates that the entire period has been marked by intense ideological struggle, reflecting the crisis of Maoism and the restriction of the ideological parasitism which was once the main source of Maoism's existence and "reincarnation." It is for this reason that the crisis naturally led to the revision of Maoist ideological and political doctrine. Maoism is still necessary, however, to the present CCP leadership as a great-power chauvinistic ideology and militaristic practice, this time in its rightist form.

This is corroborated in the materials of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (September 1979), in which the "Thought of Mao Zedong" is described as the "quintessence of more than half a century's experience in revolutionary struggle and the construction of a new society in China,

the quintessence of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party." In addition to everything else, this statement testifies that the latest "version" of Maoism also has its limits, which are intended to protect Mao and his "thought" against the threat of absolute disrepute posed by the appeals of those who advocate the "radical revision" of Maoist doctrine.

The first updated version of Maoism, set forth in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress, was just as "leftist" in form and was based on the concept of "barracks communism" and the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," defining the line of intensive "class struggle" as the "basic party line during the entire socialist period." After the 11th CCP Congress, particularly after May 1978, a struggle broke out between Hua Guofeng's group, favoring the preservation of Maoist ideological and political doctrine in the form in which it was set forth at the 11th CCP Congress, and the group of Deng Xiaoping, striving to base this doctrine on the essentially rightist-opportunistic "theory of Chairman Mao on the united front" and to base CCP activity on the accomplishment of the great-power militaristic program of the "four modernizations," presupposing the revision of Maoism in line with the rightist pragmatic outlook for the purpose of adapting it to the policy of all-round collaboration with the West. The compromise that has now been reached in the CCP leadership indicates that Maoism is undergoing an increasingly obvious transformation into a rightist opportunistic ideology.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 September 1976.
2. HONGQI, 1977, No 1, p 94.
3. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 May 1977.
4. Ibid., 29 December 1976.
5. HONGQI, 1977, No 3, p 92.
6. Ibid., No 7, pp 6-8.
7. GUANMING RIBAO, 16 January 1978.
8. Ibid., 17 January 1978.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 8 May 1978.
10. GUANMING RIBAO, 11 May 1978.
11. Ibid., 5 June 1978.

12. Ibid., 6 June 1978.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 November 1978.
14. Ibid., 16 February 1979.
15. HONGQI, 1979, No 2, p 7.
16. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 March 1979.
17. Ibid., 7 February 1979.
18. GUANMING RIBAO, 24 March 1979.
19. Ibid., 6 April 1979.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 May 1979.
21. Ibid., 28 July 1979.

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PHILOSOPHY OF MAO ZEDONG'S HEIRS

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[Article by N. G. Senin, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] In the present world struggle of ideas, Maoism has become firmly entrenched in the position of a variety of anticommunism, skilfully camouflaged as a form of Marxism-Leninism. The Maoists still regard the "Thought of Mao Zedong" as their ideological guide in domestic and foreign policy, and they assign the greatest importance to his philosophical views.

The present leaders of China have declared the "banner of Mao Zedong" to be their own banner, have proclaimed Mao Zedong the "greatest Marxist of our time" and have called his "thought" the "newest addition to the theoretical treasures of Marxism-Leninism and the most valuable legacy bequeathed by Chairman Mao to our era."¹ In the new CCP Charter, the "Thought of Mao" is declared to be the party's ideological guide and the theoretical basis of party policy.

In the last 2 years, Mao Zedong's heirs have been working on the latest revision of the "Thought of Mao" in connection with their increasingly pronounced tendency toward alliance with the United States and its Western European NATO partners. In the political sphere, emphasis has been placed on preserving only those of Mao's works and statements which correspond to Beijing's present course. For this purpose, attempts are being made, on the one hand, to hush up all of the remarks in which the prospect of building socialism in China under the conditions of the existence of an imperialist system in the world was either doubted by Mao Zedong or postponed for 200-300 years, as well as remarks in which Mao Zedong once expressed positive feelings about the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, his appeals for struggle against imperialism and for the international unity of China with the socialist community and the international communist movement are being discarded.

On the level of ideological theory, emphasis has been placed on purging the "Thought of Mao" of all mutually exclusive and logically conflicting opinions on the pretext of an "integral treatment" of the "Thought of Mao,"

as well as on the selective analysis of these opinions on the pretext of a "concrete-historical" approach to them, and so forth. Moreover, Mao's heirs are displaying a clear tendency to relieve themselves of all responsibility for the practical and theoretical "errors" of Maoism, for the propaganda of the Mao Zedong cult of personality, which took monstrous and pathological forms, for the abnormal effects of this cult of personality on the Chinese people and for the endless ideological campaigns which exhausted the working masses, and to shift all of the blame to their deposed ideological and political opponents--Lin Biao and the "gang of four." They are hypocritically accusing Lin Biao and the "gang of four" of calling the "Thought of Mao" the "highest point" of Marxism-Leninism, of replacing Mao's gnosiological directive to "look for the truth in real facts" with the statement that "everything that Mao Zedong said was the truth," as if they were declaring the "Thought of Mao" to be the criterion of truth instead of seeing experience as this criterion, and so and so forth. All of this loud propaganda, the purely pragmatic purposes of which are quite apparent, has taken on the dimensions of a new ideological and political campaign, the largest so far, on a nationwide scale.

More and more speculative allegations of this kind are being made in China. Naturally, we have no intention of defending Lin Biao or any of the discredited "four." All of them are also to blame for the shameful pages of the history of China under Maoist rule. But the blame must be shared by the present leaders of China, who are singing the praises of Mao Zedong, are declaring his banner their own and have taken a vow to "resolutely defend" this banner and "pass it on from generation to generation."

The Chinese leaders recently launched a loud campaign called "the freeing of consciousness." This campaign has been officially linked with the struggle against Lin Biao and the "gang of four." Actually, however, this represents a necessary escape-valve to alleviate the pressure of the ideological tyranny which reigned in China when Mao Zedong's group was in power. Chinese colleges and universities have revived the practice of competitive student admissions, and the normal academic terms and curricula are being restored. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is resuming its activity. It has been divided into two parts: the Academy of Sciences, which deals with the natural sciences, and the Academy of Social Sciences, which deals with philosophy, economics, law, literature, history, archaeology and other branches of the humanities. Scientific journals which were banned during the period of "Cultural Revolution" are being published again--ZHEXIUE YANJIU ("Philosophical Studies"), LISHI YANJIU ("Historical Studies") and WEN-SHI-ZHE ("Literature, Art and Philosophy"). A new journal is being published--SHEHUE KEXIUE ZHANGXIAN ("The Social Studies Front"). All-China symposiums have been convened on philosophy, history, political economy and other social sciences.

All of these "innovations" could be given a positive interpretation if they reflected a real process of democratization in China which could bring the nation out of the shadow of Maoism. The present Chinese leadership,

on the contrary, is striving to use these partial changes to alleviate the accomplishment of its militaristic and hegemonistic course and to acquire new arguments for the substantiation and justification of its own policy, hostile to socialism and alien to the interests of the Chinese workers.

The philosophy of the present Chinese leaders is the philosophy of Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong himself said repeatedly that he supported the philosophy of Marxism--dialectical and historical materialism. In the CCP Charter adopted at the 11th Congress, Mao Zedong is depicted not only as a consistent materialist, but also as a staunch fighter against idealism and metaphysics, against revisionism, dogmatism and empiricism.

The claims of Mao Zedong and his present heirs can be countered with V. I. Lenin's comment that philosophers should not be judged by their self-advertising, but by the degree to which they actually solve major theoretical problems, the company they keep and the content of their teachings in the past and the present.²

With consideration for this instructive remark by V. I. Lenin and for the appeal of the new Chinese ideologists to "search for truth in reality," we will attempt to determine what Mao was trying to teach his disciples and followers and what he actually did teach them.

As early as 1963, Mao said the following in one of his "directives": "Philosophy must be taken out of the classrooms and textbooks; philosophy must become a sharp weapon in the hands of the masses." This was followed in 1964 by the notorious philosophical debate over the "splitting of the whole," which, in turn, served as ideological preparation for the "Cultural Revolution," the spearhead of which was aimed primarily at the most aware, most intelligent segments of the population.

Assaults on the most highly trained and experienced Marxist philosophical cadres were accompanied by a mass campaign for the publication of articles supposedly written by machine-tool operators and peasants from people's communes. The articles discussed such topics as "The Philosophy of Selling Watermelons," "The Philosophy of Accounting," "The Philosophy of Hog-Raising," "The Philosophy of Ping-Pong," "The Dialectics of Vehicle Safety" and so forth. Even the special academic journal ZHAXIUE YANJIU ("Philosophical Studies") had to uphold the general line and reported on its pages that workers and peasants supposedly did not need "book philosophy" because they themselves were "natural materialists and dialecticians" and learned philosophers would only confuse them.

The line of vulgarizing philosophy by organizing a campaign for the publication of "philosophical" articles ascribed to workers and peasants was one of Mao Zedong's usual methods, which he used extensively for demagogical purposes to demonstrate his "blood-relationship" to the masses and, consequently, his right to speak on behalf of the masses.³

Mao Zedong used this speculative adaptation to the feelings of the backward masses as leverage in his domestic policy. In the beginning of the 1970's, Chinese propaganda made public a resolution noted by Mao Zedong on a particular document, calling this note a "directive." The resolution stated that "the lowest strata of the population are the smartest, and the highest are the stupidest." The political purpose of this resolution was revealed in an article entitled "The Lowest Strata of the Population Are the Masters of the Nation," written by a worker on the party committee of a tractor plant and printed in GUANMING RIBAO newspaper. The article said: "The 13-year history of our plant is the history of a struggle against the 'highest strata' constantly waged by the 'lowest strata,' holding high the banner of Chairman Mao's brilliant resolution; it is the history of the constant triumph of the materialist theory of reflection over the idealistic theory of transcendentalism."⁴ To substantiate the hypothesis that the "lowest strata are the smartest people," the author of the article states that their social status "makes them more capable than others of understanding the thought of Mao Zedong and, with the aid of this thought, actively transforming the world."⁵

The article suggested, just as all other Chinese propaganda, that the "philosophical thought" of Mao Zedong would help in distinguishing true Marxism from pseudo-Marxism and in finding the correct path between right and "left" and would teach how the class struggle should be waged. For this reason, the attitude toward the "Thought of Mao" was declared the criterion for distinguishing between "smart" and "stupid."

The second tendency in the propaganda of Mao Zedong's "philosophical thought" was an attempt to justify the Maoists' unprincipled struggle with a so-called "class line" and to lend the philosophical "Thought of Mao" a proletarian "class nature," although it was no more proletarian than the disgraceful "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" launched by Mao and his followers in the second half of the 1960's.

The Maoist "class approach" to social issues can be illustrated by statements printed in central and provincial press organs. For example, an editorial of a newspaper published in South China said: "Under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship, the class enemy hides behind the cloak of Marxism-Leninism. He spreads rumors, spreads the poison of revisionism and opposes the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao. Frauds raised the red flag to oppose the red flag. These people, engaging in idealism and metaphysics, passed themselves off as Marxists but eviscerate and distort the spirit and essence of Marxism-Leninism and oppose the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat."⁶

It is easy to see where the Maoists expected to find their "class enemies" and on whom they were taking revenge by labeling them "capitalist roaders" and branding them idealists and metaphysicians. Incidentally, these methods of discrediting and then destroying, or trying to destroy, opponents were once used by Mao Zedong against representatives of the CCP in

the Comintern, who had established contacts for the Chinese revolution with the international communist movement. It was against these individuals that tirades like the following were directed: "An individual cannot understand any phenomenon unless he comes into contact with it--that is, unless his personal life (or experience) takes place under the conditions of this phenomenon."⁷ It was the Chinese internationalist communists with the best Marxist training that Mao Zedong contemptuously called "book-worms," "know-it-alls" and "dogmatists" and chose as the target for his poison arrows in the 1930's.

Mao Zedong's article, "Against the Pedantic," written back in 1930, was published for the first time in 1964. In this article, Mao expressed what he had suppressed for almost 35 years--that is, his concealed hatred for Marxism. "The pedantic method of studying the social sciences," he said, "is the most dangerous.... Many of those who have read Marxist 'volumes' have betrayed the revolution."⁸

As we can see, it was no coincidence that Mao Zedong drew a logical connection between his ideological and political opponents and the people who had "read Marxist 'volumes'" and were branded "traitors to the revolution" by Mao. Qu Qiubo, Wang Ming, Liu Shaqi and many others fell into this category.

Both the attempt to pass the vulgarized Maoist philosophy off as Marxism and the desire to justify the arbitrary Maoist policies by means of a false class position served an ignominious goal--the defense, at all costs, of the Maoists' group views, reinforced by nationalistic ambitions, primarily to the detriment of the interests of the Chinese people, the cause of socialism and the interests of the international revolutionary movement.

This is what Mao Zedong taught his followers. The company kept by Mao Zedong and his followers can easily be discerned from this.

The present Chinese leaders, who are Mao Zedong's successors and who have inherited his political line and ideology, are trying to take a selective approach to the "Thought of Mao" and to his philosophy, but have nonetheless retained the essence of these ideas in its authentic form. The philosophical remarks of Mao Zedong that are now being circulated by Chinese propaganda were set forth in the recently published fifth volume of his "Selected Works."⁹

Let us take a closer look at some of Mao's philosophical comments that were first published in the fifth volume of his "Selected Works." We must remember that the materials included in this volume date back to the best years of China's development after the declaration of the PRC, back to the years of socialist construction, heightened public enthusiasm and the all-round flourishing of science and culture. In these years, the major works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were retranslated and published, dozens of scientific journals published articles on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and

special publications printed translations of the best philosophical articles by Soviet and other foreign authors. Lively discussion of the essence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, its place in social life and so forth took place throughout the nation.

The positive tendencies in Chinese spiritual life, which were greatly stimulated by the general revolutionary renovation of social life in the nation, beginning with the triumph of the people's revolution, could have developed successfully in subsequent years as well if the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" had not been published in the early 1950's, with the officially prescribed dogmatic attitude toward these works and the instruction to study the theoretical legacy of the founders of scientific communism exclusively through the prism of the "Thought of Mao Zedong."

Countless commentaries were written on the philosophical works of Mao Zedong "Regarding Practice" and "Regarding Conflicts," which were first published in the first volume of his "Selected Works." The critical spirit of Marxism was deliberately dimmed by the apologetic interpretation of all statements made by Mao Zedong, including remarks on philosophy. This was also promoted by the fact that the "Thought of Mao Zedong" was depicted in propaganda as nothing other than a form of Marxism-Leninism.

Naturally, even at that time Mao Zedong had serious ideological opponents in China, who did not agree with his interpretation of philosophical issues or his claims to "creative" Marxism. This is attested to by the variety of philosophical debates conducted in the nation at that time and the problems at the center of these debates.

On the basis of his false and dogmatic premise--that matter and spirit were allegedly in a state of dialectical conflict with one another--Mao developed his thesis regarding the "eternal nature" of the struggle between materialism and idealism. "Materialism and idealism in philosophy," Mao said in his speech at the all-China conference of party committee secretaries in January 1957, first published in the fifth volume of his "Selected Works," "represent the union of opposites and are fighting with one another. In addition, there are dialectics and metaphysics, which are also contradictory entities and struggle against one another. When we discuss philosophy, we cannot ignore these two pairs of opposites....

"Actually, in any nation there are idealism and metaphysics, there are poisonous weeds.... We, on the other hand, are frankly acknowledging the struggle between materialism and idealism, between dialectics and metaphysics, between sweet-smelling flowers and poisonous weeds. This struggle will continue forever."¹⁰

This line of reasoning, which was typical of Mao, is of interest not only because it laid an ideological basis for the subsequent attacks on philosophical cadres in China, who took a Marxist-Leninist stand, for the purpose of discrediting them and eliminating their vigorous opposition of Mao

Zedong's directives. The publication of this material by Mao's heirs was obviously necessary to them for the "theoretical substantiation" of their anti-Soviet political line, which had been declared the official party and state line.

Questions of Maoist dialectics--or, more precisely, pseudo-dialectics--occupy an important, if not the central, place among Mao's philosophical comments in the fifth volume. Mao was not stingy with his orders: "The entire party should begin the earnest study of dialectics and insist on using the dialectical method as a guide in their activity";¹¹ "We must gradually disseminate dialectics so that everyone gradually learns how to apply the scientific, dialectical method";¹² "The premise of the union of opposites must be propagandized, as well as dialectics. I believe that dialectics should be taken out of the narrow bounds of the philosophical community and disseminated among the broad popular masses."¹³

Although these insistent appeals mentioned dialectics, reference is not being made to scientific dialectics, but to dialectics in the Maoist interpretation.¹⁴ Mao saw his pseudo-dialectics simply as a convenient weapon, a means of "skillfully applying the tactic of using conflicts" to attain specific political goals. Here are some examples.

Mao Zedong, for example, had to lay a "theoretical basis" for the anti-Soviet slant of his policy in the mid-1950's and, simultaneously, for his great-power ambitions. For this purpose, he propounded a "dialectical" thesis: He alleged that although China and the Soviet Union were socialist countries, they represented "conflicting entities" by virtue of dialectics. This was his reasoning. "The Soviet Union," he said, "differs from China in terms of ethnic composition. The October Revolution took place there 39 years ago, and it has only been 7 years since we took power throughout our entire country. As for concrete experience, here the difference is also vast. For example, our agricultural collectivization, in contrast to the Soviet process, is passing through several stages; our policy toward capitalism is different from the Soviet one; our market price policy is not the same as the Soviet; interrelations between agriculture, light industry and heavy industry are settled by us differently than in the Soviet Union; institutions and regulations within our army and our party differ from the Soviet. We have told them that we do not agree with some things in their country and do not approve of some of their measures."¹⁵

The differences between the countries in terms of specific historical conditions, traditions and methods of solving all types of problems are natural and inevitable. But it is absolutely unscientific to lay a philosophical basis, the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites, under differences of this kind. This is a vulgarization of dialectical materialism. But as we know, it is precisely the category of "difference" that lies at the basis of Mao Zedong's own understanding of the contradictory nature of phenomena and the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

Here is another example Mao Zedong used to illustrate his idea of dialectics. "Water," he said, "is a combination of two elements--hydrogen and oxygen. It cannot consist of only hydrogen without oxygen or, conversely, of only oxygen without hydrogen.... Any chemical compound is nothing other," Mao continued, "than a union of opposites, elements differing in nature. The same applies to social phenomena. The central and local constitute a union of opposites, and each department along with other departments also constitute a union of opposites."¹⁶

This primitive gibberish is still being fed to all of the Chinese, and workers throughout the nation are forced to sit at meetings for hours after work and collectively search for the "profound meaning" invested in this statement by their "great teacher."

If it is true that in a contradiction--a union of opposites--one side cannot exist without the other, then, according to Mao Zedong's logic, oxygen cannot exist without hydrogen and hydrogen cannot exist without oxygen. And what are the "two sides" of the contradiction that make up a chemical compound? What is the institution in public life that opposes, for example, the bank, the school, the post office and so forth?

Mao was not setting forth his philosophy at a poultry farm, but at a plenum of the CCP Central Committee. And the main feature of his statement was not the philosophical wisdom of the party leader, but the ideological and political preparation of party administrators for a transition to an anti-Soviet course. He was slandering the Soviet Union and the Great October Socialist Revolution and offhandedly declaring that it had ceased to serve as an example to other countries and had "nothing more to teach," that "Leninism has already been essentially discarded" in the USSR, and so forth.

These remarks were made in November 1956.

Anti-Sovietism combined with great-power arrogance was also apparent in the abovementioned speech by Mao Zedong at the all-China conference on party committee secretaries in the beginning of 1957. In this speech, Mao philosophized about Sino-Soviet relations: "Do not think that communist parties cannot disagree. How could there be a world without disagreement? Marxism is the doctrine of disagreement, of contradictions, of struggle.... There are at present a few conflicts between China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet way of thinking and modes of behavior and their traditional customs are different from ours. Therefore, we must work with them.... Contradictions always exist. And if the situation now is tolerable in general, we can search for areas of agreement and postpone the discussion of differences. If they persist in going even further, the day will come when we will put all our cards on the table."¹⁷

This is the tone Mao Zedong taught his teachers and followers to take in discussions with Soviet people back in the mid-1950's.

Mao also used the prism of contradiction to examine the question of study in foreign countries and the use of their experience for China's needs. Moreover, even here he examined the contradictions in line with traditional Chinese dialectics: plus and minus, good and bad, and so forth. Each race, nation and individual, he said, has positive and negative features, merits and shortcomings. The only exception to the rule, according to Mao, was China. He elevated its shortcomings to merit status. China's economic backwardness and its low level of scientific and cultural development were not only not a drawback, but, according to Maoist dialectics, were stimulating social progress.

"From the standpoint of development, this is not at all bad," Mao said. "Poverty stimulates revolution, while it is difficult for a rich man to take an interest in rebellion. Nations with high levels of scientific and technical development are usually too arrogant. We, on the other hand, represent a blank piece of paper on which it is convenient to write."¹⁸

On the basis of this "philosophy of backwardness," Mao arrogantly issued instructions, telling people what they should learn, who they should learn it from and how they should learn it. Actually, as is evident in the fifth volume, he denied the need to study the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Attacking political figures in China who insisted on the need to study the Soviet experience in socialist construction, Mao called them "dogmatic" with "no opinion of their own." He accused them of being one-sided and wanting to view life in the Soviet Union only in a positive light--that is, of not noticing the second side--the shortcomings. Directing attention to this second side without even describing it, Mao Zedong made a new series of anti-Soviet attacks and advised the Chinese to thoroughly "study the progressive science and technology of the capitalist countries."¹⁹

When Mao's heirs made an effort to publish his "Selected Works" as quickly as possible because they contained statements corresponding to Beijing's present policy line, they were obviously preparing public opinion to coldly accept their plans to break off relations with the socialist countries and ally themselves with imperialist forces, which was completely consistent with Mao's own policy in the last years of his life.

The world public does not know the degree to which the theoretical substantiation of the Chinese leadership's betrayal of the principles of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity in the struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation and social progress was elaborated by Mao Zedong himself from the mid-1950's on, and to what degree it was the work of the present Chinese leadership. In any case, the fifth volume provides conclusive evidence that the Mao Zedong quoted here was an experienced political double-dealer and hypocrite, who surreptitiously treated the Soviet Union abominably while publicly vowing "eternal friendship," taking every opportunity to exploit the general Chinese working public's sincere feelings of gratitude, affection and friendship for the Soviet Union.

In this connection, it would be helpful to cite several public announcements made by Mao Zedong at various times, in which he acknowledged the role of the Soviet Union and its all-round assistance to the Chinese people in their revolutionary struggle and in the construction of socialism in China.

Just before World War II, when the CCP leadership realized that the Chinese revolution was an integral part of the unified global revolutionary process, with the Soviet Union in the lead, Mao Zedong wrote the following: "The situation now is absolutely clear: If there is no policy of alliance with Russia, no alliance with the socialist state, then there will certainly be a policy of alliance with the imperialists, there will certainly be an alliance with imperialism.... The imperialists intend to fight the USSR, to fight the communists. If you ally yourselves with them, they will demand that you "go North and fight" and nothing will remain of your revolution."²⁰

When the Chinese revolution needed an ally to triumph, and this ally could only be a socialist state—that is, the Soviet Union—Mao Zedong understood that alliance with the imperialists would mean the death of the revolution. And he expressed this view quite clearly.

In 1949, in the last stage of the Chinese people's liberation struggle, Mao Zedong acknowledged the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in guaranteeing its (China's) victory and in consolidating it. In the article "On the Democratic People's Dictatorship," he wrote: "If the Soviet Union had not existed, if World War II, which was directed against fascism, had not ended in victory, if Japanese imperialism had not been totally defeated..., the international reactionary forces threatening us would naturally be inestimably greater than they are now. Could we," Mao asked, "have been victorious under these circumstances?" He then quite reasonably replied: "Of course not. And even if we had won a victory, we would not have been able to consolidate this victory. The Chinese people have had too much experience in this."²¹

Mao Zedong's conclusion was absolutely correct and aroused doubts in neither the enemies nor the friends of China. During the first decade of China's socialist development, Mao Zedong, who headed the People's Republic of China, made several public admissions of the invaluable assistance the Soviet people had given the Chinese people in building a new socialist society, free of oppression and exploitation, and of the Russians' fraternal sharing of their own multifaceted experience in overcoming difficulties and their guarantee of peaceful skies over China. At that time, he did not make any public statements about China's conflict with the Soviet Union and did not say that the Soviet experience represented a "negative" example for China. On the contrary, when he spoke at a reception in Beijing in spring 1957 in honor of Chairman K. Ye. Voroshilov of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Mao said something quite different: "The Soviet people have accumulated exceptionally rich experience in the struggle for

a socialist revolution and the lengthy period of socialist and communist construction. This experience is of tremendous value to the workers of the entire world. The Chinese people learned much of value from the Soviet Union both in the revolutionary struggle of the past and the socialist construction of the present. The Chinese people will continue to earnestly study Soviet progressive experience to accelerate socialist construction in China."²²

At that time, Mao did not call upon the imperialist powers and all reactionary forces in the world to join China in a united front for struggle against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. On the contrary, in the same speech he made assurances of the eternal and inviolable ties of friendship between the two populations and of the strong unity of China and the USSR against imperialist aggressive forces. "Imperialist aggressive forces," Mao Zedong said, "have always taken every opportunity to subvert and undermine the unity and friendly relations between our two countries. But the facts prove that their shady intrigues could never have come to pass. There is nothing in the world that can disunite us. The friendship between the 8 million people of China and the Soviet Union is eternal and inviolable."²³

Statements of this kind by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders are being hushed up in Beijing now. They were not included in the fifth volume either, but Mao's heirs eagerly take every opportunity to cite Mao's remarks of the 1950's which, along with his newest "theories" and directives, allow them to adapt Mao's views to their own present anti-Soviet line, their alliance with imperialist forces against the socialist community and the international workers movement and their support of the most reactionary regimes in the world in their struggle against the national liberation movement. The present rulers of China are also using Mao's ideological legacy for their domestic policy which is contrary to socialism and the interests of the general working public in China.

When Hua Guofeng presented the accountability report at the 11th CCP Congress, he cited V. I. Lenin's famous remark that "the dialectics of history are such that the theoretical victory of Marxism forces its enemies to wear a Marxist disguise." This remark was addressed to the "gang of four," but it applies directly to the Maoists who are pretending to carry on the ideas and cause of Marx and Lenin. Hua Guofeng quite groundlessly gives Mao Zedong credit for supposedly "revealing the natural laws governing the development of socialist society" and "creatively applying" the law of the unity and struggle of opposites to the analysis of socialist society and thereby establishing the "great integral theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship." The essence of this "new" theory is that, under socialism, which covers a fairly long period, "classes, class conflicts and class struggle are constantly present, the struggle between the socialist and capitalist lines is constant and the danger of capitalist restoration is constant."²⁴ The main classes involved in this struggle are supposed to be the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, allegedly constituting the major conflict in socialist society. This is what necessitates fierce class struggle and continued revolution.

Despite the present Chinese rulers' assertions that Mao Zedong "inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism" and that the "theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship" occupies a "particularly important place in the history of the development of Marxism" and represents the "greatest contribution to Marxism in the socialist period" and so forth, Mao's unconvincing discussions of class antagonism and class struggle in the socialist society and the need for continuous political revolution in this society, in the form of planned upheavals like the "Cultural Revolution," right up to the point of total communism, can only jokingly be described as a "creative development" of Marxism-Leninism; they represent only an extremely wretched revision of Marxism-Leninism and serve only as a screen to conceal the departure from Marxism-Leninism.

The founders of scientific communism theoretically proved, and the practice of the world liberation movement irrefutably corroborated, that class struggle is inevitably present in class-antagonistic society. When the working class wins political power and the revolutionary transformation of bourgeois society into a new socialist society begins, the working class does not curtail the class struggle against deposed but still present classes. It continues the struggle, but it continues it, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "under different circumstances, in a different form and by different means."²⁵ The struggle continues throughout the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism, until all hostile classes have been eliminated.

V. I. Lenin gave us a precise and thorough explanation of the term "elimination of classes." "The elimination of classes," he said, "will mean that all citizens will have the same relationship to the means of production throughout society. It will mean that all citizens will have equal access to work with public means of production, on public land, in public factories and so forth."²⁶

When the bases of socialism have been laid--that is, when exploitative classes have been eliminated and public ownership of the means of production has been established in all sectors of the national economy--there is no longer any reason for class struggle within the nation in the economic, political and social spheres. All questions in these spheres will be decided by peaceful means on the basis of the sociopolitical unity of the society. In particular, cultural, ideological and educational issues in the socialist society will be resolved by peaceful means.

Mao Zedong's chief error in this case (if we can even discuss any of his specific errors) was that he did not recognize the fundamental difference between the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and the period of the construction of socialism as the first phase of communism. For him, the period of transition was the entire period from the time when the working class won power to the time of communism's final triumph. Moreover, although he realized that political power during the period of transition to socialism could only be embodied in a proletarian dictatorship, he concluded that the chief function of this political structure

would have to be coercion since this was a dictatorship. Mao always regarded coercion as a means of preserving individual authority. It was precisely this kind of coercion that he was talking about when he referred to "class struggle."

Mao Zedong ignored V. I. Lenin's important statement that the forms, methods and means of class struggle by the working class, when it was controlling the machinery of state, would be qualitatively different from those existing prior to the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, and that the chief function of proletarian dictatorship would not be coercion, but the organization and construction of a new and classless society.²⁷

For Mao Zedong, just as for his heirs, the essence of proletarian dictatorship consisted in unlimited coercion under the guise of "continued revolution," in continuous and intensive "class struggle" and in the suppression of "class enemies"--that is, all persons opposing the leadership's policies.

In order to reinforce his own position and that of the clique which came to power in China after Mao Zedong's death, Hua Guofeng made a pretense of carrying out Mao Zedong's "political wishes" by advocating, at the last CCP Congress, "people's war" on a broad front against the supporters of the discredited "gang of four," and declared that the class struggle was the "deciding link" in the nation's domestic policy. "The grand-scale class struggle for the exposure and criticism of the 'four,'" he announced from the congress rostrum, "is now the principal driving force in the development of our cause."²⁸

We must remember that the terms "class enemy" and "enemy of the people" were never invested with their immediate social import in Mao's political jargon. In essence, they served only as abusive labels which were applied to all those with whom Mao had personal scores to settle or those who did not agree with his faulty reasoning. Mao even hung the label of "class enemy" on such political figures in China as Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, men he had called his "comrades" for decades. They became the victims of his insidious intrigues.

During the period of "Cultural Revolution," Mao Zedong hung the label of "class enemy" on his opponents, who were also called "capitalist roaders"--that is, "individuals in positions of leadership who are taking the capitalist road." This category of "class enemy" included the administrators of party organizations on all levels, public agencies, public organizations and so forth--that is, the heads of the main "headquarters" on which Mao ordered "all-out attack."

In the last part of his life, after the excesses of the "Cultural Revolution," Mao Zedong, who had, with his own voluntaristic behavior, created truly antagonistic conflicts in the Chinese society between his antisocialist line and the vital interests of the workers, began to search for his

"enemy" within the communist party that he himself had reorganized. Criticizing his successors for conducting a "socialist revolution" without knowing who their "enemies" were, Mao blasphemously explained to them that the "enemy" was the bourgeoisie, which could be found "within the communist party itself."

Mao's last explanations poured balm on the wounds of his present successors. They rid themselves of their chief political opponents by using "classic" Maoist methods, branding them with labels which simultaneously discredited and smothered them. "Zhan Chunqiao is a Kuomintang spy, Jiang Qing is a traitor, Yao Wenyuan is a hostile class element and Wang Hongwen is a new bourgeois element."²⁹ Needless to say, this was an excellent funeral wreath from the "students" to their adored "great teacher"! Now it is the turn of thousands and thousands of other people who are not needed by the regime.

In the end of 1978, after the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum, the Chinese leaders declared a line of "liberalizing" class policy within the nation. Contrary to Mao Zedong's directives and their own instructions, as set forth in the materials of the 11th Congress, the Chinese leaders announced that "fundamental changes" had taken place in the Chinese class structure: Landowners, rich peasants and capitalists, they say, have ceased to exist as classes; "most of the representatives of these classes who were able to work have become workers and, consequently, the class struggle "has ceased to be the main conflict in Chinese society."

We will not try to decide whether the judgments of the Chinese leaders were more faulty before or after the 11th CCP Congress. We are more interested in the reason for the sudden metamorphosis of the Chinese leaders' views. Their explanation for the change in China's international position is due to China's "new and important successes in the creation of an international united front against hegemonism and in the development of friendly relations with countries in all parts of the world."³⁰ Among these successes, particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty "on peace and friendship" and the normalization of relations with the United States.

The alliance with international imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis, which has been elevated to the status of government policy, has also been reflected in Beijing's domestic policy. In order to achieve "grand-scale unity" in the nation, the Chinese bourgeoisie has regained the freedom to engage in private enterprise, capitalists have regained their assets and confiscated property, and foreign capital is permitted by law to engage in economic activity in the nation on an equal partnership basis. Corresponding steps have also been taken in the political sphere. The last group of "rightist elements" convicted of "subversive activity" in the 1950's was recently vindicated, the description of the "gang of four's" activity as "ultra-rightist" has been changed to "ultra-leftist," the "hundred flowers" slogan has been revived as the principal line in art and science, and the

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, now headed by Deng Xiaoping, has resumed its activity, with pronounced emphasis on stronger ties with "huaqiao" living in different parts of the world.

This "liberalization" of class policy has taken on the nature of a campaign. Appeals for intense class struggle have not been removed from the agenda in China, but the spearhead of class struggle is now pointed at those who do not agree with the absolutely rightist and strictly pragmatic line of the present Chinese leaders. Chinese propaganda explains that this spearhead is now pointed at "counterrevolutionaries," "enemy agents," "political degenerates," "opponents of modernization" and other "class enemies of various types," with whom the "proletarian dictatorship will have to deal for a long time."³¹

The political persecution of the last two decades in China has shown that anyone and everyone can be categorized as a "class enemy" and subjected to repressive action. This is particularly true now that the main criterion used in defining the "class enemy" is the attitude toward the present leadership's policy of "modernization." Anyone who accepts and supports this policy is a "friend" and anyone who does not accept it and "undermines" it is an "enemy," against whom the punishing hand of Maoist justice, speculatively called proletarian dictatorship, is turned.

By declaring "class struggle" the deciding link of their policy, Mao Zedong's heirs hope to establish "universal order" and achieve unity, solidarity and stability in the nation. This alone testifies that they feel insecure about their present position. The current Chinese leaders also feel insecure about the future of their nation. It is true that under the loudly advertised slogan of "modernization" in all spheres of social life, they are promising to "put foreign things at China's service," but in essence, they are hoping to turn China into a powerful state, which they even call "socialist," by the end of the century with the all-round support of worldwide imperialism.

Nonetheless, no matter how much the Maoists speculate on the Marxist terms "proletarian dictatorship," "socialism" and "communism," they do not really believe in socialism, in its scientific import or in communism, just as Mao himself did not believe in them. The report by Ye Jianying at the 11th CCP Congress on changes in the CCP Charter explain the basic policy-planning objectives of the party and quite clearly declared, with references to Mao's instructions, that "as long as imperialism exists, the socialist state cannot enter the communist stage."³²

Moreover, the same report mentioned another of Mao's instructions, in which he cast doubts on the creation of a communist society even after imperialism would be completely eliminated and the entire world would enter the socialist phase. Mao Zedong's explanation for these doubts was that the bourgeoisie would continue to live even after it had been deposed and would make every effort to break up the communist party.

Mao's present successors have armed themselves with this capitulating line of his.

Mao's heirs link the existence of imperialism with the absolute inevitability of war. "Chairman Mao Zedong told us that war would be inevitable until such time as imperialism and social-imperialism as a social structure would be abolished."³³

Slandering the Soviet Union and calling it a "social-imperialist super-power" allegedly preparing to attack China, Hua Guofeng took pains at the 11th party congress to "prove" that world war cannot be avoided because this is an objective law which does not depend on human wishes. Mao Zedong's allegation that war is an extension of the policy of peace, stemming from his philosophical thesis that the state of peace inevitably alternates with the state of war, has even been cited as unique "theoretical" reinforcement.

On the basis of these and other "theoretical" postulates of their "great teacher," Mao Zedong's disciples and successors are doing their utmost in conjunction with imperialist aggressive forces, to impede international detente and prevent the mobilization of progressive forces to put an end to the threat of world war, which they see as a means of carrying out their aggressive expansionist plans.

The present Chinese rulers are not only marching virtually in the front lines of the propagandists of a new world war, but they are also initiating armed conflicts with neighboring countries. The war launched against socialist Vietnam, the continuous and increasingly intense military provocations on the borders with Vietnam and Laos and the all-round support that is being given to the remnants of Pol Pot's gangs in Kampuchea testify that the Chinese hegemonists are not limiting themselves to verbal intimidation of their southern neighbors, but are actually endangering peace and security throughout Southeast Asia and are creating a dangerous source of global conflict.

An analysis of the philosophy of Mao Zedong's heirs suggests that Mao did not teach his disciples and successors Marxism, as they are implying in Beijing, but deviation from Marxism, or pseudo-Marxism, the nucleus of which is the same old great-power chauvinism and belligerent hegemonism that are directly reflected in Beijing's policy.

This policy, however, must be classified as hopeless. The propaganda about the inevitability of a new world war is arousing more and more negative response throughout the world. This propaganda is discrediting China as a great state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the main purpose of which is precisely the guarantee of world peace. Moreover, this war propaganda is being conducted in China by a small group of people in power, and not by the population of this country. The great population of China has not yet expressed its views on this matter,

but it will do this sooner or later, and these views will be of indisputably tremendous significance.

The Soviet Union's fundamental line in regard to the policy of the present Chinese leadership and its ideological basis--the "Thought of Mao"--was expressed in the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and in many subsequent announcements by the CPSU and the Soviet Government. This line consists in, on the one hand, uncompromising struggle against Maoist policy, which is alien to socialist principles and ideals, and Maoist ideology, which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, and, on the other, an open invitation to normalize relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hua Guofeng, "Political Report at the 11th All-China CCP Congress,"--"Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," Beijing, 1977, p 6.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Completed Collected Works], vol 18, p 228.
3. This kind of vulgarization of the Marxist philosophy is also one of the responsibilities of today's official propaganda organs in China. For example, the August issue of BEIJING REVIEW for 1978 reports: "The Chinese press advocates the fuller use of the theory of 'splitting the whole' or the 'theory of the two sides' in the analysis of our work--that is, the examination of weak points as well as strong points. Chairman Mao employed this theory to provide us with a vivid description of the basic law of dialectical materialism, the law of the unity of opposites." Several banal examples are presented in the article to illustrate Maoist "dialectics"--see BEIJING REVIEW, 1978, No 34, p 28.
4. GUANMING RIBAO, 18 May 1971. The "theory of reflection" refers here to Mao Zedong's empirical gnosiology, and the theory of "transcendentalism" refers to the philosophical position the Maoists ascribe, without any justification whatsoever, to their ideological and political opponents--Wang Ming, Liu Shaqi, Chen Boda and others.
5. Ibid.
6. CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, 14 May 1971.
7. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, Moscow, 1952, p 512.
8. "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," series "B," Beijing, 1964, p 21.
9. The fifth volume of Mao Zedong's "Selected Works" was published in a huge edition in April 1977. It consisted of 70 works covering the period from September 1949 through November 1957, and 46 of these

works were being published for the first time. The collected materials were carefully analyzed and edited by a special commission of the CCP Central Committee, headed by Hua Guofeng. A characteristic feature of the publication of this volume was the inclusion of anti-Soviet attacks dating back to the mid-1950's and remarks attesting to China's willingness to establish close ties with the capitalist West. The new Chinese leadership attaches exceptional significance to the fifth volume.

10. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 5, Beijing, 1977, p 440.
11. Ibid., p 459.
12. Ibid., p 520.
13. Ibid., p 628.
14. For more detail, see N. G. Senin, "Sophistry Disguised as Dialectics," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1975, No 3.
15. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 5, p 407.
16. Ibid., pp 406-407.
17. Ibid., pp 437-439.
18. Ibid., p 367.
19. Ibid., p 365.
20. "O chem umalchivayut v Pekine?" [What Are They Concealing in Beijing?], Moscow, 1972, p 26.
21. "O novoy demokratii" [On the New Democracy], Moscow, 1960, p 100.
22. PRAVDA, 18 April 1957.
23. Ibid.
24. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," pp 30-31.
25. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 39, p 15.
26. Ibid., vol 24, p 363.
27. Ibid., vol 38, p 385.
28. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," p 79.

29. Ibid., p 26.
30. "Communique of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum," BEIJING REVIEW, 1978, No 52, p 8.
31. "Fundamental Changes in Class Position of China," BEIJING REVIEW, 1979, No 46, 47.
32. "Eleventh All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents), p 179.
33. Ibid., pp 64-65.

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MAO ZEDONG'S REVENGE AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS IN 1930-1931

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 145-156

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

BEIJING RATTLES THE SABRE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 157-162

[Reprint from UNEN (MPR)]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

HO CHI MINH--THE PATRIOT, THE COMMUNIST, THE MAN (COMMEMORATING THE 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 163-171

[Article by Ye. V. Kobelev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

THE CASE OF DENG TUO: REHABILITATION OR APPROPRIATION OF AUTHORITY?

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 172-178

[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

ZOU TAOPEN--PROMOTER OF SINO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 179-186

[Article by S. R. Belousov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

AGAINST THE REVIVAL OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 187-190

[Review by P. I. Rybakov of a series of books by Hayashi Shigeo]

[Text] In recent years there has been a noticeably increased tendency toward militarization in Japan, into which the nation is being propelled by rightist political circles expressing the interests of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. From year to year, military spending increases, military cooperation with the United States is broadened and ties with NATO and China are strengthened. The escalation of militaristic hysteria in the nation is being justified by the imaginary "Soviet military threat."

The peace-loving Japanese public is well aware of the danger of this course and the need to energize the struggle for peace. The growing desire to resist the revival of Japanese militarism is attested to, in particular, by the publication of a series of three books by Hayashi Shigeo, Japan's famous fighter for peace. The appendix of each book contains the texts of numerous documents.

The first book¹ exposes the plans of Japanese ruling circles to institute emergency legislation which would give the military establishment a free hand and grant it extensive powers to mobilize human and material resources for military preparations. The author proves that Japanese ruling circles actually began to draft bills of this type long ago under the cover of various research projects. The author stresses that the plans of the Japanese military command were first reflected in the "Three Arrows" operational plan prepared by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in 1963 (p 3). Documents drafted in 1964 on the basis of this plan envisage measures to intensify militaristic propaganda, augment the composition of companies and units, create stocks of ammunition and raw materials, enlist the services of the population for various military duties and use private resources and facilities in the interests of the armed forces (pp 6-10).

The author correctly points out that the attempts of ruling circles to pass emergency legislation have been connected primarily with Japanese-American military-political cooperation, particularly the "U.S. policy of

maintaining its influence in South Korea" (p 14). It was no coincidence that the attempts to pass these laws were made at the time when the Japanese-South Korean treaty was signed in 1965 and in connection with the adoption of a joint declaration by the heads of the U.S. and Japanese governments in 1969. The current intense activity of military circles has been accompanied by closer U.S.-Japanese military-political cooperation.

The author stresses that these bills were not drafted for the purpose of defending Japan, which is not being threatened by anyone, but for the purpose of establishing dominion over other countries. To corroborate this conclusion, Hayashi cites historical examples (p 5). For instance, the passage of laws on the general mobilization of the country, on the development of the defense industry and on the institution of a compulsory draft in the past were connected with Japan's preparations for wars against tsarist Russia and China, and later with the intervention against Soviet Russia. During the period of preparations for the "great war in East Asia," a series of emergency laws were also passed.

According to S. Hayashi, Japanese ruling circles have already implemented some of the provisions of this emergency legislation without waiting for their enactment. Preparations are being made for the institution of a compulsory draft in the nation. For example, since 1966 the enlistment of volunteers in the armed forces has been conducted in accordance with the so-called "system of organized recruitment" (*soshiki boshyu*), in line with which recruiting stations have at their disposal "lists of individuals in active military service and the reserves, former servicemen and individuals who have expressed a desire to enter the military and are of age" (p 6). These measures testify that the necessary conditions for mobilization are already being prepared in peacetime and that the bases are being laid for enlisting the services of the population in times of crisis.

The author stresses that grand-scale projects in Japan, ostensibly for alleviating the consequences of natural calamities, actually envisage the enlistment of the civilian population for various military duties, and the use of material resources and means of transportation and communication belonging to private firms for this purpose (pp 7, 146-152). The existing system envisages the creation of rescue teams and brigades throughout the nation for medical assistance. The armed forces already have the right, even in peacetime, to utilize means of transport, particularly the ferry boats of private companies, to transport military equipment and personnel, and to use public and private buildings and schools to accommodate personnel during the course of military exercises. Plans have been drawn up to establish a thoroughly organized civil defense system (p 7).

At present, numerous organizations for assistance to the armed forces are operating within the nation, including the Society To Assist the Self-Defense Forces (*Jieitai kyoryokukai*), the Society for Cooperation in Defense (*Boei kyoryokukai*), the League of Friends of Native Places (*Goyu renmei*) and others; they actively help in military propaganda and the cultivation of the militarist ideology. In the event of war, these

organizations will be prepared to give the armed services rear support and will constitute the basis of civil defense subunits.

The author notes that ruling circles have recently launched a broad propaganda campaign in the nation to "heighten public awareness of national defense issues"--in other words, the ideological brainwashing of the population in the militaristic spirit has become more intensive. Expenditures on these measures increase from year to year. Just the allocations for the propaganda section of the prime minister's office rose from 100 million yen in 1960 to 11.1 billion yen in 1978 (p 10)--that is, they increased more than 100-fold. The association set up as part of the JDA in 1973 is already conducting broad-scale propaganda to encourage public opinion to favor militarization and preparations for war.

After public opinion has been properly won over, the government intends to begin revising the existing constitution. This will be done in line with the wishes of the United States, which has requested Japan to make a greater contribution to bilateral military cooperation (p 15). In particular, plans have been made to amend existing laws so that Japan will be able to include its own subunits and units in the forces of the United Nations (p 118). This, as S. Hayashi points out, should be regarded as a loophole for the evasion of constitutional provisions and the acquisition of opportunities to send troops abroad.

The proposals drawn up by the JDA for the reorganization of military administrative agencies are also part of the preparations for a state of emergency. They envisage, in particular, the creation of a joint armed forces staff, the peacetime creation of a central intelligence agency to collect, analyze and assess military information, the expansion of the functions of the national defense council, the creation of a public security commission to be headed by the prime minister and to consist of leading cabinet ministers, and so forth.

In the second book,² the author analyzes the process by which Japanese-U.S. military cooperation has become more intense in the postwar period. The author exposes the essence of Japanese-American military cooperation, its nature and its objectives at various times. The "Three Arrows" plan already envisaged joint Japanese-American operations in the event of a large-scale armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. The United States was granted complete freedom in the use of military bases on Japanese territory and Japan was made responsible for blocking the Tsushima Strait, providing for the air defense of South Korea, repairing military equipment and supplying South Korean troops with certain types of weapons.

In amplification of the "Three Arrows" plan, the JDA later drafted specific plans for joint combat operations: the "Flying Dragon" (1964-1965) and the "Buffalo Run" (1966). The "Flying Dragon" was a plan for interaction by Japanese and U.S. armed forces in combat operations on Okinawa. "Buffalo Run" was a plan for a joint operation on the Korean peninsula. According to these documents, Japanese armed forces would enter into combat as part

of the "UN troops" immediately after the adoption of a government decision and would essentially be put under the jurisdiction of the American command. Japanese armed forces would have the responsibility of defending the air and water expanses and sea lanes connecting Japan with Korea, Okinawa and Taiwan (p 13). The creation of a united agency to coordinate U.S.-Japanese combat operations was envisaged.

Military cooperation between Japan and the United States, the author points out, is now being further developed. After the "Basic Principles of Cooperation Between Japan and the United States in the Military Sphere" were ratified by the Japanese Government and the national defense council on 28 November 1978, the chief of the JDA ordered the drafting of a plan for joint combat operations, which was called a "new variant" of the "Three Arrows" plan (p 14). According to the author, the new plan envisages closer interaction by the two sides and the assumption of additional responsibilities by Japan. According to an admission made by K. Ito, former JDA department head, on 4 July 1978 at a meeting of the budget committee of the lower house of parliament, the new plan should focus more on, "firstly, the comprehensive use of the ground troops and air and naval forces of Japan; secondly, the elimination of shortcomings in the equipping of Japanese armed forces; thirdly, the assumption of additional responsibilities by Japan in joint operations by Japanese and American troops" (pp 14, 15).

As the author points out, "the present strategy of the United States in Asia and the Pacific consists in guaranteeing its military presence in the region, agreeing to semi-ally relations with China under the conditions of Soviet-Chinese confrontation and, with Japan's assistance and on the basis of a U.S.-Japanese-Chinese alliance, ensuring itself superiority to the Soviet Union in the current balance of power" (p 15). Ruling circles in the United States are striving to take advantage of every opportunity to "overpower the national liberation movement, hamper its development, ensure the supremacy of U.S. imperialism in Southeast and South Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions," preserve the division of the Korean population and strengthen the alliance connecting the United States with Japan and South Korea (p 15).

According to the "Basic Principles of Cooperation Between Japan and the United States in the Military Sphere," this cooperation envisages joint combat operations in the event of the "danger or threat of an armed attack on Japan," Japanese participation in offensive combat operations in the air and the sea near the Japanese Islands and the offer of Japanese military facilities to U.S. armed forces for joint use in the event of tension in the Far East (p 15).

Therefore, Japan has taken on the responsibility of safeguarding, in conjunction with the United States, "security" in Asia and the Pacific, which attests to qualitative changes in the scales of their military cooperation in line with the Japanese-American "security treaty." Actually, all of Asia and the entire Pacific zone have now become the object of joint action by Japanese and U.S. armed forces.

Japan has taken on the commitment of "defending" all water within 900 kilometers of the Japanese Islands and sea lanes for a distance of up to 1,850 kilometers. Japan has promised to "close" all three straits leading to the Pacific Ocean to the Soviet naval fleet "in the event of extraordinary circumstances," which should guarantee the U.S. fleet freedom of action in the Pacific and thereby enhance the effectiveness of hostilities against the Soviet Armed Forces (p 17). The author concludes that the "Basic Principles" are of cardinal importance primarily to the United States.

The "Joint Defense Plan" is also still in the draft stage. The compilation of its operational section is being supervised by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, while the political portion is being supervised by the defense agency chief. In 1980 the basic research guidelines should be determined, and this is to be followed by the drafting of variations of possible combat operations, the conduct of joint operations and the distribution of responsibilities between the armed forces of Japan and the United States.

The adoption of the "Basic Principles" has been accompanied by the further intensification of Japanese-American military and political cooperation and the coordination of foreign policy positions (p 20). The establishment of the principles of Japanese-American military cooperation, which has aroused the desire to revise several Japanese laws or to amend them substantially, will naturally, as the author correctly points out, further augment militaristic tendencies in Japan (p 20) and bring about significant changes in the entire system of Japanese-American military cooperation in the 1980's.

In the third book,³ S. Hayashi examines questions connected with the use of armed forces for the purpose of "safeguarding public security"--that is, in the interest of preserving the existing political structure in the nation. The author points out the antidemocratic nature of the Japanese armed forces, which, in accordance with the "Self-Defense Forces Act," are being used to suppress the democratic movement and guarantee monopoly domination of the country. During the course of the gradual restoration of the armed forces--the creation of a reserve police corps and its subsequent transformation into a security corps and, later, into "self-defense forces"--it was announced that their chief responsibility would be to "defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression" (pp 10, 11). The term "indirect aggression," S. Hayashi states, unequivocally implies the suppression of public demonstrations for individual rights and better living conditions. When the armed forces were being created, measures were taken to perfect the function of public repression: The appropriate decrees and laws were passed, close ties were established between the JDA and the public security commission, interaction by armed forces and police was organized and responsibilities connected with the suppression of public demonstrations were distributed among branches of the armed services (pp 10-11, 18-29).

In the 1970's, the system for preserving "law and order" continued to be perfected: The armed forces were directed to not only assist the police, but also to participate directly in punitive actions against the democratic movement in the nation. As a result of this, the armed forces and the police began to interact more closely and efficiently.

The intensification of the democratic struggle has motivated ruling circles to use the armed forces to combat this movement. It is indicative that operations for the suppression of the democratic movement are envisaged in all of the plans drafted each year in military headquarters, although this has been kept strictly confidential. Plans for struggle against democratic forces call for the use of tanks, armored carriers, helicopters and tear gas.

In conclusion, the author stresses that the emergency legislation being promoted by ruling circles is partly aimed at guaranteeing favorable conditions for the armed suppression of the democratic movement in the nation, the restriction of public rights and the transformation of Japan into a militaristic state (pp 15-16).

FOOTNOTES

1. Hayashi Shigeo, "Kokka kinkyuken-no kenkyu" [A Study of the Emergency Powers of Government], Tokyo, 1978, 178 pages.
2. Hayashi Shigeo, "Zembun-Mitsuya sakusen kenkyu" [The Drafting of the "Three Arrows Operation"], Tokyo, 1979, 139 pages.
3. Hayashi Shigeo, "Tian kodo-no kenkyu" [A Study of the Activities of Public Security Agencies], Tokyo, 1979, 135 pages.

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INDIAN OCEAN: ZONE OF PEACE OR THEATER OF COMBAT?

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 190-193

[Review by V. P. Kozin of the books "Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power" by F. A. Vali, New York, 1976, XV + 272 pages, and "U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean: The International Response" by Monarajan Bezboruah, New York, 1977, XVII + 269 pages]

[Text] The problem of safeguarding security in one of the most important parts of the world--the Indian Ocean region--has been debated more and more frequently in many countries in recent years. The interest in this issue is completely understandable: In our day the Indian Ocean region provides the world with much of its basic raw materials, particularly oil, and contains around 50 sovereign states (one-third of the UN membership), with a population exceeding 1 billion. It is therefore natural that the guarantee of real peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region would be in the interest of many of the world's peoples. In this connection, world public opinion is interested primarily in two questions: What are the possible ways of implementing the famous proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace? What effect will the foreign military presence in this region, which still exists, have on the future of the people inhabiting the region and on world peace? A great deal of literature on the Indian Ocean issue has been published in the West. The monographs being reviewed also deal mainly with this subject.

The authors of both monographs (F. Vali, an American of Hungarian descent, and M. Bezboruah, an Indian living in the United States) agree that the Indian Ocean region is playing an increasingly important role in the system of international trade, economic and political relations by virtue of its "geopolitical and geostrategic position" (F. Vali, p 41) and "the possibilities it offers for control over the vast territories adjacent to it" (M. Bezboruah, pp XV-XVI). They base their ideas, however, on different political premises: Vali advocates a "show of strength" by the leading Western nations in the Indian Ocean, while M. Bezboruah supports the idea of the "moderate" or "limited" military presence of non-littoral states. Consequently, the conclusions stated in these works also differ.

In his analysis of U.S. activity in the Indian Ocean region, F. Vali singles out five factors which, in his opinion, explain the U.S. interest in preserving its political and military presence here: "The desire to promote stability and economic development in the countries of this region; the preservation of the status quo, which would please allies and friends; capital investments in the amount of 10 billion dollars (excluding military aid); the traditional interest in ensuring the freedom of the seas; the strategic interest in ensuring the freedom of the seas; the strategic consideration that the northern part of the Indian Ocean could be used for the launching of ballistic missiles" (p 185). Vali rationalizes the need to maintain the so-called "balance of power" in the region, which he divides into the "balance of external power," made up of the non-littoral states of the region, and the "balance of local power," consisting of the littoral and mainland states. Vali feels that maintaining the "balance of external power" will prevent "hegemonism" in the region. Justifying the U.S. military presence here, he implies that it serves as some kind of stabilizing factor in the "balance of local power" and should therefore be preserved (p 52). In this connection, it is interesting that Vali remarks that the notorious gunboat diplomacy (in our day, as we know, the United States has transformed it into "aircraft carrier diplomacy" by modernizing its technical and combat equipment) should be regarded as "useful." "The presence or appearance of naval forces (American--V. K.) can lend support to foreign policy measures and influence friends and enemies. These forces can be used for friendly or hostile intervention in events taking place far from their own shores; ...in peacetime, naval ships and the carrier fleet can be used as a threat, can constitute an ocean blockade and can aid in an embargo or landing operation," he points out (p 58).

Bezboruah has a somewhat different interpretation of the matter. In his opinion, the factors attracting the American military establishment to the third-largest ocean in the world are the following: "The need to fill a vacuum," which supposedly appeared in this region after Great Britain's departure from its positions "east of the Suez" at the end of the 1960's; the desire to "cover the Indian Ocean with the nuclear umbrella"; the safeguarding of "guaranteed shipments" of major strategic raw materials, primarily oil; and the need to monitor "vitally important sea lanes." Besides this, U.S. strategy in the Indian Ocean region, according to M. Bezboruah, is also colored by the prevailing opinion in Washington that the United States can influence the course of events here "only with the aid of naval forces" (pp 35-38, 52). Relating the history of the American military penetration of the Indian Ocean, M. Bezboruah recalls that it began during World War II, and that U.S. naval ships have virtually never left this ocean since the creation of the "Middle East operational U.S. naval unit" (1948), stationed in Bahrain (pp 33, 51). He feels that in our day the Indian Ocean has a "special place in U.S. strategy" and that this strategy is "based on long-range plans of action with far-reaching goals" (pp 33, 57).

As we know, the people of the Indian Ocean basin are particularly disturbed by the many foreign military bases and installations located in the region, which constitute an important element of the permanent military presence of the United States, Great Britain and France. Vali, in complete accordance with his line of reasoning, advocates the retention of U.S. military bases in this ocean, including the naval and air force base on the island of Diego Garcia, because he believes that "in a region of possible combat these bases are still necessary, both for the fleets located here and for fleets operating in far-off regions" (pp 58, 174).¹

In contrast to F. Vali, who regards the Diego Garcia base as an alleged "ordinary communications center" (he deliberately repeats the stock phrase that is often used in U.S. congressional debates on the question of enlarging the base on the island), Bezboruah believes that this base represents the "focal point of U.S. strategy in the Indian Ocean." The question of using the island for military purposes was considered in the U.S. Defense Department's drafts of the "Strategic Island Theory" back in the late 1950's, Bezboruah says. Even then, this question was regarded "as a point of departure for defining the nature of U.S. naval operations in peacetime and naval combat missions in wartime" (p 53). It is for this reason, M. Bezboruah writes, that, from the time when the question of building a military base on the island of Diego Garcia was first discussed in the U.S. Congress, it was clear that the plans of U.S. military strategists for Diego Garcia envisaged "much more than the establishment of an ordinary communications center" (p 62). This approach differs from the view of the American researchers and officials who are trying to imply that the base serves peaceful goals, and not aggressive ones. In particular, F. Vali makes this statement (p 232). By the time Bezboruah's book was published, the military base on the island of Diego Garcia could accommodate aircraft carrier units and strategic aviation and service nuclear submarines. The nature of the military installations on the island at the present time and the proposed forms of their use in the future (including their use as a base for the U.S. 5th Indian Ocean Fleet) leave no room for doubt that Washington intends to have a huge strategic military center in the very middle of the Indian Ocean for the conduct of large-scale combat operations.

Bezboruah's position on the question of creating an independent U.S. fleet permanently based in the Indian Ocean is of definite interest (this question, according to reports, was debated once again in the military circles of the Carter Administration in spring 1979). According to the author, the creation of a fifth U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean is a possibility because the Pentagon, which advocated the preservation of the permanent U.S. naval presence in this zone, will not agree to send operational units of the 7th Fleet to this ocean, as this would considerably reduce the capacity of the latter to carry out "combat missions" in the Pacific. Explaining his negative feelings about the creation of a separate U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean, Bezboruah writes that this "would escalate the

1. For more about the Diego Garcia base, see "Diego Garcia--U.S. Military Base in the Indian Ocean," ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1979, No 1, pp 84-86.

rivalry between certain powers and institute the spending of billions of dollars on new operational units and hundreds of millions of dollars on their annual maintenance" (pp 229-230). It should be noted that recent events have corroborated some of M. Bezboruah's conclusions in regard to the possibility of more pronounced U.S. aggression in the Indian Ocean zone. In addition to creating a permanently based fifth fleet in the Indian Ocean, the Pentagon has already decided, in principle, to create an expeditionary "rapid response" corps, numbering 110,000, for transfer to some parts of the Indian Ocean, primarily the Persian Gulf zone.

Separate sections of the books by F. Vali and M. Bezboruah are devoted to the analysis of Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean. The complete distortion of the Soviet stand on the Indian Ocean issue is characteristic of Vali's work. Clutching onto the hackneyed myth about of the notorious "Soviet threat," he tries to ascribe absolutely inappropriate functions to a small group of Soviet ships (for example, the prevention of oil shipments), and presents an entire list of "Soviet military bases" in the ocean, although statements of this kind are completely groundless and have been officially refuted by many Indian Ocean states. It has been the principled line of the Soviet Union to refuse to construct military bases in the zone. This was quite authoritatively announced from the rostrum of the 25th CPSU Congress by L. I. Brezhnev.² On the other hand, F. Vali not only tries to describe the numerous U.S., British and French military bases located in all parts of this ocean as harmless installations, but also makes every effort to understate the actual quantity of these bases. It is known, however, that these states already have close to 20 large military bases and installations. If smaller bases and the bases of this "trio's" allies are counted, this figure would appear even more impressive. As a speaker noted in the Australian Senate, there were 33 U.S. military bases and installations in this nation alone in 1976.

In his investigation of Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean, M. Bezboruah concludes that they can be explained by the Soviet desire to maintain trade and economic relations with the countries of the zone, engage in the extraction of products from the sea, ensure access between its European and Far Eastern ports and counteract the threat of nuclear attack (pp 132, 135-138). On the basis of data published in U.S. congressional documents, Bezboruah concludes that the combat strength, composition and sphere of operations of Soviet naval ships in the Indian Ocean are much smaller than those of U.S. ships, and if the activities of the United States' allies--Great Britain, Australia and South Africa--in the ocean are considered, the level of Soviet military presence in the zone is much lower than the U.S. level (pp 98, 102). He states that "the essence of the Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean reflects the Soviet determination to have a low level of presence of a defensive nature in the region" (pp 117, 147-148).

2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Current Party Objectives in the Sphere of Domestic and Foreign Policy," Report to the 25th CPSU Congress, 24 February 1976, Moscow, 1976, p 28.

After examining China's policy in the Indian Ocean, both authors predict that it will be able to send its naval ships to the ocean for long periods of time in the future (up to the present time, Chinese ships had only appeared in the ocean in April 1970). In Vali's opinion, China has a relatively strong naval fleet for this, ranking fifth in the world in terms of the number of ships and third in terms of the number of naval personnel; besides this, China's military contacts with Pakistan and several other states bordering on the Indian Ocean, the show of Chinese military strength in adjacent seas, the "reaching out" to the Malacca Strait—one of the ocean's most important waterways, and so forth are quite indicative (pp 193-195).

Bezboruah writes that China views the Indian Ocean region "from the standpoint of ideological, strategic and political prospects" (p 159). Pointing out the long-term of Chinese interests in the zone, he also issues a warning regarding the possible appearance of Chinese submarines and other types of naval forces in the Indian Ocean in the future (p 164). In addition, China will support Washington's plan to build up its naval forces in the ocean because the American military presence in this region is "useful to China from the standpoint of its long-range interests." In turn, the United States, in exchange for China's agreement with its policy in the Indian Ocean region, will assist China in safeguarding its own "interests" (pp 162-163).

Japanese interests in this part of the world are dictated, as F. Vali and A. Bezboruah unanimously state, by economic considerations. They differ, however, in their predictions regarding the possibility of the future appearance of Japanese naval forces in this ocean. Whereas Vali feels that the main obstacle keeping the Japanese navy from entering the ocean consists of "constitutional restrictions" and a "shortage of enthusiasm" (p 208), Bezboruah asserts that the Japanese naval forces have "significant opportunities" to extend their sphere of military activity to the Indian Ocean and that constitutional obstacles can be "easily bypassed" (p 166).

In reference to the military presence of some NATO countries in the Indian Ocean, M. Bezboruah quite carefully writes that their policy of a "show of military strength" in this region and, on the whole, their negative attitude toward the idea of turning the ocean into a zone of peace suggest that they are prepared to maintain a "strong military presence" in the Indian Ocean (p 167). We must say that the intensity of tactical and combat preparations by the naval forces of the leading NATO countries has escalated noticeably in the Indian Ocean in recent years.

We absolutely cannot agree with F. Vali's statement that the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is an "impossible dream" (pp 62, 237). Naturally, if the Indian Ocean becomes a "separate theater of operations," as F. Vali views it, and if the foreign military presence in this region becomes stronger and the network of military bases and installations is expanded, it is obvious that serious obstacles will be set up

on the road leading to the implementation of the zone of peace idea. Bezboruah also distorts the principled foreign policy line of the Soviet Union when he asserts that the USSR does not support this idea (p 144). The Soviet Union is taking an active part in its implementation along with other states. This is attested to by many CPSU and Soviet Government documents and speeches by Soviet leaders and diplomats. The position of the Soviet Union in regard to the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has been set forth repeatedly in the last 9 years (that is, after the question was included in the UN General Assembly agenda in 1971). It is also no secret that the USSR has taken a constructive stand in negotiations with the United States in regard to the Indian Ocean, during the course of which it has favored the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the ocean. The transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of genuine peace, security and productive cooperation, with consideration for the interests of all states concerned, and without any violation of the general standards of international law, particularly the principle of free shipping, and under the conditions of the total dismantling of foreign military bases in the region, would aid considerably in extending the process of detente to other parts of the world.

In conclusion, we can say that although the authors of these works approach the Indian Ocean issue in different ways, their works as a whole do not present an accurate picture of the nature, goals and progress of the famous proposal to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. In this respect, they are typical bourgeois historical works on the Indian Ocean issue. This makes the need for a Soviet scientific study, which would introduce clarity into the question of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of genuine peace and cooperation, all the more urgent.

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A SENSE OF JAPAN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 193-196

[Review by A. I. Mamonov, candidate of philological sciences, of the book "Kavabata Yasunari. Ocherk" (Kawabata Yasunari. An Essay) by N. T. Fedorenko, Moscow, 1978, 272 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

JAPANESE FISHING INDUSTRY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 196-199

[Review by R. D. Khlynova, candidate of economic sciences, of the book "Rybnoye khozyaystvo Yaponii" by N. K. Kutsobina, Moscow, Nauka (Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1979), 261 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

USEFUL AID

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 199-200

[Review by A. A. Moskalev, candidate of philological sciences, of the book "Drevnekitayskiy yazyk. Teksty, grammatika, leksicheskiy kommentariy" (The Ancient Chinese Language. Texts, Grammar and Notes on Vocabulary) by M. V. Kryukov and Huang Shuying, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, 512 pages with illustrations]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

'FROM THE LONG MARCH TO AGGRESSION'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 201-204

[Review by M. D. Popov of the book "A hosszú meneteleste az agresszióig" (From the Long March to Aggression) by F. Varnai, Zrínyi katonai kiadó, Budapest, 1979, 248 pages]

[Text] An understanding of present events in China obviously requires a look at the past, at the factors which led the nation so far out of the mainstream of historical development. The dangerous abnormalities of the "Chinese phenomenon" disturb and worry not only progressive politicians and statemen, but also all people who want to live in peace and harmony. This phenomenon is attracting the attention of historians, philosophers and journalists, who are trying to understand it and expose it. This is the second time Hungarian journalist Ferenc Varnai has dealt with this subject. His first book, "The Maoist Path," published by the Kosut Publishing House (also available in a Russian translation), is a unique biography of Maoism. Exposing the petty bourgeois essence of Maoism, the author writes: "The Maoists entered into conflict with Marxism-Leninism, with proletarian internationalism, and while their attacks are now directed against the Soviet Union and the CPSU, this is only because the CPSU has been the most consistent defender of these principles and the policy of the USSR represents the embodiment of internationalism and the major obstacle in the way of Maoist ambitions."¹

In his new book "A hosszú meneteleste az agresszióig" (Zrínyi Publishing House, Budapest, 1979), Varnai demonstrates, with the aid of documents and eye-witness accounts, that the path of the renegades does not end with betrayal, but goes on to aggression and to the creation of a situation endangering world peace and public security. The fact that the Beijing leadership is conducting a policy of rapid arms buildup while simultaneously rejecting all initiatives aimed at the alleviation of international tension is causing people throughout the world to wonder whether China's intensive militarization will lead to war and whether its move to the camp of international reaction will disrupt the balance of power in favor of the opponents of detente, freedom and independence.

In connection with this, many people are wondering how this could have happened to China, a nation whose population and army once fought a heroic battle against Japanese imperialism, deposed the bourgeois feudal regime of Chiang Kai-shek and, in the first years after the establishment of the popular government, were extremely successful in economic construction, assisted by their economic, political and military alliance with the socialist countries. The answer to this question can be found in the history of the CCP, where there has been a continuous overt or covert struggle by supporters of the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist policy line against non-proletarian, nationalistic elements and petty bourgeois revolutionaries who have only learned isolated Marxist slogans.

"The fact is," Varnai writes in the preface to his book, "that conflicts between internationalist and nationalist elements had already sprung up in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and had become quite acute by the late 1920's and early 1930's. At the end of the 1950's, unfortunately, the great-power chauvinistic course triumphed, and it is this course that has distorted the features of the People's Republic of China for two decades now" (p 4).

The Maoists themselves primitively divide their history into two periods--the "period of defeats," when Mao Zedong was not yet the head of the party, and the "period of victorious Chinese revolution," when the ideas of the "great helmsman" began to be propagated in the party. In reality, however, the origination and development of Maoism went through four basic stages--and Varnai corroborates this with documents and facts.

The development of Mao Zedong's anti-Marxist ideas took place mainly during the period from the 1920's through 1934. The author feels that 1935-1959 was the period of Mao's struggle for a leading position in the Chinese revolutionary movement and the army. In the 1960's and early 1970's the Maoists launched a struggle for the leading role in the international communist movement and, when they were unable to attain this goal, severed relations with the communist movement and the socialist community. In the second half of the 1970's they openly allied themselves with extremist imperialist forces, announced a united front of struggle against the Soviet Union and launched aggression against one of the socialist countries--Vietnam--in an attempt to gain the assistance of the Western nations in the modernization of the Chinese army and economy and in the establishment of a material and technical base for their great-power chauvinistic policy.

At first, the Maoists tried to make their departure from the position of internationalism and their betrayal of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism look like a "conflict with Moscow," for which the "Soviet revisionist leadership" was to blame. Their subsequent behavior proved, however, that they were not only opposing the Soviet Union, but also trying to break up the socialist community by setting the fraternal nations in opposition to the world's first socialist state. Therefore, this was not a conflict between two parties or two nations. In their attempt to undermine the unity of the socialist countries, the Maoists have conducted a differentiated policy

toward them, trying to energize nationalist, anti-Soviet forces. Now they are implying that the socialist countries, which have solved many of their problems with the selfless aid of the Soviet Union, are supposedly kept on a Soviet leash. In a speech at an NPC [National People's Congress] meeting, CCP Central Committee Chairman Hua Guofeng openly advised the socialist countries, for example, to "fight against threats, intervention, subversive activity and control on the part of the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union." In the same speech, he slanderously called the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization "instruments of Soviet domination" (p 170). After the 10th CCP Congress, the Maoists launched a rabid anti-Soviet campaign, provocatively declaring that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack China. "While they were spreading this slander," the author notes, "they agreed to ally themselves with any and all forces in the interests of struggle against the Soviet Union, the socialist community and the solidarity of the international workers movement" (p 139).

Ferenc Varnai turns to history not only to remind the reader of educative events and facts in the past, but also to define the class nature of the forces that were able to prevail in the Chinese leadership and trace their behavior patterns. It is no secret that an important role in the Chinese revolution was played by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the positive services of which, from the Long March to the routing of Chiang Kai-shek's forces, are not doubted by anyone. But it is alarming--and the author points this out to the reader--that the Maoists are applying the laws of wartime to the period of peaceful construction, cultivating "military communism" and "military democracy" and substituting voluntarism for a scientific approach to the resolution of national economic problems. The fact is that they have always regarded the army as a more effective means of winning power than the party (p 151). As early as 1938, Mao Zedong said: "With a rifle, it is fully possible to set up party organizations.... Anyone who wants to take over the government and hold on to it must have a strong army."² In connection with this, the author recalls Lenin's words about the need to "learn all, without the slightest exception, forms or aspects of public activity" and about the folly of attaching primary significance only to military methods and the army.³

The non-Marxist, petty bourgeois approach of the Maoists to the issue of authority was already apparent during the period of civil war and the fight against the Japanese occupation, when it was particularly urgent that all national and patriotic forces be united in a single resistance front. They stubbornly adhered to this view after the victory of the revolution and the establishment of a popular government. In August 1958, at a meeting in Beidaihe, Mao Zedong announced the need to institute an "atmosphere of military communism" (p 75). This "military communism," as an ideal--in the Maoists' opinion--form of social organization, signifies the rejection of the Leninist principle of financial incentives and the replacement of this principle with excessive egalitarianism. The militarization of the entire Chinese society on the model of the PLA and the

regulation of all public life in the spirit of "barracks socialism" were given priority. All of this is fundamentally inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism.

"In the life of any particular nation, naturally, it may come to pass," Varnai writes in connection with this, "that the equal distribution of small commodity supplies can only be guaranteed through the institution of strict measures" (p 82). As an example of this, the author mentions, in particular, the necessity for a system of military communism in the USSR in the years of civil war. "During the course of the Chinese revolution," he says, "it was just as natural to use this method to provide the liberated regions and the troops of the fighting Red Army with the necessary supplies. But I am referring to something quite different, to the actual discrediting of communism. Communism, Marxism-Leninism teaches us, does not mean poverty or the equal distribution of meager supplies of food and commodities, but abundance and the provision of each individual with material goods according to his needs. And this cannot be attained through the primitive organization of labor or the militarization of the masses, but through the development of modern productive forces" (p 82). This, as Lenin stated, calls for organization, on which "all contemporary science and technology" can rest. "The mention of rifles in this connection is the height of absurdity."⁴

The Maoists never cease the "mention of rifles." They feel that complex economic and political problems can be solved by organizing society on the army model. Even in Mao's lifetime, the army was called the "school" of his ideas, and the army also became the main force in conducting the "Cultural Revolution." In a letter to Lin Biao, for example, Mao Zedong spoke of turning the army into a "great school," in which the soldiers, in addition to learning about politics, military science and culture, would study agriculture, auxiliary trades and industrial production, both for the satisfaction of personal needs and for exchange for goods in the state sector. (p 111). It is true that the economic impact of this activity was negligible. More attention was paid to the plan to assign the functions of government agencies to the army in the event of a broad-scale attack on Mao's political opponents. And this did come to pass.

The exclusive role of the army in national life is also attested to by other facts. Varnai stresses that virtually all economic, political and cultural life in the nation is controlled by military units. Real power in the provinces is concentrated in the hands of generals, who usually command military districts and head local government at the same time (p 180). Such slogans as "Rifles engender power," "Learn from the army" and "The army is the school of Mao Zedong's Thought," which have nothing in common with the Marxist interpretation of the party's role during the period of socialist construction in China, are not only being declared, but are also being implemented. The army is superior to the party in the PRC. Varnai cites the following data in his book: More than 40 percent of the members of the CCP Central Committee are army men, 10 of the 23

Politburo members are military men, and 3 of the 5 members of the Standing Committee, which actually governs the nation, are simultaneously holding top-level military positions (p 161).

"Barracks socialism" could be regarded as China's internal affair if the Chinese leaders only rattled their rifles. But the fact is that the Maoists oppose the policy of peaceful coexistence, call international detente a "great fraud," talk incessantly about the inevitability of a third world war, lay claim to the territory of neighboring countries and provoke military conflicts. They stubbornly reject all initiatives aimed at disarmament.

Varnai lists three reasons for the Maoists' interest in the arms race. First of all, this race serves as justification for the militarization of the country--according to UN data, PRC military expenditures exceed 40 percent of the state budget. Secondly, the arms race, in the Maoists' opinion, is slowing the economic and social development of the countries they regard as their opponents. Thirdly, Beijing is opposed to disarmament and is striving to involve even the developing countries in the arms race, as this would be a heavy burden on their economies and would help to strengthen Chinese influence in these countries (pp 164, 167).

Moreover, under the conditions of the arms race the Maoists can hope to gain the assistance of the imperialist states in building up and modernizing China's military potential.

Peace-loving people are particularly disturbed by the Chinese leadership's views on nuclear weapons and nuclear war, which are the direct opposite of the international communist movement's views. The Maoists, Varnai stresses, deny the possibility of preventing thermonuclear war, reject the policy of peaceful coexistence by states with differing social structures and see no connection between the struggle for peace and the development of the revolutionary and national liberation movement. Advocating preparations for a nuclear war, in which, according to their estimates, half of mankind would be lost, they do not believe in the ultimate triumph of socialism over capitalism in worldwide economic competition (pp 98-99).

A large section of the book deals with the modernization of the Chinese army. The Chinese regular armed forces number, according to the author's data, 4,325,000 (3,625,000 in ground forces, 400,000 in air and air defense forces and 300,000 in the navy and naval aviation). Besides this, militarized forces include the armed militia--7 million individuals, making up 75 divisions and 10 regiments--the millions of members of the urban militia and the construction-production corps (almost 4 million) and the 70-100 million people making up the so-called base militia, where they undergo combat training (p 179). The author describes the main types of troops and presents interesting data on their organizational structure, military equipment and combat capability.

The Maoists realize that their present army is not strong enough to attain their expansionist goals. For this reason, they have drawn up a program for the modernization of the armed forces and have enlisted the help of Western experts in carrying out the program.

"Chinese military delegations are making one 'fact-finding trip' after another to the NATO countries," Varnai writes. "The purpose of these trips is partly the purchase of modern weapons and partly--and this is of no less importance to the Chinese defense industry, the technical backwardness of which became more pronounced during the years of the 'Cultural Revolution'--the acquisition of licenses and technological documents. Besides this, the Chinese military leaders have received an opportunity in the West to learn about the experience of the NATO nations in the military organization and control of troops" (p 207).

The goal of the technical modernization of the army is also being served by such measures as the creation of a special committee to enlist the help of Chinese technical experts living abroad, to invite scientists living in the United States to visit China for an unspecified length of time, particularly scientists working in the field of nuclear physics, precision engineering and the aerospace industry, and to send Chinese students to technical institutes in the Western countries.

The road of betrayal of the socialist cause, the interests and goals of the international communist and workers movement and the national liberation struggle has led the Maoists directly into the camp of the enemies of peace and progress. Their expanding ties with the nations of the North Atlantic bloc have won China shameful reputations as the "16th member of NATO." "In an attempt to change the global balance of power, the promoters of cold war," the author writes, "are prepared to aid in the modernization of Chinese military potential in the hope of containing, with China's help, much of the military strength of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" (p 222).

The Maoists, however, have gone even further, to the logical conclusion of their shameful biography. Launching aggression against socialist Vietnam, they exposed themselves completely as the enemies of peace, democracy and progress. Analyzing the reaction of the world public to this treacherous action, the author writes: "We can frankly say that the aggression against Vietnam was the result of Beijing's great-power chauvinist policy, which has nothing in common with socialism and, in fact, is obviously hostile to it. China has reached the point of direct and overt economic, political and even, as the aggression against Vietnam proved, military struggle against socialism" (p 222).

Under present circumstances, Ferenc Varnai writes in conclusion, China has three alternatives. If it wants to return to the road of real progress and socialist construction, it must resume its friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. On the basis of the

principles of peaceful coexistence, it can also normalize at least governmental relations with the nations of the socialist community, which have always been prepared to agree to this. The third path, which China has been following in recent years, is the path of anti-Soviet, nationalistic and adventuristic policy aimed at alliance with world reaction. "This is why the struggle against Maoist ideas and practices," Ferenc Varnai stresses, "is inseparable from the struggle against imperialism and for the triumph of the cause of peace and security, for the purity of scientific socialist principles and for the preservation of the Chinese revolution's achievements. In essence, this struggle is one of the ways of rendering international assistance to the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people" (pp 241-242).

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Varnai, "The Maoist Path" (translated from the Hungarian), Moscow, 1979, p 14.
2. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 2, Moscow, 1953, p 388.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 81.
4. Ibid., vol 36, pp 272-273.

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SOVIET-JAPANESE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE IN TOKYO (DECEMBER 1979)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1980 pp 205-206

[Report by V. A. Krivtsov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] The first Soviet-Japanese round table conference on the "Role and Responsibilities of the Public in the Movement for Stronger Friendship Between the People of the Soviet Union and Japan" was held in Tokyo on 4-9 December 1979.

The delegation representing the Soviet public was made up of T. B. Guzhenko, chairman of the board of the USSR-Japan Society, minister of the maritime fleet of the USSR and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet (he was also the head of the delegation); N. T. Fedorenko, editor-in-chief of INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA magazine and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. B. Spandar'yan, trade representative of the USSR to Japan; V. A. Krivtsov, deputy director of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. A. Matveyev, IZVESTIYA political correspondent; V. A. Syrokomskiy, first deputy editor-in-chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA; and B. P. Lavrent'yev, department head at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The conference was also attended by a delegation of CPSU party workers touring Japan, headed by Director A. G. Yegorov of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, by Soviet embassy personnel and by representatives of the Soviet press and the state television and radio broadcasting system (around 50 in all).

The Japanese side was represented at the conference by prominent Japanese public spokesmen, members of parliament (including Chairman H. Ishida of the parliamentary Japanese-Soviet Friendship Association, Chairman M. Akagi of the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society and others), the heads of the majority of organizations and societies maintaining friendly relations with the USSR, representatives of the business community, the intelligentsia and youth and women's organizations, and numerous representatives of the press (around 100 in all).

After the plenary session, at which H. Ishida and M. Akagi spoke for the Japanese side and D. S. Polyanskiy, Soviet ambassador to Japan, and T. B. Guzhenko presented speeches on behalf of the Soviet side, the conference split up into discussion groups. There were four such groups. The first discussed the movement for friendship between Japan and the USSR (this meeting was participated in by T. B. Guzhenko, N. T. Fedorenko and B. P. Lavrent'yev); the second dealt with questions of Japanese-Soviet economic ties (participated in by V. B. Spandar'yan); the third concerned international developments and the situation in the Far East (V. A. Matveyev and V. A. Krivtsov); the fourth discussed the development of cultural and scientific exchange between the USSR and Japan (N. T. Fedorenko and V. A. Syrokomskiy). At the concluding plenary session, the leaders of the discussion groups presented reports and a conference communique was adopted.

Problems in Soviet-Japanese political, economic, cultural, scientific and technical relations were earnestly discussed at the plenary sessions and group meetings, and speakers stressed that their successful development would be inseparable from efforts to consolidate peace and public security, stop the arms race, particularly in the case of nuclear arms, promote disarmament, deepen detente and extend it to all parts of the world, and that the development of these relations would contribute to peace and security in the Far East and Asia and promote the cause of world peace. The Soviet delegation consistently made it known that Japan and the USSR must immediately begin work on a document stipulating the principles of relations between the two countries, based on good-neighbor contacts and mutually beneficial cooperation, and continue to develop economic and technical ties, expand scientific and cultural exchange on a long-term basis, both through governmental and through public channels, and promote deeper mutual understanding and stronger trust between the people of the USSR and Japan.

Members of the Soviet delegation cogently and logically explained to the Japanese conference participants the groundlessness of Japanese claims to Soviet territory, the absurdity of allegations that the build-up of Soviet military strength in the Far East will endanger Japan and the mistaken nature of current assessments of PRC foreign policy and the situation in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet delegation met and talked with Secretary General Ito of the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers, Chairman Yasui of the Japanese House of Councillors, Chairman Nado of the Japanese House of Representatives, Transportation Minister Chizaki, President Hiraoka of MAINICHI newspaper and the leadership of the Japan-USSR Society (Horie and others). During these talks, official representatives of Japan made positive comments about the conference and its communique, stressing that all opportunities for Japanese-Soviet friendship had not yet been exhausted and that concerted effort to take advantage of these opportunities would be important. They said the soil should be prepared for the development of good-neighbor relations and cooperation between Japan and the USSR. They also brought up the "territorial question" in one form or another and similar related issues.

Members of the Soviet delegation worked extensively with representatives of the Japanese press and television. In addition to appearing on television, the head of the delegation granted interviews to the largest Japanese newspapers--ASAHI, MAINICHI and YOMIURI. At the end of the conference, the heads of the Soviet and Japanese delegations held a special press conference.

On 7 and 8 December, delegates V. A. Matveyev, V. A. Syrokomskiy and B. P. Lavrent'yev attended the first Soviet-Japanese symposium in Kumamoto and Fukuoka to discuss the development of friendly ties between the USSR and Japan. The Japanese side was represented by more than 80 activists from the Japanese-Soviet Friendship Society. The symposium adopted a joint document censuring the Japanese-American security treaty and the anti-Soviet campaign in the Japanese press and calling for the development of Japanese-Soviet friendship.

Delegates also met and spoke with representatives of the Japanese public, the business community, the intelligentsia, students and writers.

In general, we can say that the first round table conference in Tokyo was successful and was conducted in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The main result of the conference was the adoption of a communique which included the statement that the USSR and Japan must begin work as soon as possible on a document stipulating the principles of relations between the two countries on the basis of neighborly and mutually beneficial cooperation in the interests of the Soviet and Japanese people and the cause of peace and security in Asia. The conference demonstrated that there is a stronger tendency in Japan toward more active Japanese-Soviet relations and a search for ways of overcoming existing difficulties and an increasing desire for greater mutual understanding and trust. The conference directed the attention of large segments of the Japanese public, government and parliament to the need for better Soviet-Japanese relations.

The Japanese press gave the conference and its results extensive coverage. The ASAHI, YOMIURI and MAINICHI newspapers printed long interviews with the head of the Soviet delegation. Soviet-Japanese relations were also the subject of several editorials.

Despite the fact that the bourgeois press frequently repeated the usual government line, the general tone of press articles was favorable, the importance of Japanese-Soviet relations was underscored and, to a considerable extent, the communique's appeal for negotiations to conclude an agreement on good-neighbor relations and cooperation was supported.

The results of the first Soviet-Japanese round table conference suggest that this kind of conference is helpful and productive and will aid in consolidating the Japanese who are in favor of good-neighbor relations and cooperation with the USSR.

The individuals who participated in the conference acknowledged the expediency of holding this kind of round table conference in Japan and the Soviet Union on a regular basis to make the general public aware of the need for better Soviet-Japanese relations.

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INTERNATIONAL YOUTH SEMINAR IN NAKHODKA

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[Report by D. T. Kapustin, candidate of historical sciences, on Fifth International Youth Seminar of 13-18 August 1979 in Nakhodka]

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